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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last two decades, extensive research has been undertaken to understand incumbent 
firms’ adaptation behavior to disruptive innovation, considering technological change as the 
most important focus of analysis. Recently, there is an emerging literature that views disruptive 
innovation as a business model problem in which a technological innovation is deployed. In this 
literature, disruptive innovation is understood to be primarily a function of conflict between an 
incumbent’s traditional and an entrant’s new business model. This raises two major questions.  
 
First, although the original theory of disruptive innovation evolved from technological studies, 
this theory persists to explain all types of disruptive innovation over time (Markides, 2006: 19). 
Furthermore, disruptive innovation has always been studied from an incumbent firm perspective.   
With the need to shift the research focus from a technology to a business model, we also need a 
new framework to understand disruptive innovation taking the business model as the unit of 
analysis taking both the entrant’s and incumbent’s perspectives. Building on business model 
innovation studies (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001; Normann, 2001; Hamel, 2000) and the 
established technology based disruptive innovation theory (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; 
Christensen, 1997), this study offers a systematic business model framework to comprehend 
disruptive phenomenon from both an incumbent’s and an entrant’s perspectives. 
 
Second, disruptive innovation studies predominantly focus on high-tech industries. Increasingly 
many low-tech industries are being affected by disruptive non-technological market-driven 
business model innovations. Considering that disruptive innovation theory is principally 
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technology based, a review of the literature suggests that we know little about the differences 
between high-tech and low-tech market-driven disruptive innovations in terms of their 
evolutions, competitive and disruptive effects.   
 
From the strategic management literature point of view, the contribution of this study becomes 
even more relevant when the two questions are examined across economic regions. Although 
there is ample evidence that shows disruptive innovations are not always restricted to developed 
economies, little is known about how incumbents in developing economies adapt their 
organizations to disruptive business model innovations. This study takes South Africa as a 
development economy case-study. The empirical setting of the current study includes four South 
African industries: the mobile and IT industry (high-tech), banking, insurance and airlines (low-
tech) industries.  
 
In addressing the two key question of the study, the dissertation presents the empirical analysis at 
the first-order (firm-level study) and second-order (high-tech vs. low-etch study) levels. The 
first-order study argues that an innovation creates and grows a niche market through radical 
product design, different core competencies and/or a different revenue model long before it 
becomes disruptive innovation. It proposes a framework that attempts to model the evolution of 
this trajectory from an entrant’s perspective. From the entrant’s perspective, a potentially 
disruptive business model innovation is a process that evolves over time in successive 
adaptations to endogenous and exogenous innovation drivers that shape the evolution and path of 
the new business model. An innovation becomes disruptive only when the new business model 
fully or partially affects an incumbent’s established business model and market.  
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Taking the viewpoint of an incumbent firm, the first-order study further offers a framework that 
seeks to provide a causality model to comprehend the root cause of disruptive innovation and its 
impact on the incumbent’s traditional business model. One of the major causes of disruptive 
innovation is the incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma. This means that an incumbent’s success 
or failure is partly contingent on the senior corporate management’s entrepreneurship readiness 
that is manifested in terms of taking risk initiative, willingness and ability to take appropriate 
strategic approaches to enable disruptive innovation. By articulating the causes of disruptive 
innovation, it suggests four key strategic approaches an incumbent should follow to enable 
disruptive innovation. While the study finds common patterns for the causes and approaches 
among incumbents across the four industries at a firm-level, some of the hypotheses of this study 
could not be proven at an aggregated system level. Disruptive innovation is a relative 
phenomenon: Some innovations that are disruptive to some firms or industries may not be 
disruptive to other firms or industries. Therefore, the study further re-examines the aggregated 
firm-level outcomes by disaggregating the data into dichotomous technology versus market-
driven disruptive innovations. By conducting a second-order analysis at the innovation category 
level, this study adds considerably to extant innovation literature by establishing that a low-
technology market-driven disruptive business model innovation entails different business model 
evolutionary processes, different disruptive effects and different managerial implications 
compared to high-tech disruptive innovation.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Introduction  
Business environments constantly change, sometimes continuously and sometimes 
discontinuously. The persistent nature of this problem continues to generate extensive research 
streams. Some scholars argue that although complex and multiple dimensions of uncertainty 
interact to create an environment that is virtually impossible to predict, discontinuous change is a 
rare phenomenon. This type of change tends to be neutralized as industry incumbents adapt it. 
With some isolated exceptions, change takes place incrementally: its impacts on industry 
structure appear to be slow on average (Campbell and Park, 2004, Treacy, 2004; Porter, 2001; 
1996; Grant, 1998; Courtney, Kikland & Viguenrie, 1997). 
 
Others maintain that a wide range of industries are at a ‘tipping point’, where compounding and 
gradual effects of change cause an ‘inflection point’. In other words, many industries are in a 
transition state from an old to a new structure (Davenport, Leibold & Voelpel, 2006; Tapscott, 
Ticoll & Lowy, 2001; Clark and Clegg, 2000; Prahalad and Oosterveld, 1999; Hamel, 2000; 
1998; Evans and Wurster, 1997; Grove, 1996) 
 
Discontinuous innovation is defined as an innovation that causes market and/or technological 
discontinuities (Macher and Richman, 2004: 90). Discontinuities often arise from many sources 
including radical and disruptive technological innovations. Radical innovation refers to a 
different set of scientific and engineering principles which displaces a previously established 
dominant design of a technology (Dewar and Dutton, 1986: 1422). However, although this type 
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of innovation may cause technological discontinuities, it is arguably presumed to be less 
disruptive to industry incumbents because its imminent threat of obsolescence to existing 
dominant design tends to be obvious to incumbents’ managers from the outset (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990: 18). 
 
This thesis focuses on a particularly challenging discontinuous innovation that incumbents’ 
managers tend to find difficult to recognize or anticipate. This type of discontinuous innovation 
is called “disruptive innovation” and that is defined as an innovation that introduces new 
products or services that initially emerge in a niche, low-end market, but over time displaces 
market incumbents by successively moving up-market through performance improvements. 
Disruptive innovation is defined in comparison to sustaining innovation. Sustaining innovation, 
whether incremental or radical, is one that does not disrupt incumbents business models 
(Christensen, 1997: 8; Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 34). 
 
A consistently recurring theme throughout the studies of disruptive innovation is that almost all 
established organizations across a wide range of industries succeed in managing sustaining 
innovations, but fail to effectively adapt their organization when faced with disruptive 
innovations. However, new entrants often succeed in disruptive innovation (Anthony, Eyring, & 
Gibson, 2006; Henderson, 2006; Gilbert, 2003; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Christensen, 
1997). 
 
To a large extent, technological change has always been considered a major cause of disruptive 
innovation. Recently, there is an emerging view that considers change in a business model, as 
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opposed to a technology alone, to be a major cause of disruptive innovation. Disruptive 
innovation is now defined as a function of a conflict between a pioneer’s disruptive and 
incumbent’s traditional business models (Christensen, 2006: 43; Markides, 2006: 19; 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002: 533). Many scholars have provided useful frameworks and 
approaches to assist industry incumbents to deal with disruptive innovation (Markides and 
Charitou, 2004; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Chesbrough, 
2003).  
 
However, a scrutiny of the literature reveals that many of these studies focus on disruptive 
problems facing industry incumbents. With the emerging view that defines disruptive innovation 
as a function of a conflict of business models, relatively few studies provide insights into the two 
sides of the disruptive innovation problem, i.e., how entrants introduce a potentially disruptive 
business model innovation and how industry incumbents reinvent their business models to enable 
disruptive innovation. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to introduce an integrated 
framework for business model innovation (proactive) and business model reinvention (reactive) 
strategic processes to enable disruptive innovation.  
 
The notion of “enabling” is this thesis refers to expropriation, stimulation and to exploitation by 
reinventing a second business model for an innovation that has already been created internally by 
an incumbent or externally by disruptors and grown in a niche market (see Voelpel, Liebold, 
Tekie & von Kgrogh, 2005; Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001). In this thesis, the terms incumbents 
and established companies are used alternatively to refer to companies that have been operating 
traditional business models that existed before the introduction of disruptive innovation. 
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Conversely, the terms start-ups, entrants or insurgents are used alternatively to refer to new 
companies that have introduced potential disruptive innovation.   
 
Firstly, this chapter reviews the relevance of the thesis from a theoretical perspective; secondly, 
it provides its rationale from the perspective of a strategic management practice in developing 
economies. Thirdly, it identifies gaps in the strategic management literature, and presents the 
thesis’s questions and objectives. Fourthly, it introduces the research methodology and design. 
Finally, it outlines the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.2  Relevance of the Study from a Theory Perspective 
The foundation of disruptive innovation theory, as a simultaneous destructive and creative 
production process, is commonly traced back to the seminal work of Joseph Schumpeter (1942). 
In his breakthrough study of ‘gales of creative destruction’, Schumpeter (1942: 83) observed that 
waves of discontinuous technological innovations destroy old industries while creating new ones. 
Owing to the Schumpeterian theory of ‘creative destruction’, disruptive innovation provides 
specific technological characteristics through which an innovation evolves over time to displace 
market incumbents. Typically, disruptive innovation emerges initially in small, low-end markets, 
with inferior quality relative to established technology. Over time, it displaces the market 
incumbents by successively moving up-market through performance improvements (Christensen, 
1997: 8; Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 34).  
 
Most recent elaborations of this theory show that disruption occurs at the intersection point 
between new and existing (old) markets, when a fundamentally different (new) business model 
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transgresses an incumbent’s established business model. Theoretically, a particular incumbent’s 
business model originates from its early strategic choice made on how it intends to compete in its 
chosen industry and market. This choice sets a departure point for a particular evolutionary path 
(history) which shapes the structure and direction of the incumbent’s business model.  
 
In this evolutionary process, the fit that has evolved over a period of time between different 
capabilities of the incumbent’s business model, including its processes, resources, values and 
profit models make it rather difficult for the incumbent to respond to another disruptive business 
model that is destroying its market. Consequently, for an established firm the question of how to 
reinvent a business model to enable disruptive innovation, while its traditional business model is 
still profitable, becomes a key issue of survival in the long run (Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 
34; Normann, 2001: 82; Leonard-Barton, 1992: 111).  
 
The emerging scholarly perspective that views disruptive innovation as a business model 
problem, not only a technology problem, seems to trigger two possible research gaps. First, this 
new understanding suggests a shift of research focus and unit of analysis from a technology to a 
business model. Although the original disruptive innovation theory was developed from 
successive technological studies, few studies have tried to explain disruptive innovation using 
the concept of a business model. A business model approach considers all aspects of business 
activities for possible disruptive innovation, not only a technology (Markides and Charitou, 
2004; Christensen and Raynor, 2003). 
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From an insurgent's perspective, few researchers have invoked a business model concept to 
guide managers in pursuing innovation processes through systematic conceptual frameworks. 
However, there seems to be little effort to link these approaches with disruptive innovation 
theory. Business model innovation is a necessary first step that paves the way for a potential 
disruption. Yet, innovation of a commercially viable business model per se does not necessarily 
lead to disruptive innovation on its own (see Voelpel et. al., 2005; Govindarajan and Gupta, 
2001; Amit and Zott, 2001). 
 
By integrating the business model innovation approaches into the disruptive innovation theory, a 
new framework is needed to describe how a potentially disruptive business model innovation 
arises, becomes a problem to industry incumbents and how incumbents reinvent their business 
models to deal with disruptive innovation. The framework should identify the enabling or 
disabling processes through which a potentially disruptive business model originates from a 
niche market, improves over time, enters into a mainstream market, and succeeds or fails to 
dislocate incumbents’ markets. It should further describe the enabling and disabling forces that 
determine success or failure of incumbents in reinventing a second business model to enable 
disruptive innovation. 
 
Second, although the original theory of disruptive innovation evolved over time from studies on 
high-tech industries, the same theory has been used to explain all categories of disruptive 
innovations over time. While there are many examples of disruptive innovations that arise due to 
market-driven business model innovations in low-tech, it is little known whether the original 
disruptive innovation can be replicated to predict this type of innovation. In low-tech industries, 
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market-driven business model innovation often emerges at a later stage when a market matures 
and competition through a business model becomes critical (Markides, 2006: 19; Moore, 2004: 
88).  
 
A careful scrutiny of the literature reveals that most studies of disruptive innovation focus on 
high-tech industries. In response to academic criticism on the theoretical replication of disruptive 
innovation theory (Markides, 2006; Tellis, 2006; Danneels, 2004), Christensen (2006: 48) 
recently improves his original theory by adding the concept of relativity. He states that 
“disruptive innovation is a relative, not an absolute phenomenon”. Said differently, a similar 
innovation that may constitute disruptive to a particular incumbent’s business model in a given 
industry or context may be sustaining to another incumbent’s business model in another industry 
or context. This suggests that a study of disruptive innovation is not complete without describing 
the relativity of disruptive innovation and explaining contextual factors responsible for variations 
across different innovations and industries. Therefore, there is a need to investigate the relativity 
of disruptive innovation theory empirically. As a second contribution, this thesis seeks to 
investigate this relatively by testing the disruptive innovation theory across high-tech and low-
tech industries in the South African context (Christensen, 2006; Markides, 2006).  
 
1.3  Relevance of the Study from a South African Practice Perspective 
From a strategic management literature point of view, the question of how organizations should 
reinvent their business models to enable disruptive innovation becomes even more relevant when 
it is examined across economic regions. Although there is ample evidence that shows disruptive 
business model innovations are not always restricted to developed economies, little is known 
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about how innovators and managers in emerging economies replicate or adapt disruptive 
business model innovations, given the distinguishing features of these different economies 
(Davenport et al., 2006; Prahalad, 2006). The variations in factor endowments and access to 
critical resources between developed and developing economies could probably mean that 
managers face different challenges in their strategic endeavors to enable disruptive business 
model innovation. Chesbrough (1999) provides some examples of differences among countries 
within developed economies, but not for developed vs. developing economies.  
 
With a rapidly emerging economy, and being a first-follower of the first world in adapting 
innovations, South Africa one logical choice for studying this problem. The importance of this 
point can be illustrated by comparing the global change drivers with domestic situations, and 
thus their implications for business model innovations in South Africa1. 
 
Technological innovation: Advances in information and computer technology (ICT) 
substantially decrease transaction costs, and thus drive innovation of new business models, new 
organizational arrangements, new structures and new products (Clark and Clegg, 2000; Evans 
and Wurster, 1997). South Africa is characterized by a mixture of developed and developing 
economies. While the country is adapting technological innovations to create cheaper, easy to 
use and convenient products for its educated and affluent customers, the majority of the 
population lacks the means and access to benefit from such innovations. 
 
                                                 
1
 For detailed discussion on drivers of the ‘innovation economy’ see Chesbrough, (2003); Foster and Kaplan (2001); 
Tapscott et al. al., (2000); Clarke and Clegg (2000); Prahalad and Oosterveld (1999). 
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Access to capital and knowledge: Generally, knowledge is considered a key source of wealth in 
the 21st century. In developed economies, the rising power and mobility of knowledge workers, 
coupled with  the rise in private venture capitalists have increasingly threatened established 
firms, which were previously able to raise entry barriers by utilizing financial strengths and 
patents (Chesbrough, 2003: 38). In South Africa, however, it appears that while small start-ups 
struggle to access venture capital, some diversifying entrants seem to leverage their financial and 
physical resources to introduce new business models into other industries2. 
 
Prosumerism: The shift in customer orientation from passive buyers to (pro) active co-creators 
is characterized by the term ‘prosumerism’ (Gibbert, Leibold & Probst, 2002: 464). The advance 
of information technology is increasingly transforming customers from passive consumers to 
pro-active participators in co-production. This shift is generally considered as a key driver for 
agile companies to reinvent their business models in a way that can engage customers to take 
part in producing their own value. In South Africa, while this seems to be happening at the high-
end market, at the lower-end, poverty; unemployment; and accessibility are major challenges (or 
opportunities) for innovation.  
 
Globalization, deregulation and privatization: These three factors have intensified 
competition by blurring national and industry boundaries, and forcing companies to be more 
innovative than ever. Some of these were predominantly domestic, fragmented and protected by 
regulation (Clark and Clegg, 2000; Prahalad and Oosterveld, 1999). In South Africa, although 
the reintroduction of the country into the global economy in 1994 created many opportunities, 
                                                 
2Lagace, Martha (2006). How South Africa Challenges Our Thinking on FDI, interview with Eric Werker on 
November 6, 2006, Harvard Business School, Working Knowledge retrieved on 4 Feb, 2007 from 
http://www.hbs.org 
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regulation is still used to limit international cooperation and competition (Dorsey and Jacob, 
2005: 1; Porteous and Hazelhurst, 2004: 2).  
1.3.1  The Impacts of Driving Forces on Disruptive Business Model Innovation 
Broadly viewed, South African managers take three approaches to business model innovation in 
response to various domestic and global change impacts when examined over three major eras. 
The classification of these eras is necessary for generalization purposes. In reality, an archetype 
business model of one era overlaps with another era.  
 
The first archetype business model reflected Henry Ford’s industrial era or mass production 
model and Frederick Taylor’s philosophy of scientific management and specialization of labor. It 
was characterized by vertical integration: with command-and-control hierarchical structure, 
centralized communication and cost control, and top-down strategic planning. And it was tuned 
towards the objective of achieving scale and scope of production through mass production of 
relatively standardized products and services. This type of business model worked well before 
the country’s reintroduction to the global economy in early 1990s, when the business 
environment was relatively predictable and immune from fast changing global influences.  
 
Towards the second half of the 1990s, social and political changes, coupled with accelerating 
global technological innovations, allowed South African organizations to gain efficiency through 
process innovations. The process innovations that are prevalent in many South African 
corporations can be expressed by concepts such as ‘just-in-time’ (JIT); total quality management 
(TQM); business process engineering (BPR); and supply-chain management. These approaches 
are generally referred to as ‘continuous innovations’, which are aimed to improve established 
 11 
business models without major changes in structural components and designs (Quinn, 1997; 
Dawson and Palmer, 1995; Hammer and Champy, 1993; Cusamano, 1985).  
 
Beginning in the early years of 2000, the rapidly evolving market structure and global influences 
of disruptive business model innovations forced large corporations to rethink hard about their 
traditional business models. Calling for total transformation of business organizations, Normann 
(2001: 82) contends that incremental improvement often becomes a trap from the inside of which 
organizations fail to notice that the rules of the game are changing quicker than the company, or 
that the company fails to see the rules of the game have been entirely disrupted.  
 
South Africa’s traditional corporations first seemed to receive such warning with mixed 
reactions. While some incumbents ignored all the disruptive impacts of new business models, 
others attempted to respond without changing their business models. For example, in the early 
2000s full-service airlines operators responded to the newly introduced disruptive low-cost 
carriers (LCC) by cutting prices or increasing marketing expenditures. 
 
Between 2005 and 2010, it can be observed that a number of large, medium and small enterprises 
are undertaking structural innovations across a number of industries (Davenport et. al., 2006; 
Grulke and Silber, 2004). See Table 1.1 for industry examples of recently introduced potentially 
disruptive business models in South Africa. The various business model innovations taking place 
in the country can be identified by a range of academic terms found in the literature, including 
‘virtual corporation’ (David and Malone, 1992), ‘business ecosystem’ (Iansiti and Levien, 2004; 
Moore, 1993), ‘outsourcing’, ‘business-web’ (Tapscott et. al., 2000), ‘networked incubators’ 
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(Hansen, Chesbrough, Nohria & Sull, 2001) and ‘open-innovation’ (Chesbrough, 2003). In view 
of the country’s unique contextual factors discussed above, little is known about how these 
approaches are being introduced by entrants and being adapted or reinvented by industry 
incumbents.  
 
Table 1.1: Industry Examples of Potentially Disruptive Business Models in South Africa 
Industry Value propositions 
emphasized by traditional 
business models  
Value propositions emphasized 
by new business models 
Pioneering 
companies 
Banking Extensive, nationwide 
branch network and 
personal service 
Reaching previously un-banked 
customers through mass 
retailers’ distribution channels, 
mobile banking, 24-hour access, 
convenience, low fees 
Wizzit, 
MTNBanking,
Gobanking, 
PostNet, 
Capitec Bank 
Insurance Personal, face-to-face 
advice through an extensive 
agent network 
Disintermediation, convenience 
and low commission rates 
 
Outsurance, 
1Lifedirect  
Dial Direct 
Airlines Hub-and-spoke system, 
premium service, meals, 
baggage, checking 
Disintermediation, low price, no 
frills 
 
Kulula.com, 
1time.com, 
Mango 
 
Retailing  Low-end discount stores 
based on economies of scale 
and scope, location, wide 
range of choices 
High-end specialty stores based 
on lifestyle and trends 
Woolworth 
Telecommunication   Mobile cellular network  
 
VoIP over 3G mobile network, 
mobile social networking  
Vodacom, 
MTN 
 
1.4  The Research Gap and Focus 
Based on the above reviews of strategic management theory and practice, this thesis identifies 
the following primary and secondary research gaps:  
 
Primary research gap:  
With the emerging academic understanding that disruptive innovation is a function of conflict 
between an insurgent’s disruptive and incumbent’s traditional business model, a careful scrutiny 
of the literature reveals that little is known about how entrants introduce a potentially disruptive 
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business model innovation, and how established organizations reinvent their business models to 
enable disruptive innovation.  
 
Secondary research gap:  
Recently, although there is an emerging view that considers change in a business model, as 
opposed to just a technology alone, to be a major cause of disruptive innovation, the disruptive 
innovation theory continues to treat all categories of disruptive innovations in the same way. The 
literature reveals that it is little known whether the same theory can be replicated to explain 
technology-push disruptive innovations and market-driven disruptive business model innovations 
in the same way (Markides, 2006: 19).  
 
The above two research questions become more relevant to both theory and practice particularly 
when the extant studies on disruptive innovation are examined across economic regions. In 
general, existing innovation research, to a considerable degree, focuses on challenges of 
disruptive innovations facing high-tech industries in developed economies (Christensen, 2006; 
Henderson, 2006; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004; Gilbert, 2003; Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  
 
Very few comprehensive studies exist that provide insight into how companies introduce 
potentially disruptive innovation or reinvent their business models to enable disruptive 
innovations in developing economies. Examples in developing economies such as the South 
African mobile, airlines, banking and insurance industries show that disruptive innovations are 
no longer restricted to developed economies. Thus, South Africa provides a good case to 
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investigate this study in a developing economy setting (see Davenport et. al., 2006; Grulke and 
Silber, 2004; Prahalad, 2006).  
 
Not corresponding with this development, however, strategic management research has 
inadequately progressed to provide managers in developing economies appropriate and 
systematic conceptual frameworks to deal with the increasing occurrence of disruptive 
innovations in their industries. Taking into consideration the differences in business 
infrastructure, factor endowments and access to resources between developed and developing 
economies, there is a need to investigate through which disruptive business model innovation 
emerges in developing economies.  
 
1.5  Research Question 
The above research gaps and inadequacies highlight the need for an integrated framework for 
business model reinvention for enabling disruptive innovation. Therefore, the primary research 
question of this thesis is:  
• How should companies reinvent their business models to enable internally or externally 
induced disruptive innovations? 
 
The secondary question is:  
• What are the differences between technological and non-technological market-driven firms in 
terms of creating and developing disruptive business model innovation, and strategic 
approaches to reinvent their business models to enable disruptive innovation?  
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1.6  Research Methodology 
The multi-dimensional, complex and dynamic natures of the notions of disruptive innovation and 
a business model require a research approach including deductive, inductive, qualitative and 
quantitative methods. As shown in Figure 1 below and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, 
this study utilizes all these methods with the purpose of addressing the primary and secondary 
research questions.  
 
Using inductive and deductive reasoning, Chapter 3 develops a conceptual framework to inform 
the empirical research to investigate the research questions (Christensen, 2006: 40). In the initial 
stage, the deductive approach is used to examine the established disruptive innovation theory in 
view of current disruptive innovation phenomena in South Africa with the aim of discovering 
research gaps. The inductive approach is then used to explore relatively unknown disruptive 
business innovation behaviour in South Africa and to build an integrated framework for business 
model reinvention to enable disruptive innovation. Although the concepts of a business model 
and disruptive innovation are well established in the literature of strategic management, 
disruptive innovation is traditionally linked to technological discontinuities. The question of how 
organizations enable disruptive innovation by reinventing their business models, particularly in a 
developing economy setting, is an under-researched phenomenon. In this study, the process of 
data collection, analyses, conclusions and formulation of the theoretical framework follows an 
inductive method. 
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Figure 1: The Research Outline 
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The primary and secondary research questions are addressed at two levels of analysis. At the first 
level of analysis to address the first research question, this thesis’s conceptual framework 
proposes two parts consisting of evolutionary and disruptive phases of disruptive innovation. The 
evolutionary part presents seven hypotheses to test a proactive introduction, emergence and 
successful evolution of an insurgent’s potentially disruptive business model innovation. The 
disruptive part conceptualizes another seven hypotheses to investigate the disruptive impact of an 
innovation, and incumbent’s reactive business model reinvention processes to deal with 
disruptive innovation. To address the second research question at the second-order of analysis, 
the study investigates the relativity of disruptive innovation theory or framework across two 
innovation categories namely, between disruptive technology and disruptive market-driven 
business model innovations by subjecting each innovation group to the same ten hypotheses and 
statistical unit.   
 
The empirical investigation is carried out through both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods. The qualitative method is conducted by developing five case studies of disruptive 
innovation phenomena in South Africa. Disruptive innovation is an uncommon phenomenon, 
and the rarity logically makes a case study method the preferred approach to study the disruptive 
innovation phenomenon (Voelpel et. al., 2005; Macher and Richman, 2004; Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Hamel, 2000; Tripsas and Giovanini, 2000). There are two ways to design a 
case study research: single case study or multi-case studies. While a single case study is 
sufficient for studying a unique situation, multiple case studies are used to compare two or more 
similar cases by exploring common or different characteristics, themes and categories for 
generalization across similar contexts (Yin, 1994). Qualitative data is compiled using a 
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triangulation method, which involves employing a variety of sources, including face-to-face in-
depth interviews with top level executives, company and industry archives, the Internet and 
published sources. Chapter 5 discusses the case studies.  
 
The case study analysis is enhanced further by quantitative methods to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of the study’s results. While the case study method investigates 
the process of disruptive innovation at a firm-level, some scholars have used survey-based 
quantitative method to indentify common patterns at a system-level (see Adner, 2002; Markides 
and Charitou, 2004). Thus, the purpose of survey-based quantitative method is to identify 
common patterns first on the aggregate level of analysis (system-level) that can be generalized 
across industries, and second to identify differences between technology and non-technological 
market-driven innovations. Chapter 6 and 7 present the quantitative results for the first-order and 
second-order studies respectively. The quantitative aspect of the methodology is a cross-sectional 
study, because the population of concern is studied during a specific period in time. The present 
study adopts the quantitative analytical instruments used and recommended by many innovation 
researchers (see Shimp, 2007: 117; Markides and Charitou, 2004: 33; Rogers, 2003: 10; Rafi and 
Kampas, 2002: 117; Leanord-Barton, 1985: 916; Arndt, 1967: 293). 
 
In summary, the chosen research methodology includes quantitative and qualitative, inductive 
and deductive, exploratory and cross-sectional methods. Chapter four discusses in detail these 
methods, their relevance to the conceptual framework in terms of data collection, sample design, 
result analysis and the quality measures used in producing valid and reliable conclusions.  
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1.7  Structure of the Thesis 
Besides this first, introductory chapter, the thesis is composed of seven chapters presented below. 
 
Chapter 2 presents the literature review concerning disruptive innovation and a business model. 
The first section reviews established theories and concepts of disruptive innovation, and revisits 
the relevance of extant strategic management approaches that consider technology as the key 
cause of disruptive innovation. The second section analyzes various theoretical and empirical 
works on business models, representing diverse academic disciplines. By identifying key 
components of a business model that are commonly agreed upon across these disciplines, a 
definition of the term is established in order to lay the foundation for a conceptual framework in 
the next chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework. The framework is developed by scrutinizing 
existing research streams concerning the approaches for enabling disruptive innovation and 
business model reinvention frameworks. Building on these two streams, and further refining and 
integrating their relevant aspects, this chapter introduces a conceptual framework for “business 
model reinvention to enable disruptive innovation”. Chapter 4 explains the data and 
methodology used in this study. It details how the analysis of both quantitative and qualitative 
data is undertaken and integrated in this endeavour to meet the objectives of the study. In 
addition, it describes the quality measures adopted by this study. 
 
Chapter 5 presents five case studies representing four South African industries including mobile 
telephony, banking, airlines and insurance. The five case studies are used to explore common or 
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different characteristics, themes and categories for generalization across similar contexts (Yin, 
1994). Chapter 6 discusses the quantitative empirical analysis for the aggregated data at a first-
order level. This means that by aggregating all survey data gathered from four industries, the 
chapter carries out a system-level analysis with the objective to find common patterns of 
disruptive innovation processes that can be replicated across the whole population of the study.  
 
Chapter 7 discusses the differences between technological and non-technological disruptive 
innovations by disaggregating the sample into these two groups. Chapter 8 summarizes the key 
findings of both case studies and quantitative analysis, and presents the study’s overall 
conclusions and theoretical implications. Finally, the chapter puts forward key recommendations 
for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  Introduction  
Changes in business environment can be characterized by both a continuous and/or 
discontinuous change. Discontinuity may originate from complex and multiple variables of 
uncertainties such as economic, social, political, technological and legal factors, and the interplay 
between them that create an environment that is virtually impossible to predict. Discontinuities 
may also arise from radical technological and/or disruptive business model innovations 
(Markides and Charitou, 2004; Prahalad and Oosterveld, 1999; Grove, 1996; Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). 
 
Some organizations may anticipate some discontinuous changes, such as the introduction of the 
mobile phone technology into the South African market in 1994, after a cell phone had already 
become a household product in developed countries. In other instances, some discontinuities may 
not be easily foreseen. They may emerge initially small, but gradually building up, and at one 
dramatic moment they may lead to disruption of established industry structure and business 
models. The latter is referred to as a disruptive change (Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 34; Evans 
and Wurster, 1997: 14; Grove, 1996: 33). 
 
Over the last two decades, extensive research has been carried out to comprehend business 
organizations’ adaptation behaviors to disruptive change. A relatively consistent hypothesis 
recurring throughout the literature on this topic is that almost all established organizations across 
a wide range of industries succeed in managing continuous change, but fail to adapt their 
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organization effectively when faced with disruptive change. This phenomenon, which is referred 
to as “the tyranny of success” or “the incumbent curse”, has always been considered a 
technology problem (Anthony et. al., 2006; Henderson, 2006; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004; Jay 
and Ralph, 2004; Chandy and Tellis, 2000; Gilbert, 2003; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Foster and 
Kaplan, 2001; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). 
 
Recently, there is an emerging body of knowledge that shifts the research focus from mere 
technology to the business model when analyzing the impact of disruptive change on established 
companies. This emerging sphere of analysis focuses on the impact of discontinuous technology 
on the evolutionary nature of an incumbent’s business model. It shows how the fit between 
processes, resources and values, within an established business model that has evolved over time 
causes the incumbent to struggle in the face of disruptive change. Consequently, the challenge 
facing many incumbents is how best to reinvent their business model to deal with disruptive 
change (Christensen, 2006; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Christensen and Overdorf, 2000). 
 
Many scholars have suggested different theories and frameworks to assist managers of 
incumbent firms in their creative endeavors to deal with disruptive change (see O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2004; Markides and Geroski, 2005; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Chesbrough, 2003; 
Hamel and Valikangas, 2003; Hansen et. al., 2000; Beinhocker, 1999). A careful scrutiny of the 
literature reveals that while these frameworks provide important non-business model insights 
into how companies should “enable” disruptive innovation, relatively few studies provide 
insights into how companies should “innovate” and/or “reinvent” a business model to enable 
disruptive innovation. A business model approach considers all aspects of business activities for 
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enabling possible disruptive innovation, as opposed to a technology solution alone (see Voelpel 
et. al., 2005; Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001; Hamel, 2000). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine extant theories, concepts and models of disruptive 
innovation and a business model that deal with the present thesis’ research question: How should 
firms “innovate” and/or “reinvent” a business model to enable disruptive innovation? This 
chapter is organized in to two parts. The first part scrutinizes disruptive innovation theory, 
reviews its antecedents and examines the recent shift of the literature from disruptive technology 
to disruptive business model innovation. The second part analyses the concept of a business 
model and reviews its theoretical foundations. This chapter closes by underlining the research 
gaps in the extant innovation literature.  
 
 
2.2 Disruptive Innovation Theory  
In order to conduct an appropriate investigation of the literature based on this study’s research 
question, it is important to be clear about the relevant key terms that are used in the context of 
this thesis namely: innovation, technology, discontinuous innovation, radical innovation, 
disruptive innovation and a business model. Innovation can be defined by contrasting the term 
with creativity. In the Oxford English language dictionary, innovation is defined as “the action or 
process of innovating: a new method, idea, product, etc...”, but creativity means “the use of 
imagination or original ideas to create something new”3.  
 
                                                 
3
 The Oxford Dictionary of English, 2003: 893 & 406. 
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Creativity may result in something new, but it does not necessarily mean that it adds value to the 
organization in a commercial sense (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003: 258). The innovation concept is 
very broad that is used across many natural and social sciences. One of the more relevant and 
comprehensive business definitions is proposed by Myers and Marquis (1969: 12): 
 
Innovation is not a single action but a total process of interrelated sub processes. It is not 
just the conception of a new idea, nor the invention of a new device, nor the development 
of a new market. The process is al these things acting in an integrated fashion.  
 
Drucker (1985: 19) argues that innovation can be subject to a systematic study as a part of a 
management discipline. This study embraces this view. An innovation is a deliberate 
management process, through which firms create, develop and exploit a new product or a 
business model. A review of business innovation literature shows various terminology and 
nomenclature of innovation. Strategic management scholars broadly categorize business 
innovations into two categories. The terms “incremental innovation” (Gatignon, Tushman, Smith 
& Anderson, 2004; Foster and Kaplan, 2001; Ettlie, 1983), “sustaining innovation” (Christensen 
and Raynor, 2003; Christensen, 1997) and “continuous innovation” (Robertson, 1967) are used 
to refer broadly to continuity of improvement along an established trajectory. 
 
In contrast to the above, the concepts of “discontinuous innovation” (Macher and Richman, 
2004; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Robertson 1967), “structural innovation” (Moore, 2004, 
Tapscott et. al., 2000), “architectural innovation” (Gulanic and Eisenhardt, 2001; Henderson and 
Clark, 1990), “strategic innovation” (Charitou and Markides, 2003; Govindarajan and Gupta, 
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2001), “transformational innovation” (Denning, 2005, Foster and Kaplan, 2001), “radical 
innovation” (Macher and Richman, 2004; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Chandy and Tellis, 2000) 
and “disruptive innovation” (Daneels, 2004; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Gilbert, 2003; 
Christensen, 1997) are used to refer in general to innovations of discontinuous or Schumpeterian 
nature.  
 
Discontinuous innovation can be defined as an innovation that cuts the linkages of a technology 
or market from what existed previously (Macher and Richman, 2004: 90). Discontinuous 
innovation may come in the form of radical or disruptive innovations. Radical innovation is 
defined as a fundamentally different set of scientific and engineering principles that introduces a 
new technology generation which displaces a previously established dominant design of existing 
technology of a similar nature (Dewar and Dutton, 1986: 1422). Of particular interest to this 
study is the disruptive one which creates a serious dilemma to mangers of incumbent firms. 
Many connotations are associated with the term “disruptive” in English language, including 
confusion, disorder, interruption, failure and radical. The foundation of literature on the meaning 
of “disruptive”, as a simultaneous destructive and creative innovation process, seems to be 
rooted in Schumpeter’s seminal work of gales of creative destruction. Schumpeter (1942: 83) 
observed that waves of discontinuous technological innovations destroy old industries, and create 
new ones in their place. Building on this, Christensen (1997: 8) pioneered the term “disruptive 
technology”. Disruptive innovation is defined as an innovation that introduces new products, 
processes or business models which initially emerge in small low-end markets, but over time 
displaces industry incumbents by successively moving up-market through performance 
improvements (Christensen, 1997: 8; Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 34).  
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2.2.1  Foundations of Disruptive Innovation Theory  
Table 2.1 shows that the extant disruptive innovation theory is firmly rooted in business 
innovation literature that has progressed through successive streams of research work that have 
explored the evolution of technological change and its impact, as a central force, in shaping 
business environments. These studies use a plethora of innovation terminologies and 
categorizations to articulate various phenomena associated with continuous and discontinuous 
changes4. Taking into consideration this study’s research question, this chapter reviews only 
those major scholarly works that are concerned with incumbents versus new entrants’ seemingly 
intriguing behaviors in dealing with discontinuous innovation as shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1:  Antecedents of Disruptive Innovation Theory 
Authors Categorization Generalization of 
association 
Research gaps/anomalies  
Dewar and 
Dutton 
(1986); Ettlie 
et. al., (1984); 
Burns and 
Stalker (1966) 
Incremental 
vs. radical 
innovations  
Incumbents are likely to 
perform well with 
incremental innovations, but 
radical innovations tend to 
create great difficulties.  
Some firms managed to enable radical innovation. 
The incremental vs. radical categorization does 
not fully capture the reasons why incumbent 
struggle in the face of discontinuities (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986) 
Tushman and 
Anderson 
(1986) 
Competence-
enhancing 
discontinuities 
vs. 
competence-
destroying 
discontinuities 
Incumbents tend to do well 
with competence-enhancing 
discontinuities, whereas 
new entrants outperform 
them with competence-
destroying discontinuities. 
Some incumbents stumbled with seemingly 
incremental changes. The categorization of 
competence-enhancing discontinuities vs. 
competence-destroying discontinuities does not 
fully explain why incumbents fail (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990). 
Henderson 
and Clark 
(1990) 
Modular vs. 
architectural 
innovation  
Incumbents are more 
predisposed to adapt 
modular innovations with 
less hurdle, but flounder a 
great deal with architectural 
innovation.  
Incumbents tend to do well with both incremental 
and radical innovations. The earlier 
categorizations are less adequate on their own to 
explain disruptive phenomena (Christensen, 
1996).  
Christensen 
(1997) 
Christensen 
and Raynor 
(2003) 
 
Sustaining vs. 
disruptive 
innovation  
Whereas incumbents will 
always succeed with 
sustaining innovation, new 
entrants are likely to 
outperform incumbents with 
disruptive innovation. 
Disruptive innovation is a function of conflict 
between new (disruptive) and traditional business 
models, not only a technology problem 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Markides, 2006). 
                                                 
4
 For the nomenclature of innovations, see Christensen (2006: 4); Moore (2004: 88); Foster and Kaplan (2001: 106-
114); Tapscott et. al., (2000: 14); Henderson and Clark (1990: 12); Robertson (1967: 15). 
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Incremental vs. Radical Innovation  
The terms of “incremental” and “radical” innovations were commonly used in the early studies 
about the topic of incumbents’ misfortune in dealing with discontinuous innovation. Incremental 
innovation does not depart from previous technology significantly, and it helps industry 
incumbents to sustain their competitive advantage in established markets. But radical innovation 
refers to a different set of scientific and engineering principles which displaces previously 
established dominant design of technology and that introduces new products, or creates entirely 
new markets and possible applications (Dewar and Dutton, 1986: 1422, Ryle, 1994: 45).  
 
The main purpose of early studies on this issue was to assess the impact of a radical product 
innovation on competitive performance of established firms in the market (see Dewar and 
Dutton, 1986; Dess and Beard, 1984; Burns and Stalker, 1966). When a radical technology 
emerges, it creates a new product class, which triggers initially a period of technological ferment, 
followed by emergence of a dominant design that creates a platform for successive incremental 
innovations. During the period characterized by industry upheaval, companies tend to innovate at 
a higher rate of variation in a competitive struggle to define the design until a certain design 
combination is adopted by customers. The industry, in turn, adopts this standard which then 
becomes a dominant design. A dominant design stabilizes product-class and ends the period of 
technological upheaval (Dewar and Dutton, 1986: Dosi, 1982; Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Burns 
and Stalker, 1966). 
 
Scholars have suggested several reasons to explain why radical innovation tends to create 
problems for incumbent firms. These include the early mover advantage, irreversible 
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commitment to prior investment and inertia. The assumption of the first mover advantage 
hypothesizes that early entrants are likely to benefit from early entry into an initially uncertain 
market and the learning experience for developing a dominant design. Later followers may lag 
behind in acquiring the technical competence for developing radical innovation; this tends to be 
more likely where industry incumbents have already made substantial financial, physical and 
managerial commitments to their previously established technological competence. This in turn 
may cause inertia that is likely to lock-in innovative behaviours to the incumbent’s bureaucratic 
and formalized rules, which typically place new entrants in a better position to succeed with 
radical innovation relative to established companies (Rothwell, 1986; Dewar and Dutton, 1986; 
Dess and Beard, 1984; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Ettlie et. al., 1984; Cooper and Schendel, 
1976; Daft, 1982; Hage, 1980; Burns and Stalker, 1966; Terrien and Mills 1955). 
 
Competence-Enhancing Discontinuities vs. Competence-Destroying Discontinuities 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) re-examined the simple “incremental – radical” innovation 
dichotomy and its generalization. Contrary to previously established statement of association, 
they found that some industry incumbents succeeded with seemingly radical innovations. 
Following this, Tushman and Anderson (1986) categorize innovations in a way that innovations 
introduced by new entrants, and which increase industry upheaval and uncertainties, are called 
“competence-destroying discontinuities”. But innovations launched by industry incumbents that 
augment incumbents’ competitiveness are referred to as “competence-enhancing 
discontinuities”.  
 
Tushman and Anderson (1986: 442) argue that the impacts of competence-enhancing 
discontinuities on incumbents tend to be less serious since these improve the existing technology 
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along its existing performance trajectory, without departing significantly from previous dominant 
design. Although some innovations of this nature may displace older generation of technologies, 
they do no destroy the old product development capabilities of the firm. In other words, the 
established competence will still be relevant to operate the new technology. For example, in 
airlines manufacturing industry, the introduction of fan jets was considerably different from the 
previous technology that used to propel the velocity of jets, yet aircraft makers leveraged their 
existing capabilities to adapt to the new technology. 
 
In contrast, competence-destroying discontinuities entail new capabilities (skills, abilities, and 
knowledge) that did not exist in the incumbent’s technical knowledge. Because competence-
destroying discontinuities displace the previously dominant design, they fundamentally shift the 
competence base required to perform the core technology of new products from previously 
existing dominant designs. For example, the introduction of diesel locomotives demanded 
fundamentally different competence from the typical skills and knowledge required for the 
manufacture of the steam-engine. The uncertainties and turbulence induced by competence-
destroying discontinuities is considered to be the basis for a successful entry of new companies 
that have developed necessary capabilities to appropriate the new market’s potential (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986: 461; Richardson, 1972: 883). 
 
Modular vs. Architectural Innovation 
Henderson and Clark (1990) further questioned the above generalization and found that some 
companies struggled a great deal to adapt to a seemingly incremental change in innovation 
 30 
relative to existing technology. This observation redefined earlier categorization by new terms: 
modular versus architectural innovations.   
 
Modular innovation changes the dominant design concept of a technology, without changing the 
relationships between the components of a product’s architecture. For example, although the 
introduction of digital telephone disrupted the core design concept of the analog technology 
based telephone, it did not change the product’s architecture. More specifically, although the 
technology transition from analog to digital was relatively radical, the previous parts and their 
relationships, including the cable, telephone sets, and the network server and how they all fit 
together as a system, remained unchanged. Industry incumbents are said to be generally capable 
of handling modular innovations within their existing business model (Baldwin, 2008).  
 
But architectural innovation alters the relationships in which the components of a product are 
connected together, although it may not change the existing dominant design concept. Thus, 
architectural knowledge is the know-how about how all individual parts of a product fit together 
to function as a system. An interesting generalization stemming from this finding is that 
incumbents tend to be cognizant to the emergence of modular innovation - whether it is 
incremental or radical (which displaces a dominant established design)  -  because it does disrupt 
the existing models of learning. However, because architectural innovation disrupts the 
architectural product development process (hence the established models of learning) of the 
incumbent, it is likely to cause failure. Henderson and Clark (1990: 27) argue that the lock-in 
effect of the incumbent’s evolutionary learning process in a previous architectural design can 
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cause the firm to overlook a seemingly incremental innovation that changes the architect of the 
existing product system.  
 
2.2.2  The Disruptive Innovation Model  
Expanding on earlier theories, Christensen (1997) explored the characteristics of a special type of 
discontinuous innovation that causes incumbent companies to fail. According to Christensen 
(1997), innovations that enhance the incumbent’s current market, whether incremental or radical, 
are called “sustaining innovation”. But innovations that disrupt its established market are called 
“disruptive innovation”.  
 
Christensen’s (1997) original theory of disruptive innovation has generated extensive research 
over the last two decades. A widely established generalization among many scholars is that 
almost all incumbents across a wide range of industries succeed in managing sustaining 
innovation, but fail to adapt their business model appropriately when faced with disruptive 
innovation. In contrast, new entrants generally do well with disruptive innovation (Anthony, 
Eyring & Gibson, 2006; Henderson, 2006; Christensen; 2006; Gilbert, 2003; Adner and Zemsky, 
2003; Adner, 2002; Gilbert and Bower, 2002; Christensen and Overdorf, 2000; Christensen, 
1997).  
 
Figure 2.1 provides the disruptive innovation model that seeks to predict how disruption takes 
place in incumbents’ market. The “Disruptive Innovation Model” has three components (a) the 
market focus (performance and consumption curve) (b) sustaining innovation and (c) disruptive 
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innovation. The vertical and horizontal dimensions of the model indicate performance 
improvement and time of innovation diffusion in a particular market. 
 
Figure 2.1:  The Disruptive Innovation Model 
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Source: Christensen and Raynor (2003: 32) 
 
(a) The market focus 
The starting point of analysis of the disruptive innovation model is the incumbent’s strategic 
market focus as depicted by line A (dotted line slightly upward sloping) and the Bell curve. This 
dotted line represents the performance of an existing technology in a particular incumbent’s 
market. The vertically oriented Bell curve shows the distribution of customers around a median 
of users. On the upper extreme of the curve, there are demanding customers who might not yet 
be satisfied with an existing product’s performance at a point in time. At the lower extreme of 
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the curve, there are some customers who may not use or need all the features of existing 
technology (product). In between these two groups, the dotted arrow depicts a “good enough” 
technology performance that meets an average customer’s needs.  
 
 
(b) Sustaining innovation 
Line B represents “sustaining innovation” which evolves along an already established 
technological trajectory. This targets the incumbent’s existing market base with the aim to 
improve existing products in ways that existing customers will appreciate. Innovations along this 
established trajectory can range from “incremental to radical innovations”. While incremental 
innovations are considered less of a problem to the incumbent firm, the model predicts that, 
regardless of the difficulties in adapting their business model, established companies often 
succeed in outperforming rivals with regard to radical innovations. This theory assumes that 
because radical innovation typically attracts the high-end market and the incumbent’s revenue 
model, incumbents will find means to embrace the technology. This sets a basic point of 
departure between the concept of disruptive and radical innovations (Christensen and Raynor, 
2003: 33). 
  
(c) Disruptive innovation 
The third element of the model depicted by line C is “disruptive innovation”. The model suggests 
that the pace of technological progress of sustaining innovation exceeds the ability of customers 
to use a technology at any point in the Bell curve. This is because the urge to maximize profits 
from the incumbent’s customer base, especially from the high-end “not-yet satisfied” customers, 
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will motivate companies to improve their existing technology continuously or create radical 
products. This will likely cause a successive higher rate of sustaining innovation in product lines 
or features that will “overshoot” the market in due course. This market phenomenon is 
considered as one of the demand side drivers of disruptive innovation. 
 
Disruptive innovation emerges through the introduction of new, cheaper, convenient and simple 
to use products that will meet initially the basic requirements of customers at the low-end, small 
margin market. During the introduction period, the disruptive product does not meet the 
incumbent’s customers’ expectations compared relative to existing products. Over time, through 
a new performance trajectory (line C), this product will ultimately meet the incumbent’s 
customers expectations in a “good enough” manner. Eventually, a market disruption occurs when 
the incumbent’s customers switch from existing product to disruptive ones (Gilbert, 2003: 32; 
Charitou and Markides, 2003: 56; Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 32-45; Rafi and Kampas, 2002: 
116; Christensen, 1997: xv).  
 
Figure 2.2 below further classifies disruptive innovation in to two: “low-end” and “new market” 
disruptions. “Low-end disruptions” originate in the incumbent’s established value network, 
where disruptors attack incumbents by introducing a low-cost business model that initially 
appeal to the low-end segments of the existing market at the time of introduction. New-market 
disruption creates a new value network. This means that it creates a new market by focusing on 
fundamentally different customers who were not part of the incumbent’s market. As indicated in 
the figure, it has a different performance trajectory that requires a distinct measure relative to the 
existing market. 
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Figure 2.2:  Low and New Market Disruption 
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Source: Christensen and Raynor (2003: 44). 
 
In both circumstances, the disruptive innovation model identifies four key characteristics of 
technological innovation that are likely to cause disruptive innovation (Christensen and Raynor, 
2003: 32-45; Rafi and Kampas, 2002: 116; Christensen, 1997). 
• First, the innovation is typically simpler, cheaper, and convenient to use relative to 
existing products.  
• Second, it targets low-end or new customers (non-consumers) who were not part of the 
incumbent’s consumption trajectory of “sustaining innovations” due to lack of financial 
and/or technical abilities. 
• Third, the quality is relatively inferior when measured by the performance dimension of 
the incumbent’s current customers.  
 36 
• Four, over time the disruptive technology improves its performance on the dimensions 
the mainstream market values and begins to displace previously existing products of 
similar nature.  
 
2.3  From Disruptive Technology to Disruptive Business Model  
Recently, scholars have revisited the original disruptive innovation theory and concluded that 
disruptive innovation is a function of conflict between disruptive and traditional business 
models, not only a technology problem. The revisited disruptive innovation theory predicts that 
the embedded relationships of the components and learning processes that have evolved over a 
relatively long period of time within the incumbent’s business model make it difficult for the 
firm to respond to disruptive innovation. Beyond technology and market target differences, 
fundamental differences in some of the key components of a business model, including strategic 
market focus, capabilities, firm’s economic size and revenue model are said to be the major 
reasons why incumbents waver in face of disruptive innovation (Christensen, 2006; Charitou and 
Markides, 2003: Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; 
Christensen and Overdorf, 2000). 
 
Strategic market focus: While the emphasis on the firm’s customer orientation is useful in 
sustaining innovation, the same emphasis is likely to influence the incumbent to screen out a 
potential disruptive innovation which does not appeal to its current customers (Christensen, 
2006: 51; Day and Schoemakers, 2005: 135; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002: 536; Day, 
1999: 5; Leonard and Rayport, 1997: 102). 
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Capabilities and inertia: Capabilities can be defined as the company’s dynamic ability to identify, 
integrate, develop and configure own and others’ competence to innovate (Teece, Pisano & 
Shuen, 1997: 606; Richardson, 1972: 882). Capabilities that determine what a firm can and 
cannot do comprise processes, resources and values (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000: 68). A 
particular incumbent’s capabilities evolve over time, reinforcing each other in causal and 
dynamic relationships around the center of the firm’s strategic market choice. The relationship 
that has evolved over time between the incumbent’s processes, resources and values will 
possibly create problems in its effort to deal with disruptive change. This is likely to be so 
because disruptive innovation often requires capabilities that are somewhat in conflict with the 
firm’s current target market (Christensen, 2006: 43; Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 211; 
Christensen and Overdorf,  2000: 71). 
 
Firm’s economic size and revenue model: Christensen and Raynor’s (2003: 32-45) concept of 
“asymmetric motivation” explains why the difference in size and revenue model could be one of 
the major causes of disruptive innovation. It suggests that small, low-end, and low-margin 
markets are likely not to be attractive to large established companies’ profit model. Contrary to 
this scenario, small start-ups have typically thinner cost structure that will enable them to 
generate profits from this type of market. The underlying cause of asymmetric motivation is 
nothing but a fundamental difference between two models of transaction costs of producing and 
distributing goods or services (Coase, 1937). This difference often results from configuring a 
direct, shorter or open (distributed) value chain compared to traditional industry value chain. As 
a result of this conflict of interest, the absence of competition from large companies gives small 
start-up innovators time and incentives to move up-market gradually through a different 
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performance improvement trajectory. To address incumbents difficulties arising from disruptive 
innovation, many scholars have suggested different models and approaches.  
 
2.3.1  Extant Approaches to deal with Disruptive Innovation 
The review of the literature shows that the topic of disruptive innovation has been one of the 
most important issues for strategic management research in the last two decades. The major 
studies that deal with discontinuous innovation in general (not only with disruptive innovation) 
are summarized in Table 2.2 and subsequently reviewed briefly in order.  
 
Separation Strategy  
The widely accepted view in addressing the question of enabling disruptive innovation is to 
create a disruptive business model through an autonomous organization. According to this view,  
because of fundamental conflicts in terms of strategic market focus, capabilities, revenue model 
and firm size, established firms that attempt to manage disruptive technology within their already 
existing business model are likely to fail. Incumbents should therefore create an entirely 
separated company with complete freedom to develop its own new processes, resources and 
culture (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Gilbert, 2003, Adner, 2002). 
 
The “Ambidextrous Organization”  
Being cognizant of the above criticism, O’Reilly and Tushman (2004) argue that non of the 
established firms which launch independent or unsupported ventures succeed in enabling radical 
innovation. Rather, most ‘ambidextrous organizations’ are relatively more successful in 
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launching radical products or services. An ambidextrous organization is an organization which 
initiates a radical technology through a structurally independent venture, having its own 
processes, structure, and culture, but that is integrated at the senior executive level. 
 
Table 2.2:  Extant Approaches for Disruptive Innovation 
Principal Authors Approaches Enabling strategies Focus 
Christensen and 
Raynor (2003); 
Christensen and 
Overdorf (2000) 
Separation 
strategy 
Create an autonomous organization Disruptive 
technology 
O’Reilly and Tushman 
(2004) 
Ambidextrous 
Organization 
Create an autonomous organization but integrate 
it at senior executive level 
Radical product 
innovation 
Markides and 
Charitou (2004) 
Contingency 
Approach  
Separation or integration is contingent to a 
particular incumbent’s context 
Market driven 
business model 
innovation  
Markides and Geroski 
(2005) 
Feeder networks Incumbents should let independent small 
entrepreneurs take the first initiative, and then 
they should appropriate at a later stage 
Radical product 
innovation 
Hansen et. al. (2000) Network 
incubators 
Incubate independent small internet 
entrepreneurs though minority equity shares 
Internet e-
business models 
Chesbrough (2003) Open innovation Each company should focus on core 
competencies in a distributed business model 
Technological 
innovation 
 
Beinhocker (1999) 
Hamel & Valikangas 
(2003) 
Complex 
Adaptive 
Systems based 
theory 
A population of diverse experimental strategies 
to shape one’s future environment  
 
Proactive 
strategy, 
unknown future 
 
This approach is likely to succeed only if the top management is willing to cannibalize its 
existing culture and values. “Willingness to cannibalize” refers in this context to deliberately 
destroying an attitudinal trait of the top executives which is embedded in the existing culture, 
shared values and beliefs (Chandy and Tellis, 1998: 475). The ‘ambidextrous organization’ 
approach suggests that on the one hand, tight integration at the executive level allows the 
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fledging ventures to share important resources from the traditional units including cash, talent, 
expertise, customers etc… On the other hand, the organizational separation guarantees that the 
new venture’s distinct processes, structure, and culture are not overwhelmed by the dominant 
traits of the parent company (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004: 77).  
 
The Contingency Approach  
Markides and Charitou (2004) argue that there is no a “one-fit-all” strategy to enable disruptive 
innovation across all situations. The question of whether to separate or integrate a disruptive 
business model basically depends on two key variables: (1) the degree of strategic differences or 
similarities between the new and the old markets and (2) the seriousness of conflicts between the 
disparate business models in a particular situation. Figure 2.3 provides four strategic options 
indicated by the letters of A, B, C and D that an incumbent may choose depending on its 
particular situation (Markides and Charitou, 2004).  
 
• A: The ‘separation strategy’ tends to be appropriate when the new market is not only 
strategically different from the existing market, but also when the disruptive and the 
current business models entail serious tradeoffs and conflicts. For example, Nestle 
followed this strategy when it launched Nespresso, a coffee bar concept business that 
targeted up-market young professionals. Nespresso is different in terms of a business 
model and market from Nestle which sells instant coffee to the mass market through 
retailers.  
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Figure 2.3:  Different Strategies for Managing Dual Business Models 
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Source: Markides and Charitou (2004: 24). 
 
• B: A firm should adopt a ‘phased separation strategy’ when the new market is 
strategically different from the established one, but the two business models have minor 
conflicts. When there is little conflict between the two business models, the incumbent 
may find it better to first develop the new business inside in order to leverage the 
capabilities of the existing business. After some time the new unit can be developed into 
an independent one. For example, Tesco, the UK’s biggest retailer developed its online 
business Tesco Direct first inside before it become an independent subsidiary. Eventually 
the separation strategy was important because the online market had evolved differently 
from the location based market.  
• C: A ‘phased integration strategy’ would be appropriate when the two markets are 
strategically similar but the two models have a high degree of conflicts. A case in point 
for such circumstance is the Danish bank Lan & Spar. When the bank launched its Direct 
Bank, it was separated from its branch based bank for three years, until it decided to 
merge the two. In the beginning, this was necessary to avoid cannibalization of the 
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established business by the new company. For example, the interest margin for Direct 
bank was 7% lower than the branch bank. Therefore, the transition had to be planned 
carefully after three years Direct Bank operated independently. Although the new bank 
targeted the low-end market, it was integrated with the branch bank through IT systems, 
common organizational values and culture, and reporting structures.  
• D: The ‘integration strategy’ is preferred when the new market is similar to the existing 
market and minor conflicts exist between the old and the new business models. For 
example, Edward Jones, one of the leading US brokerage firms integrated the online 
business to improve the efficiency of its branch business.  
 
In summarizing their view, Markides and Charitou (2004: 32) argue that at a glance some 
business models may appear disruptive to all incumbents (as in case of online banking business 
models). Nevertheless, the question whether to integrate or separate a new business model 
depends on the context of a particular established company. 
 
Collaborative Frameworks: Feeder Networks, Network Incubators and Open Innovation 
Some authors argue that some incumbents would normally be hesitant to get their radical 
innovation to the market first, if they perceive a possible cannibalization of their current 
offerings. It is suggested that established firms should perhaps adopt an opportunistic approach 
of wait-and-see until others take the first initiatives, and then appropriate the radical innovation 
when the market is clarified at a later stage, and thus capitalizing on their marketing and 
resources powers (Naull and Vandenboscb, 1996: 345; Ali, 1994: 50; Conner, 1988: 10). 
Building on this view, Markides and Geroski (2005) argue that instead of launching the 
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innovation through an own autonomous organization, established companies are likely to be 
better off by creating a “feeder network” to incubate and support small independent companies 
that would introduce the innovation, and develop a poised strategy to appropriate the new 
market’s growth later on.  
 
Favouring a more collaborative approach, Hansen et. al., (2000) suggest a “network incubator” 
framework that prescribes a minority equity stake for the incumbent in return for its network 
infrastructure and resources support for the innovator. This kind of partnership would ensure the 
independence of small start-up innovators at all times. The network-incubator structure combines 
the best of the two opposite worlds: the scale and scope of large established corporations and the 
entrepreneurial drive of small venture-capitalists. The network-incubator model generally limits 
its research and generalization to e-businesses. 
 
The collaborative approach to innovation is perhaps better articulated through Chesbrough’s 
(2003) model of ‘open innovation’. In this model, business organizations can generate ideas from 
inside sources but develop and commercialize them by using external pathways. Alternatively, 
they can generate ideas from outside their boundaries, but develop the ideas internally for 
commercialization through their own market channels. In this view, the boundary between the 
organization and its environment is viewed to be permeable, allowing innovation to move easily 
between the two. The open innovation model suggest that in the innovation economy where 
knowledge and physical resources are said to be relatively abundant, established companies 
should not limit the boundaries of their innovation development processes and market channels 
only to their own products. In a highly competitive environment, the quickest way to exploit 
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opportunities is to specialize on one of three basic processes of innovation: generating, funding 
or commercializing innovation (Chesbrough, 2003: 37). 
 
While most of the above frameworks seem to be reactive in nature (i.e., they attempt to provide 
normative models to assist organizations to adapt, or to introduce innovation to a somewhat clear 
enough market), other scholars have suggested models based on complex adaptive systems 
theory (CAS). CAS theories suggest that companies are able to leap-frog their rivals by shaping 
their own environments. 
 
Complex Adaptive System (CAS) Based Theory  
The CAS theory is rooted in the Darwinian evolutionary theory which hypothesizes that genetic 
variety, within and across species, in nature is fundamental to species survival. Some species that 
varied slightly from others in such a way that would provide them fitness to adapt the changed 
conditions would prevail in the face of a changing environment (Stacey, 1996: 34). The 
Darwinian theory takes a gradualist mode towards change – “natura non facit saltum” (nature 
does not perform leaps), which provides the rationale for favoring the incrementalism view in 
contemporary business strategy literature.  
 
However, the application of CAS theory in business science is used to explain an evolutionary 
change that is occasionally punctuated by discontinuous change. Adopting this view, the 
pioneers of CAS theory in business science argue that in today’s environment, where disruptive 
change is a norm rather than an exception in many industries and countries, firms should create, 
develop and experiment with a portfolio of innovations to explore unknown future. This 
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approach will ensure to create at least one or two innovations that have developed necessary 
capabilities to deal unknown future, while some, if not most, will probably fail (Anderson, 1999; 
Beinhocker, 1999; Hamel and Valikangas, 2003; Marshal, 1920).  
 
In practice, the CAS approach to business innovation has two major limitations. The first is the 
high risk associated with exploring an unknown future. Some scholars argue that the reason why 
many new-to-the-world innovations fail is the lack of opportunities (markets do not exist), rather 
than a shortage of experimentations. The second is that the cost of running multiple 
experimentations can exceed even the most optimistic success with any of the innovations 
(Denning, 2005: 6; Campbell and Park, 2004: 27; Markides and Geroski, 2003: 2; Treacy, 2004: 
29).  
 
Unresolved issues about approaches for enabling disruptive innovation 
The review of the above models and others that provide seemingly conflicting views appear to 
suggest that the question of dealing with discontinuous change is a far more complex challenge 
than it is currently perceived to be. But even so, the frameworks discussed above provide 
important insights into how companies should manage discontinuous innovation from different 
perspectives. When these frameworks are scrutinized closely, taking into account the question of 
this study - how companies should innovate and/or reinvent a business model to enable 
disruptive innovation - some issues remain unclear.   
 
Most of the above mentioned works seem to be focused more on technology problem. Because 
of the use of many innovation terms (for example, disruptive technology, radical production 
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innovation, architectural innovation, etc….) and the lack of criteria in the literature for 
distinguishing various types of discontinuous innovations (see Daneels, 2004: 247; Winjberg, 
2004: 1470; Chesbrough, 2001:  33), it would be less appropriate to associate the studies with the 
business model problems of disruptive innovation.  
 
Most importantly, a careful examination of extant literature reveals that we seem to know little 
about how pioneering companies introduce a disruptive business model and how traditional 
companies reinvent their business models to deal with disruptive innovation. A search in the 
literature shows that few studies have used a business model concept to guide managers in 
pursuing business model innovation through deliberate strategic process (see Voelpel et. al., 
2005; Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001; Amit and Zott, 2001). But the disruptive innovation 
theories and approaches have not been associated with business model innovation studies to 
provide an integrated theoretical model or framework that describes both business model 
“innovation” and/or business model “reinvention” to enable disruptive innovation. While the 
concept of innovation implies a proactive action of introducing an imminent or a potentially 
disruptive innovation, the concept of “reinvention” underlines a reactive action for enabling 
disruptive innovation after an innovation has proven to be disruptive. 
 
2.4  A Business Model Approach to Innovation  
Before discussing the established business model innovation frameworks, it is important to 
define the concept of a business model and review its theoretical foundations. In business 
strategy, a business model is defined as a holistic and systemic entrepreneurial concept which 
describes how a firm: (a) articulates value proposition(s) for a specific target market; (b) 
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identifies a particular customer segment for that value proposition; (c) structures its internal 
value chain to create and deliver that value to customers; (d) finds an economically viable 
position within the value network (external linkages); (e) identifies, accesses and coordinates 
own and others strategically important capabilities and resources (residing across a particular 
value chain and value network structure) to create and deliver that value for customers in 
sustainable manner; and (f) defines the revenue generating mechanisms, and develops a core 
strategy to compete in its defined industry and market (Voelpel et. al., 2005: 40; Shafer et. al., 
2005: 201; Hedman and Kalling, 2003: 56; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2003: 533; Hamel, 
2000: 66). 
 
2.4.1  Theoretical Foundations of the Concept of a Business Model 
The concept of a business model and its key components as defined above is rooted in historical 
and existing strategic management theories as discussed in chronological order as shown in 
Table 2.3. By following the logic of constructive criticism of these earlier theories, this section 
identifies both their key deficiencies in dealing with disruptive innovation by themselves and 
their relevance to the business model definition. 
 
The planning school  
The first models of strategic management, known as “the planning school”, typically consist of 
formalized processes of analysis of external opportunities or threats, identification of alternative 
courses of action, and strategy formulation. The first systematic definition of strategy in the 
discipline of business strategy seems to have come possibly from Chandler (1962). 
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Table 2.3: Theoretical Foundations of a Business Model Concept 
School of 
thought 
Principal 
Authors 
Approaches Deficiencies 
dealing with 
disruptive change 
Relevance to a business model 
concept (definition) 
1960s 
Planning 
Chandler (1962), 
Ansoff (1965),  
Andrews (1971) 
Strategic 
planning 
SWOT 
Too general and 
predictive 
Analyze SWOT of market and a 
company 
1970s 
Balancing, 
leveraging 
Abell & 
Hammond 
(1979) 
BCG 
PIMS 
Lack of guidance 
in strategizing for 
competitive 
advantage 
Analyze, 
Manage portfolio 
Correlate quality with market 
share 
1980s 
Positioning 
Porter (1985) Strategic 
positioning 
Static, lack of 
capability 
analysis within 
firms 
Analyze the ‘five forces’ to 
create a strategic position and 
then to configure a value chain 
1990s 
RBV 
Barney (1991) 
Gulati et. al. 
(2000) 
Firm-specific 
unique resources  
Network-specific 
resources 
Static, atomistic, 
lack of process 
and learning 
orientation 
Identify, access, develop and 
configure own and others 
resources and capabilities 
1990s 
Learning 
Senge (1991) 
Mintzberg 
(1994) 
Hammer & 
Champy, (1993) 
Learning 
Emergent 
strategy 
Process 
innovation 
Evolutionary 
process driven, 
not useful for 
dealing with  
disruptive 
changes 
Learn, create, improve, and 
adapt, but also warns that 
evolutionary learning process 
can create inertia 
 
 
Chandler (1962: 13) defined strategy as “the determination of the basic long-term goals and 
objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources 
necessary for carrying out these goals.” Expanding Chandler’s (1962) work, Ansoff (1965: 18) 
viewed strategy as a deliberate plan to exploit external opportunities and threats and defined 
strategy as follows: “Strategic decisions are primarily concerned with external rather than 
internal problems of the firm, and specifically with the selection of the product-mix that the firm 
will produce and the markets to which it will sell”. Andrews (1971: 28) further classified strategy 
in the context of corporate and business unit strategies. Corporate strategy defines the industry 
and market a firm wants to compete in, while a business unit strategy is a subset of a corporate 
strategy and deals with a particular business division’s choice of product/market scope. During 
the industrial era, when the business environment was said to be relatively stable or predictably 
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changing, the strength, weakness, opportunities and threats (SWOT) framework and strategic 
planning were relevant for developing the vertically integrated business models of that time 
(Clark and Clegg, 2000: 242). 
 
The balancing school 
The strategic planning and SWOT models were too general and too inflexible to guide firms in 
dealing with the growing and diversified business models of the corporation (Collis and 
Montgomery, 1995: 118; Mintzberg, 1994: 107). To hedge against an unforeseen future and 
increase their wealth through diversification, large corporation were diversifying into many 
businesses. The growth-share matrix, otherwise known as the Boston Matrix, introduced by the 
Boston Consulting Group (BCG) and Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) were two of the 
well known frameworks that were useful for managing a portfolio of business models. These 
models are useful for assessing each business units performance by measuring the market shares 
and the correlation of product quality to market competitiveness. Based on this analysis, a 
corporation could allocate resources to diversified business units through ‘balancing’ 
(leveraging) models (Abell and Hammond, 1979). 
 
These frameworks were, however, merely indicators for resource allocation and synergy between 
diversified business models. They do not provide guidance for strategizing to defend or build 
market position in the future (Leibold et. al., 2002: 70; Clark and Clegg, 2001: 205). 
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The strategic positioning school 
To address this research gap, Porter (1985) built on the industrial organization school and 
developed his competitive strategy model, which remains one of the most influential approaches 
in the field of strategic management. Porter (1980) argues that the external industrial “five 
forces”, including substitute products, the power of customers, the power of suppliers, intensity 
of competition among rivals and the strength of entry barriers determine a firm’s competitiveness 
in a given industry. He proposed that by analysing the industry’s forces a firm can choose to 
compete through one of three generic strategies: ‘differentiation’, ‘low-cost’ and ‘focus’. The last 
one has been dropped in his later works as both ‘differentiation’ and ‘focus’ could have the same 
meaning.  
 
Porter’s work was further developed via the value chain concept, which focuses on the activities 
and functions of the firm, the underlying factors that drive cost, and differentiation advantages. A 
value chain is a tool used to systematically analyze a series of activities a particular firm 
performs in the creation and delivery of a product or service, including sourcing inputs, 
production, distribution and marketing. The value chain concept entails that the controlling and 
grouping of activities allow firms to utilize either cost or differentiation potential through the 
reaping of scale advantages or the creation of firm-specific configuration (Porter, 1985: 33).  
 
According to Porter (1985), a firm should first identify sources of strategy content (strategic 
positioning) in the industry and then program its internal value chain configuration towards this 
desired strategic position. The strategic position also defines the firm’s place within the external 
value network. A value network links the focal firm’s value chain with its suppliers, customers, 
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or others who complement and amplify the firm’s own resources (Hamel, 2000: 88). This 
strategic positioning view provides important insights into how a firm develops a business model 
by first developing a unique strategic position in its industry, then configuring the internal value 
chain and locating its place in external value network to fit this strategic position. For example, 
in order to create a value proposition for a particular target market, a company must first define a 
‘strategic choice’ through the analysis of the industrial “five forces” (Hedman and Kalling, 2003: 
53; Shafer et. al., 2005: 203).  
 
Porter’s competitive strategy theory focuses on one aspect of a business model – that is the 
source of competitive advantage emanating from the firm’s external positioning in its 
competitive environment. But it pays little attention to sources of differential advantage that stem 
from internal firm-specific valuable and inimitable capabilities and resources.  
 
The RBV theory 
Perhaps, it is in response to the above shortcoming that the Resource Based View (RBV) 
approach emerged as a dominant paradigm during the late 1980s and 1990s in strategic 
management. The RBV is an umbrella term for various approaches that commonly view that the 
differences among firms’ specific internal resources as key determinants of competitive 
advantage. The RBV theory seeks to identify resources and capabilities within a firm’s business 
model that are (a) inimitable, (b) not readily substitutable, (c) superior to competitors, (d) scarce 
among competitors, and that (e) enable to leverage core competencies in related businesses 
(Clarke and Clegg, 2000: 231; Teece et. al., 1997: 511; Collis and Montgomery, 1995: 118). 
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Expanding the RBV analysis from a firm to a value network perspective, network and strategic 
alliance scholars argue that inimitable and sustainable resources can also emanate from ‘network 
structure’, ‘network membership’ and ‘tie modality’. A firm’s co-specialized ‘network structural 
pattern’ determines a firm’s performance and differential advantage. Resources embedded in a 
firm’s network structure may provide a firm with valuable strategic information which enables 
the firm to act appropriately and quicker than rivals. A focal firm’s ‘network membership’ is 
often idiosyncratic and even more inimitable than ‘network structure’, allowing members to gain 
differential advantage over non-members who may be ‘locked out’ from accessing information 
and opportunities within the network (Iansiti and Levien, 2004: 72; Gulati et. al., 2000: 203; 
Teece, 1986: 293). 
 
The concept of ‘modality tie’ refers to institutionalized rules and norms that govern relationships 
in inter-firm interactions. This tie, whether cooperative or opportunistic, strong or weak, 
multiplex or single, impacts on a focal firm’s strategic behavior and performance. The nature of 
relationships between firms is often influenced by structural network characteristics, including 
the position of a focal firm in the network, reputation and its history (Gulati et. al., 2000: 208).  
 
Learning theory 
In rapidly changing business environments, the strategic positioning and RBV prescriptive 
models are said to be inadequate to explain how firms adapt their changing business 
environments. The ‘learning school’ argues that inability to predict the future means that strategy 
models of static content analysis have to give way to frameworks that inform organizational 
learning processes for continuous innovation (Campbell and Alexander, 1997; Nonaka and 
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Takeuchi, 1995; Mintzberg, 1994; Senge, 1991). Approaches that emphasize continuous 
innovation of a business model, such as ‘just-in-time’ (JIT)), total quality management (TQM) 
business process engineering (BPR) supply-chain management (Quinn, 1997) can be categorized 
as part of the learning and process theories (Dawson and Palmer, 1995; Hammer and Champy, 
1993; Cusamano, 1985). 
 
The examination of traditional models shows that the concept of a business model has a solid 
foundation in the strategic management literature. The relevance of traditional models in dealing 
with disruptive innovation can be summarized as follows: The strategic positioning and the RBV 
approaches provide frameworks for identifying static internal and external sources of 
competitive advantage by analyzing ex-post successful business models. However, they do not 
provide insights into how an incumbent firm should strategize to deal with disruptively changing 
business environments (Camillus, 1997: 1; Sanchez, 1997: 939).   
 
While the learning and continuous innovation approaches are useful for guiding firms in dealing 
with continuously changing business environments, they also help us to understand why 
incumbents fail to deal with disruptive changes. Organizational theorists use the theory of inertia 
to explain a cognitive “lock-in” in organizations that arises due to continuous learning processes 
(see e.g. Blau and Schoenherr, 1971; Kasarda, 1974; Terrien and Mills, 1955). As a firm evolves 
and matures through the process of retaining successful culture and values and discouraging 
those that do not confirm with its strategic choice, it develops a “dominant logic” or “mental 
models”. These can act as its liabilities by filtering out ideas that could be useful for developing a 
potentially disruptive business model; simply because the ideas do not conform to its current 
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successful business model (see e.g. Weick, 1976: 2; Henderson and Clark, 1990: 27; Prahalad 
and Bettis, 1986: 485).  
 
The implication of traditional models to business model innovation and reinvention for the 
purpose of enabling disruptive innovation is that managers should continuously question their 
firms’ current business model. In other words, they should challenge the firm’s own strategic 
position, its current internal and external strategically important capabilities, and most 
importantly their own conventions (cognitive constraints) about how they compete in their 
industries. An emerging body of knowledge suggests that it is possible for managers to reinvent a 
business model through systematic use of the business model concept itself (Govindarajan and 
Gupta, 2001; Kim and Mauborgne, 2005; 1999; Hamel, 2000; Holmstrom, Hoover J.r., 
Louhiluoto & Vasara, 2000). The following section discusses the formal introduction of a 
business model concept into the business strategy literature and its usefulness as a framework for 
enabling innovation.  
 
2.4.2  The Concept of a Business Model as Locus of Innovation   
The literature review presents a plethora of business model definitions. To have a relevant 
definition for developing a conceptual framework, this study analyzes major works on the topic 
of the business model (see Table 2.4). Although one may not easily grasp a consistent definition 
across these works, a close scrutiny of these reveals some basic underlying similarities 
underpinning the core concept and six major common components that are applicable to a wide 
range of contexts.  
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Table 2.4: Various Definitions of a Business Model 
Author Discipline Various definitions of a business model 
Knoczal 
(1975: 47) 
IT A mathematical description of characteristics of a real (business) system, that defines the 
relationships existing in the real system.  
Timmers 
(1998: 4) 
e-business An architecture for the product, service and information flows, including a description of 
the various business actors and their roles; and a description of the potential benefits for 
the various business actors; and a description of the sources of revenues. 
Amit & Zott 
(2001: 511) 
e-business A business model depicts the content, structure, and governance of transactions designed 
to create value through the exploitation of business opportunities.  
Rappa (2001) e-business In the most basic sense, a business model is the method of doing business by which a 
company can sustain itself -- that is, generate revenue. The business model spells out how 
a company makes money by specifying where it is positioned in the value chain. 
Afuah & 
Tucci  (2001: 
54) 
e-business The components of a business model include customer value (distinctive offering or low 
cost), scope (customer and products/services), price, revenue sources, connected 
activities, implementation (required resources), capabilities (required skills), and 
sustainability. 
Tapscott et. 
al., (2000: 17) 
e-business A (business model)  ‘business-web’ (b-web) is a distinct system of suppliers, distributors, 
commerce services providers, infrastructure providers, and customers that use the Internet 
for their primary business communications and transactions… in which each participant 
focuses on a limited set of core competencies, the things that it does best. 
Hamel (2000: 
66-70) 
Business 
strategy 
A business concept and a business model are the same – a business model is simply a 
business concept that has been put into practice. A business concept comprises four major 
components: core strategy, strategic resources, customer interface, and value network.  
Govindarajan 
& Gupta 
(2001: 3) 
Business 
strategy 
The business model results from answering three questions (1) who are my target 
customers? (2) what value do I want to deliver to them? (3) how will I create it?. The 
answers to these questions operate as a system – the individual answers must be self 
reinforcing and internally consistent.  
Magretta 
(2002: 87) 
Business 
strategy 
 
A business model answers four fundamental questions: ‘Who is the customer? What does 
the customer value? How do we make money in this business? And what is the 
underlying economic logic that explains how we can deliver value to the customer at an 
appropriate cost? 
 
Hedman & 
Kalling  
(2003: 52) 
Information 
system 
A generic business model includes (a) customers, (2) competitors,  
(3) offering, (4) activities and organization,(5) resources, and (6) supply of factor and 
production, and (7) a longitudinal process component to cover the dynamics of the 
business model over time and the cognitive and cultural constraints that managers have to 
cope with.  
Chesbrough & 
Rosenbloom 
(2003: 533) 
Technological 
Innovation & 
strategy 
The functions of a business model are to articulate value proposition, identify market 
segment, define the structure of the value chain, estimate the cost structure and profit 
potential of producing the offering, describe the position of the firm within the value 
network, and formulate the competitive strategy by which the innovating firm will gain 
and hold advantage over rivals.  
Shafer et. al., 
(2005: 202) 
Business 
strategy 
A business model is a presentation of a firm’s underlying core logic and strategic choices 
for creating and capturing value within a value network.  
Voelpel et. al., 
(2005: 40) 
Business 
strategy  
The particular business concept (or way of doing business) as reflected by the enterprise’s 
core value proposition(s) for customers; its configured value network(s) to provide that 
value, consisting of own strategic capabilities as well as other (e.g. outsourced/alliance) 
value networks and capabilities; and its leadership and governance enabling capabilities 
to continually sustain and reinvent itself to satisfy the multiple objectives of its various 
stakeholders (including shareholders). 
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A review of the literature shows that the first systematic discussion of the concept of a business 
model in peer reviewed journals seems to come from the field of information technology, 
probably with the advent of the personal computer and spreadsheet (see Dottore 1977; Knoczal, 
1975). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, with the proliferation of Internet businesses, the term 
business model gained momentum in e-business research and Internet start-ups (e.g. Hoque, 
2002; Dubosson-Torbay, Osterwaldeer & and Pigneur, 2002.; Afuah and Tucci, 2001; Rappa, 
2001; Amit and Zott, 2001; Timmers, 1998).  
 
Since the beginning of the new millennium and onwards, the concept has been one of the top 
topics which has elicited intense discussions in the field of strategic management, signifying its 
application not only in e-businesses but across a wide range of industries (Davenport et. al., 
2006; Voelpel et. al., 2005; Vlaar et. al., 2005; Shafer et. al., 2005; Hedman and Kalling, 2003; 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001; Hamel, 2000). 
 
The analysis of Table 2.5 shows that many researchers have used a business model concept for 
different purposes, including (a) to architect or to design a business system; (b) to show logical 
relationships among different parts of a system; (c) to implement a business plan; (d) as a 
framework of efficiency; and (e) more importantly as a locus of innovation. These purposes 
match with Eriksson and Penker’s (2000: 7) scheme of five uses of a business model framework:  
• to better understand the key mechanisms of an existing business for control purposes 
(logical relationships) 
• to act as a basis for improving the current business structure and operations (efficiency) 
• to design a structure of a new business (architecture, implementation) 
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• to identify outsourcing opportunities (innovation and restructuring) 
• to experiment with a new business concept or to imitate or study a concept used by a 
competitive company, e.g. benchmarking on the model level (innovation) 
 
Table 2.5:  Purposes of Extant Business Model Research 
*Field of 
study/industry 
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Architecture + +  +    +  + +   + + +  
9 
Implementation +    +             
2 
Efficiency + +  +    +   +   + +   
7 
Innovation   + +   + + + +     + +  
8 
*IT = Information technology, **EB = e-business, ***S = Strategy, ****TI = Technology innovation, *****IS = 
Information system. 
 
Of particular importance to the current thesis are the works that have used the business model 
concept as a locus of innovation. A review of the literature shows that very few academics have 
used the business model concept as a framework of innovation. Building on these studies, the 
present study will use a business model concept as a conceptual framework for reinvention of a 
business model (see Chapter 3). The logic for using this concept is as follows.  If the current 
business model is arguably said to be an incumbent’s source of rigidity in the face of disruptive 
innovation, a new business model can then possibly emerge by questioning each component of a 
firm’s current business model (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001; Kim and Mauborgne, 2005; 1999; 
Hamel, 2000; Holmstrom et. al., 2000). More specifically, Govindarajan and Gupta (2001) argue 
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that a new business model may emerge by asking the following three questions as reported in 
Table 2.6. 
 
Table 2.6:  Key Dimensions for Business Model Reinvention 
Key questions Answers 
1) Who is the firm’s customer? Reinvent the customer base 
2) What does the customer value?  Reinvent the value proposition(s) 
3) How does the firm create that value?
  
Redesign the value chain or the value network 
Source: Govindarajan and Gupta (2001: 3) 
 
Figure 2.4 shows that a business model reinvention may begin by a dramatic redefinition of a 
firm’s customer base or by its reinventing value proposition(s). Alternatively, a radical redesign 
of value-chain or value-network may create a new business model (Voelpel et. al., 2005: 27; 
Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001: 4; Holmstrom et. al., 2000: 85). The assumption of a cause and 
effect relationship of major components of a business model means that any substantial change 
in one of the three key components will reinforce changes in all other components, if a business 
model is to function as a dynamic system (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001:  4).  
 
Among a number of related works, Govindarajan and Gupta’s (2001) framework in particular 
offers a systematic approach for pursuing business model innovation by looking across the 
conventionally defined boundaries of a firm’s target market and industry. Contrary to the 
Porterian and RBV static models that look systematically within defined boundaries of the firm, 
this approach provides insights for questioning the firm’s current customer value, its target 
market and its value chain and value network configurations, and to reinvent them by looking 
across the defined boundaries (e.g. Kim and Maubourgne, 1999). 
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Figure 2.4:  The Three Arenas Framework for Business Model Reinvention 
Procurement    R&D     Manufacturing     Marketing     Distribution CustomersCustomer 
value
The Value Chain
3. Dramatically 
redesign the 
end-to-end value 
chain architecture
1. Dramatically reinvent 
the concept of customer 
value
2. Dramatically 
redefine the customer
base
Source: Govindarajan and Gupta (2001: 4). 
 
2.5  Research Gaps in Extant Strategic Management Literature  
The above literature review shows that the topic of disruptive innovation has been extensively 
studied virtually from all facets of business environments, including technical competence, 
capabilities, culture, market and industry linkages. In particular, recent studies have 
comprehensively explored the dual problems facing organizations, i.e., the challenge of 
simultaneously sustaining an existing business model and enabling disruptive business model 
innovation. They have proposed many insightful normative frameworks to guide organizations in 
their creative endeavors for mastering this challenge. Whilst this stream of studies focuses on 
“enabling” disruptive innovation, an emerging body of research has provided useful conceptual 
frameworks for assisting organizations in pursuing business model innovation in systematic 
ways. This thesis identifies two research gaps in existing management innovation literature: a 
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dearth of research to understand how incumbent firm reinvent their business models to enable 
disruptive innovation, and lack of knowledge on the differences between technology and non-
technology disruptive innovations.  
 
2.5.1 A Framework for Business Model Reinvention to Enable Disruptive Innovation  
The review of extant strategic management literature reveals that the two fields, namely 
disruptive innovation and business model innovation studies have not been linked systematically 
to provide an integrated framework for business model innovation and reinvention to enable 
disruptive innovation. When the (principally technology based) disruptive innovation studies are 
examined in light of this thesis’s research question, they mainly focus on how an incumbent firm 
should deal with disruptive innovation when disruptive innovation has already taken place. 
Therefore, these studies seem to be more reactive and appear to be silent on the evolution of 
(potentially disruptive) business model innovation before it becomes disruptive.  Similarly, when 
the emerging business model innovation studies are scrutinized, to a large extent they focus on 
the evolution of business model innovation. These studies do not seem to link business model 
innovation approaches with problems facing established companies to deal with disruptive 
innovation. By drawing the two fields of studies together, this thesis proposes to develop an 
integrated framework for business model reinvention to enable disruptive innovation.  
 
2.5.2  Technology and Market-Driven Business Model Innovations 
Many scholars have cited examples of low-tech disruptive market-driven business model 
innovations. Some of these examples are the introduction of Dell’s “built-to-order” direct model 
in the computer industry, South West’s low-cost carrier in the airlines industry and direct models 
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in the insurance and banking industries that offer 24-hour access, convenience and low premium 
compared to traditional offerings (see e.g. Markides, 2006: 19 Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001: 6). 
However, the same theory of disruptive innovation that evolved from successive technological 
studies persists to explain all types of disruptive innovations. We seem to know little whether 
these low-tech disruptive innovations entail different evolutionary processes, competitive and 
disruptive effects in comparison to high-tech disruptive product innovations.   
 
To understand this secondary question, it is important to define and distinguish the two concepts. 
Broadly, technology can also be defined as a scientific method or process that converts inputs 
including, knowledge, labor, material, capital, energy and information into outputs. Taking this 
definition, technology may refer to process innovation, which typically involves a change in the 
scientific method to make processes for established value propositions more effective or 
efficient, or to create a new product. This definition is comprehensive and may include all types 
of innovation. Narrowly, technology can be defined as “electronic or digital products and 
systems considered as a group”. Taking the latter constricted view, the present study defines 
technological innovation as a core product innovation (Moore, 2004: 88; Hill and Rothaermel, 
2003: 258; Tushman and Anderson, 1986: 440). 
 
A business model is a sine qua non for all profit-making organization to commercialize all types 
of innovations, whether product, process or non-technological innovations. Some product or 
process innovations do not necessarily involve change in business models. Some other product or 
process innovations completely change the business model. In this study, innovations that change 
fundamentally both the core product and a business model can be defined as technology-push 
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business model innovation or simply as “technological innovation”. Stated differently, a business 
model naturally evolves as a result of, and around a technological product innovation. Some 
examples of technological disruptive innovations are as follows: The introduction of 
minicomputers was disruptive to mainframe computers. The introduction of personal computers 
was disruptive to the previously existing technology of minicomputers.  
. 
Innovations that do not change the established core product compared to previously established 
core product or service, but that fundamentally change a business model, can be referred to as 
low-tech market-driven business model innovation, or simply as business model innovation. In 
other words, a less-technological business model innovation results from market innovation that 
reframes the established value propositions in an existing industry. An innovator firm creates a 
market as a result of, and around a business model innovation. Market-driven business model 
innovation often emerges at a latter stage when a radical or disruptive technological innovation 
matures and competition through business model becomes critical (Moore, 2004: 88). 
 
The question of differences between technology-push and low-tech market-driven innovations is 
discussed in view of the relative concept of disruptive innovation. Christensen (2006: 48) 
recently improves his original theory by adding the concept of relativity. He states that 
“disruptive innovation is a relative, not an absolute phenomenon”. Stated differently, a similar 
innovation that may constitute disruptive to a particular incumbents’ business model in a given 
context may be sustaining to another incumbent’s business model in another context. This recent 
addition suggests that a study of disruptive innovation is not complete without describing the 
relativity of disruptive innovation and explaining contextual factors responsible for variations. A 
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careful scrutiny of the literature reveals that few studies have attempted to discuss the concept of 
relativity in disruptive innovation theoretically. Therefore, there is a need to investigate this 
concept empirically particularly within the different innovation categories within South African 
industries (Christensen, 2006; Markides, 2006). 
 
The primary and second research questions become even more relevant when viewed from a 
developing economies setting. The disruptive innovation literature confines its empirical studies, 
to a large extent, on high-tech industries in developed economies. Although, some studies show 
that disruptive innovations are increasingly shaping markets and industries’ structures in 
developing economies, it is unclear how these phenomena vary from disruptive innovation 
circumstances observed in developed countries (see Davenport et. al., 2006; Grulke and Silber, 
2004). The variations in factor endowments and access to critical resources between developed 
and developing economies could probably mean that managers in developing economies face 
different challenges in their strategic endeavors to enable disruptive business model innovation. 
This is possible because even industry incumbents in different countries within developed 
economies have exhibited different behaviors in dealing with disruptive innovation (Chesbrough, 
1999).  
 
2.6  Summary  
This chapter examined extant theories, concepts and frameworks of disruptive innovation and a 
business model in order to identify research gaps in current strategic management literature. The 
introductory part presented definitions of key concepts used in this study in order to provide 
 64 
clarity on their meanings in the analysis of the literature. Defining these concepts are critical for 
proper operationalization of proxies in empirical investigations of this thesis.   
 
The first part of the chapter examined the disruptive innovation theory and its theoretical basis. It 
shows that the theory has evolved through successions of studies that have explored the 
evolution of technological change and its impact, as a central force, in shaping the future of 
business organizations over the last fifty years. The early works framed the question of industry 
incumbents’ problem in dealing with disruptive change in terms of technology alone.  
 
The latest development in this field shifted the focus of analysis to the incumbent’s current 
business model and its evolutionary nature, as opposed to a focus on technology alone. The 
evolved relationships of major components, evolutionary learning processes and cognitive 
models embedded within the incumbent’s business model are said to be the major cause for the 
incumbents’ failure in the face of disruptive innovation. And such outcome is more likely when 
the incumbent’s business model has been successful in the past. Consequently, for established 
companies, the issue of reinventing their business models becomes a strategic challenge for 
survival in the long run, while their traditional business models are still profitable. To address 
this challenge of “dualism”, many scholars have suggested different frameworks for assisting 
industry incumbents to enable disruptive innovation, while sustaining their current business 
model. A careful study of these frameworks reveals that while they provide important managerial 
insights and guidance for managing discontinuous innovation, they seem to disregard the 
question of business model reinvention. 
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The second part of this chapter examined the concept of a business model. Although the concept 
of a business model is relatively a recent introduction to the field of strategic management, it has 
a solid theoretical foundation in the literature. Its antecedents, the strategic positioning and RBV 
theories, can inform an organization about its relatively static internal and external sources of 
competitive advantage that reside within its business model. These models may be useful for 
strategizing towards the future when the environment is believed to be predictably changing. The 
learning and continuous innovation approaches are useful for providing guidance to firms about 
dealing with continuously changing business environments. However, they are inadequate for 
assisting managers of incumbent firms in the face of disruptive changes.  
 
Possibly in an effort to address the shortcoming of traditional strategy theories, an emerging 
body of knowledge has invoked a business model concept as an appropriate framework for 
pursuing innovation. A careful examination reveals that business model innovation studies have 
not been systematically linked to disruptive innovation studies. By reviewing the two fields of 
studies this chapter has highlighted two research gaps.  
 
The first question is concerned with how organizations should innovate and reinvent a business 
model to enable disruptive innovation. The second question hypothesizes that technological and 
market-driven business model innovations are two distinct disruptive innovation phenomena that 
require different approaches. The following chapter will present a conceptual framework for 
carrying out empirical investigation to answer these research questions.  
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CHAPTER THREE: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1  Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a conceptual framework for guiding the empirical 
investigation to address the present research questions. This chapter is organized in three major 
parts. The first part provides a more comprehensive definition of a business model and outlines 
its six key components. The second part presents a conceptual framework that integrates the 
concepts of a business model and disruptive innovation. The third part distinguishes the 
difference between technological and market-driven business model innovations.  
 
This chapter proposes two conceptual models, namely an entrant’s evolutionary and an 
incumbent’s enabling model for disruptive innovation.  From an entrant point of view, the 
evolutionary model articulates seven hypotheses that are assumed to determine a successful 
introduction and emergence of potentially disruptive business model innovation. This section 
culminates by arguing that although a business model innovation is realized when an innovator  
firm succeeds in creating and growing a potentially disruptive niche market, this does not, on its 
own, lead to disruptive innovation. Building on existing theories and integrating emerging 
insights from the South African case studies, the study develops a second conceptual model that 
deals with disruptive innovation process from an incumbent firm perspective. It puts forward 
another seven hypotheses that are thought to determine the disruptive impact of innovation on an 
incumbent’s traditional business model, and how an incumbent firm should reinvent their 
business models to enable (or disable) disruptive innovation.  
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3.2 A Conceptual Framework for Enabling Disruptive Innovation  
This study conceptualizes its framework based on two established assumptions. First, disruptive 
innovation introduces a fundamentally different business model to that of the incumbent. Second, 
the incumbent’s existing business model will be the cause of its problem in the face of a 
disruptive innovation. These assumptions suggest that disruptive innovation is a function of 
conflicts between an incumbent’s and entrant’s business models (Christensen, 2006: 43). 
 
According to the business strategy literature, a business model is defined as a holistic and 
systemic entrepreneurial business concept which describes how a firm: (a) articulates latent value 
proposition(s); (b) identifies a particular customer segment(s) for that value proposition; (c) 
designs internal value chain; (d) configures external value network structure; (e) identifies, 
accesses and coordinates own and others capabilities and resources (residing across a particular 
value chain and a value network structure) to create and deliver that value, and (f) generates 
revenue (economic logic) and develops a core strategy necessary for capturing and sustaining the 
value it creates. The systematic categorization of these components into six major constructs 
captures the most fundamental elements of a business organization. The systemic and holistic 
terms refer to a conceptual representation of the aggregation of all major components of a 
business underpinned by a core economic logic (Voelpel et. al., 2005: 40; Shafer et. al., 2005: 
201; Hedman and Kalling, 2003: 56; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2003: 533; Hamel, 2000: 
66). 
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Figure 3.1: Dynamic Relationships of a Business Model’s Components 
1. Value proposition(s)
2. Customer base
3. Value chain 
configuration
(Internal)
4. Value network 
configuration
(External)
6. Economic 
logic
& Strategy
5. Business model 
capabilities
 
As shown in Figure 3:1, a business model conceptualizes how a business functions as a system. 
The figure shows that the components have a dynamic relationship with each other that co-
evolve around a core economic logic, which must be sustained by a firm’s core strategy 
(Magretta, 2002: 87). The following section discusses each of the components and their linkages 
from an incumbent’s existing business model perspective.  
 
(a) Customer value proposition  
The most basic point to start in creating a business is to discover a viable customer value. Value 
is defined as “the amount customers are willing to pay in return for a firm’s offerings” (Porter, 
1985: 38). The concept of value proposition refers to the total customer benefits offered by a 
particular company for a specific customer base relative to competitive offerings. The total 
customer value is derived from the functional, experiential or emotional benefits of a product or 
service. These benefits can be created from several interrelated elements including, price, 
quality, ease of use, brand recognition, complementary offerings, convenience of transaction 
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mechanisms (efficiency) in obtaining the product (Walker, Boyd, Mullins & Larreche, 2006:  
75). 
 
A clearly defined value proposition constitutes the foundation upon which a business model of a 
firm is built. When the value proposition is synchronized with the needs of a particular target 
market, it articulates the company’s strategic focus. Generally, there are two types of strategic 
focus; differentiation (higher quality) or low-cost strategy (lower price). A firm’s business model 
evolves from an early choice made between these strategies. A continuous strategic focus assists 
the company to sustain its competitive advantage in its established market. It allows the firm to 
achieve “fit” between its business model, strategy and its external environment. From an 
incumbent perspective, the notions of focus and fit suggest that it is often difficult, if not 
impossible, for a firm to integrate an essentially different value proposition in the same business 
model (Porter, 1996: 63).  
 
(b) Customer base 
The second vital component of a business model is a firm’s particular target market for which its 
specific value proposition is designed. Generally, a market segment can be categorized as high-
end or low-end depending on the price sensitivity of customers in a particular market. A firm 
may choose to serve either market segment based on whether it adopts differentiation or low-cost 
strategy. Once a firm’s value proposition is established in its specific target market, a firm 
maintains an ongoing relationship between the company and its customer base through 
marketing approaches such as a customer relationship management (CRM) process (Shimp, 
2007: 472).  
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The application of advanced information and computer technology (ICT) devices, such as 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) and data-mining technology are useful for identifying needs, 
targeting customers with relatively high accuracy, customizing offerings, and providing efficient 
customer support services. These attributes create a good interface between the firm’s value 
propositions and its customer base. But such a relationship that evolves from a chosen strategic 
focus often confines the firm to its previously defined market base. Because of conflicts in value 
propositions (higher quality vs. lower price, for instance), a firm is typically less able to serve a 
characteristically different target market (high-end vs. low-end, for example) within the same 
business model (Gilbert, 2003: 32). 
 
(c) Value chain 
Once a firm develops a customer value concept for a particular customer base, it configures a 
value chain to create and deliver that value to the final user. A value chain is a systematic 
conceptual tool that is used to analyze a linear flow of activities that a particular firm performs in 
the creation and delivery of a product or service. A value chain comprises primary and support 
activities. The primary activities are those processes that are directly concerned with the creation 
and delivery of a product to the customer. These include supply chains, production, distribution, 
marketing, sales and services (Porter, 1985: 38). 
 
Although support activities are not directly involved in the creation and delivery of a product, 
they enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of value creation activities. Support activities 
include procurement, human resources management, technology development and process 
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infrastructure. A value chain assists a firm to asses the cost of each activity in creating value in 
accordance with the firm’s chosen strategy. For example, a firm that adopts a differentiation 
strategy configures a value system and performs activities that increase quality of the product 
from a user perspective. On the other hand, a firm that follows cost-leadership strategy designs 
systems that lower the cost for the buyer. A firm generates value (profit) when its revenue 
exceeds the total cost of performing all activities in the value chain (Porter, 1985: 38). 
 
When a firm is successful in configuring a profitable value chain, the “fit” and consistency that 
evolve between individual activities may continue to be sources of differential advantage in the 
traditional market. The advances in ICT and the Internet make possible the effective application 
of processes and practices such as just-in-time’ (JIT), total quality management (TQM), and 
business process engineering (BPE) (see Quinn, 1997; Dawson and Palmer, 1995; Hammer and 
Champy, 1993; Cusamano, 1985). 
 
The dynamic and interdependent linkages of value proposition, target market and value chain, as 
presented so far, means that a fundamental change in one element is often difficult, if not 
impossible, without changing all of the other three components – that is changing the business 
model as a whole (see Markides and Charitou, 2004; Teece et. al., 1997).  
 
(d) Value network  
A business model approach to business strategy suggests that the creation and delivery of 
products or services depends not only on a single firm’s value chain, but also on its external 
value network. A value network links the focal firm’s value chain with its suppliers, customers, 
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or others who complement and add value to the firm’s core product or services (Hamel, 2000: 
88).  
 
Strategy scholars use different concepts such as the ‘value system’, ‘clusters’, ‘ecosystem’, 
‘strategic network’, and ‘socio-cultural business system’ to describe the boundaries and 
pathways of a focal firm’s business model in its network, as well as to map the logical 
relationships among different actors in that network. These various relational concepts help us to 
define a focal firm’s value network structure, showing the firm’s vertical relationships such as 
those between suppliers, producers, distributors and customers; or its horizontal relationships 
among competitors linked by strategic alliances (Iansiti and Levien, 2004; Moore, 1993; Gulati 
et. al., 2000; Leibold, Probst & Gibbert, 2002; Porter, 1985). 
 
A firm’s value network also comprises complementary actors that add value to the firm’s core 
product or service or other agents who influence its value creation and value-capture potential. 
For example, an airline and a hotel may form a partnership to complement their services, and a 
government, regulatory agencies, investors and stakeholders can influence a firm’s value 
creation and capture potential. 
 
A firm’s value-capture potential may depend on the nature of its external relationships. A firm’s 
may have specialized and generalized relationships with its external partners. A firm’s special 
relationships can be built through exclusive contracts, for example, with few suppliers of 
strategically important inputs, exclusively trained distributors and its most loyal corporate 
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clients. Other relationships can be of a general nature, such as arms-length relationships with 
suppliers of generic materials (Teece, 1986: 291).  
 
When the firm’s core linkages in its ecosystem or network are reasonably specialized, 
predictably changing and healthy, they raise entry barriers and provide a stable platform for a 
member firm to continue improving its business model. Conversely, these historical linkages and 
interdependences imply that a firm’s existing value network can restrict its business model to 
existing relationships, making it difficult for the firm to adapt to disruptive innovation that 
emanates outside of its network boundaries (see Chakravorti, 2004: 65; Gulati et. al., 2000: 207). 

(e) Capabilities 
The firm’s value chain and value network structure are made up of capabilities. Otherwise stated, 
capabilities reside within the firm’s value chain and outside within its partners and 
complementors’ value chains. Capabilities refer to the firm’s ability to identify, access, integrate, 
build, and reconfigure, internal and external competencies and resources to sustain a firm’s 
existing business model. Capabilities comprise core-competencies, processes, values and 
resources (Sanchez, 1997: 943; Richardson, 1972: 883; Teece et. al., 1997: 517). 
 
Core-competencies: A firm’s critical knowledge, experience and skills that make its final 
products or services unique relative to the firm’s competitors’ products or services are referred to 
as core-competencies (Teece et. al., 1997: 517).  
 
Processes: A process refers to distinctive routine activities which are performed in coherent and 
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consistent ways. Processes, for example, can be the ways by which production is planned and 
made, and the ways by which procurement, market research, investment decisions, budgeting, 
and resource allocation are planned and executed (Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 183; Teece et. 
al., 1997: 517). 
 
Values: Values include culture, standards, ‘mental models’ and ‘dominant logics’ which 
members of a firm use as a frame of reference in making judgments and decisions in their 
strategic and technical activities. A mental model is an abstract representation of processes 
within one’s head.  A dominant logic represents the frame of mind that employees use to 
prioritize their activities. This includes feelings and belief systems which one may not even be 
conscious of. When the corporate values are explicitly or implicitly clear and broadly 
disseminated, they ensure the internal coherence and consistency of the dynamics in a firm’s 
business model (Von Krogh and Nonaka, 2000: 6; Prahalad, and Bettis, 1986: 485). 
 
Resources: Resources include both tangible assets like finance, technology, product designs, 
equipment and machinery, building, and labor; and intangibles such as brand, information and 
specific knowledge about the firm’s customers (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000: 73). 
 
When resources, core competencies, processes and values are intertwined within a particular 
business model, they may become firm-specific capabilities that are difficult, if not impossible, 
to emulate. Because each firm’s capabilities evolve in idiosyncratic ways contingent upon its 
own context and history, the capabilities determine what a firm can or cannot do. When a firm’s 
environment is said to change fairly predictably, and that the firm has been successful in the past, 
its capabilities may feed each other dynamically to create more success in the future. Conversely, 
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when a firm’s environment is said to be discontinuously changing, its current capabilities may 
become sources of its maladaptive rigidities (Foster and Kaplan 2001: 61; Normann, 2001: 82; 
Leonard-Barton, 1995: 111). 

(f) Economic logic and strategy  
The ultimate measure of any business undertaking is, of course, economic value creation. A 
company may create value for its customers and itself by offering competitively better or cheaper 
value propositions, identifying a profitable customer segment, assembling value chain and value 
network. However, if it lacks a strategic position and firm-specific strategically important 
capabilities, its economic logic may be deficient. The most important issue for a firm is, 
therefore, to capture and sustain corresponding economic returns relative to the value it creates 
(Shafer et. al. 2005: 205; Porter, 2001: 65). 
 
By analyzing competitive forces, a company can carve out a strategic position to compete within 
those forces. A firm should also identify resources and capabilities within its business model that 
are (a) inimitable, (b) not readily substitutable, (c) superior to competitors, (d) scarce among 
competitors, and that (e) enables it to leverage core competencies in related businesses (Collis 
and Montgomery, 1995; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). 
 
The economic logic requires management to address and evaluate the potential and consistency 
of the six components of a business model for value creation, capture and sustainability. To 
operate a profitable business, all the components must function as a dynamic system in an 
internally consistent manner, and dynamically revolving around the firm’s core economic logic.  
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This suggests that an existing business model (the usual way of doing business) can influence 
managers to pay less attention to other business opportunities that do not confirm with the 
economic logic. For example, a firm that adopts a differentiation strategy may not find a low-end 
opportunity attractive. Alternatively, a firm that exploits economies of scale and low-cost 
production to serve a large mass market may not find a small low-end niche-market financially 
attractive (Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 32-45).  
 
In chapter two, it was discussed that serious differences in terms of strategic market focus, value 
chain, value network, capabilities and revenue model can cause incumbents to falter in the face 
of disruptive innovation. Then an important question for an established organization is how to 
reinvent a business model to deal with disruptive innovation while its traditional business model 
is still profitable (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004; Hamel and Valikangas, 2003; Beinhocker, 
1999). A logical approach to address this question for the incumbent seems to take an entrant’s 
(disruptor) perspective of the equation.  
 
Table 3.1:  The Fundamental Questions Put by a Business Model Concept 
Fundamental questions Key components 
1. What does the customer need? Value proposition(s) 
2. Who is the firm’s customer? Customer base 
3. Where and how does the firm create that value? Value chain 
4. Who are the firm’s partners (suppliers/distributors)? Value network 
5. How does the firm create and capture that value? Capabilities and resources 
6. What does the firm gain and how does it sustain the value for itself? Economic logic, strategy 
 
As shown in Table 3.1, the systematic categorization of a business model’s components into six 
major constructs highlights the basic questions that are necessary for creating and developing a 
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business model (for additional insights see Shafer et. al., 2005; Hedman and Kalling, 2003; 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Magretta, 2002).  
 
Building on the above logical sequence of questions, and integrating the concept of a business 
model with the theory of disruptive innovation, this study develops two conceptual frameworks 
for entrant’s business model innovation and incumbent’s business model reinvention for 
enabling disruptive innovation. The conceptual frameworks can be described in a nutshell as 
evolutionary and disruptive stages of markets as graphically depicted in Figure 3.2. Firstly, from 
an entrant’s perspective in the evolutionary phase it assumes that a potentially disruptive 
business model innovation originates and builds momentum in a niche market. Secondly, from 
an incumbent’s perspective in the disruptive phase, beyond creation of a niche market, disruption 
occurs if a new business model succeeds to enter into an incumbent’s established mainstream 
market. Theoretically, an innovator firm transforms from a niche player into a disruptive firm, as 
it successfully adapts to endogenous and exogenous dynamics. The first evolutionary phase puts 
forward seven logically linked hypotheses that are assumed necessary for creation of a successful 
niche market. The second disruptive phase proposes other seven hypotheses that are 
conceptualized to determine an incumbent’s reinvention processes to enable or disable disruptive 
innovation.  
3.3  Niche Market Innovation  
Figure 3.2 shows a conceptual framework of the evolutionary process from an entrant’s 
perspective. The first hypothesis (H1) assumes that a process of a potentially disruptive business 
model innovation may begin, first, by introducing a product or service with a different set of 
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value propositions and performance attributes that are perceived inferior and unattractive on the 
dimensions the mainstream customers value compared to the existing offering.  
 
Figure 3:2:  Entrant’s Perspective: A Conceptual Model of Business Model Innovation 
Dynamics for Creating a Potentially Disruptive Niche Market 
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Second, the paradoxical nature of disruptive innovation suggests that a potentially disruptive 
innovation must create asymmetric motivation during an innovation’s introduction life-cycle 
(Christensen et. al., 2004: 13). 
 
From an entrant’s perspective, H1 hypothesizes that the innovation’s relative advantage (RA) is 
negatively related to “asymmetric motivation” (AM). “Asymmetric motivation” refers to the 
differential economic incentives, where a small start-up disruptor may find a low-margin, low-
end small market profitable, whereas the start-up entrance may motivate a large established 
incumbent to flee that relatively low-margin market in order to concentrate on the more 
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profitable established market. H2 therefore hypothesizes that AM is positively related to a 
potentially disruptive niche market innovation growth (IG) (Christensen et. al., 2004: 13). 
 
The third hypothesis (H3) suggests that a fundamental end-to-end reconfiguration of a value 
chain is positively related to continuous innovation (CI). The extent to which a fundamentally 
different value chain configuration enables continuous innovation determines an innovator’s 
potential to create a disparate and disruptive trajectory that moves up market the new business 
model over time before the innovation encroaches the established market. Thus, H4 assumes that 
continuous innovation (CI) is positively related to a potentially disruptive niche market 
innovation growth (IG) (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001: 3). 
 
In chapter two, a distinction was made between the concepts of creativity and innovation. It was 
highlighted that creativity may result in something new, but it does not necessarily mean that it 
adds value to the organization in a commercial sense (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003: 258; Drucker, 
1985: 19). Similarly, the discovery of the three independent components namely, new value 
propositions, customer base and value chain are endogenous innovation drivers which are 
necessary conditions but not sufficient for business model innovation (Voelpel et. al., 2005: 27; 
Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001: 3). 
 
Business model innovation depends on an innovating firm’s ability to overcome exogenous 
enabling or disabling forces by developing a strategy. Thus, H5, H6 and H7 put forward 
assumptions for assessing the dual innovator’s challenges of overcoming constraints and 
competitive pressures on one hand, and building firm-specific strategic capabilities for capturing 
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value and growth on the other hand (Drucker, 1985: 19). H5 hypothesizes that constraint is 
negatively related to IG. H6 assumes that competition is positively related to IG (Porter, 1985: 
38; Walker et. al., 2006: 180), and H7 hypothesizes strategy is positively related to IG. A firm’s 
strategy determines whether an innovating firm can or cannot exploit opportunities and resources 
to enable innovation (Teece et. al., 1997: 519; Collis and Montgomery, 1995: 120). The model 
conceptualizes that the seven variables, namely RA, AM, differential value chain, continuous 
innovation, constraint, competition and strategy are interdependent that evolve in cause and 
effect dynamics adapting to endogenous and exogenous, enabling and/or disabling forces. When 
they evolve positively overtime reinforcing each other coherently around a center of a sound 
economic logic, they create a potentially disruptive innovation. The dynamic relationships are 
depicted by dotted arrows in Figure 3.2 (Collis and Montgomery, 1995: 120; Teece et. al., 1997: 
519; Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001: 3). The next section discusses each hypothesis in depth 
building on established theory.  
 
3.3.1  Relative Advantage (RA) and Asymmetric Motivation (AM) 
An innovator firm begins by discovering a new value proposition. Value creation depends on the 
relative advantage (RA) of an innovation in terms of price, ease of use, technology newness, 
quality and brand recognition benefits (Agarwal and Prasad, 1997; Chau, 1996; Rogers, 1995;  
Davis, 1989). Kim and Maubourgne (2005; 1999) propose the concept of a value curve (see 
Figure 3.3) to provide insight into how managers can reinvent value propositions by looking 
systematically across the value elements including, price, quality, ease of use, brand recognition, 
complementary offerings, convenience of transaction mechanisms (efficiency in buying) or 
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introducing new technology. A case to illustrate reinvention of value proposition is Intuits 
innovation of Quicken personal finance software. 
 
Case example: Intuit5 
The introduction of personal finance software was essentially a disruptive innovation to manual-
based accounting services. Every household conducts financial calculations for making budgets 
and paying bills. In 1984, there were 42 various types of personal finance software, but they had 
little impact on the households’ manual accounting businesses. People continued to rely on the 
pencil for their accounting needs. 
 
Figure 3.3:  Reinventing Value Propositions 
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Source: Kim and Mauborgne (1999: 85). 
 
Intuit, a financial accounting software company, reinvented the traditional value propositions by 
looking systematically into why users still choose the pencil over the existing financial software. 
The company discovered that the pencil had two significant advantages over computerized 
                                                 
5
 Kim and Mauborgne (1999: 85). 
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financial software: it was substantially cheaper and conveniently simple to use. The software 
packages were highly expensive, selling at an average price of USD$300. In addition, they were 
designed for the few, affluent and educated up-market households. For the mass market, their 
accounting terminologies and features were intimidating, making it difficult for the people to 
understand and use them.  
 
As Figure 3.3 shows, by looking across the substitutes between the pencil and the software, and 
thinking about how customers make trade-offs across these substitutes, Intuit created a new 
software, Quicken, which brought together the best of these two worlds – the strong advantages 
the pencil has over the package (low price and ease-of-use) and the essential advantages that the 
package has over the pencil (speed and accuracy). By removing all other attributes such as the 
accounting jargon and sophisticated features, Intuit created a user friendly interface that is 
similar to the familiar checkbook. The result was Quicken, a package that has become more 
accurate and faster than the pencil, yet just as easy to use as a pencil (Kim and Mauborgne, 1999: 
86). 
 
As the Intuit case illustrates, an innovator may create a new customer value by changing some 
elements of the value proposition dramatically and removing others altogether. For example, a 
company which aims to create a much cheaper product or service may have to trade-off down 
quality and brand attributes. Conceptually speaking from a disruptive innovation point of view, 
there are two important assumptions for disruptive value propositions: 
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First, traditional marketing and innovation theories assume that the concept of relative advantage 
(RA) is positively related to sustaining innovation; the higher the RA, the higher the incumbent’s 
motivation to retaliate (Leonard and Rayport, 1997: 102; von Hippel, 2005: 20). Disruptive 
innovation theory assumes that the urge to maximize profits from “customers not-yet satisfied” 
in an established market will drive companies to improve their products better in ways that 
existing customers will value. When an innovation’s relative advantage is perceived as a better 
value compared to established product by existing customers, the theory predicts that, regardless 
of the difficulties in adapting their business models, established companies almost often succeed 
in outperforming rivals with regard to sustaining innovations (Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 
33).  
 
Second, disruptive innovation theory implies that RA is negatively related to disruptive 
innovation (Day, 1999: 5; Day and Schoemakers, 2005: 135). A potentially disruptive innovation 
introduces products or services that initially do not meet the mainstream customers’ 
expectations. Therefore the innovation is not comparable with existing value propositions using 
the incumbent’s customer orientation and RA metrics. From the potential disruptor’s perspective, 
the innovation should appeal to the low-end or new customers. Disruptive innovation requires 
that during the introduction stage, the overall RA of the innovation should not be significant 
enough to cannibalize the incumbent’s profitable stronghold market. Cannibalization refers to 
decline of the flow of income from established product’s market (Gilbert et. al., 1984: 238; 
Reinganum, 1983: 741). 
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Stated differently, from the entrant’s perspective, a potentially disruptive innovation must have 
relatively higher relative advantage (RA) in some of the attributes of value propositions, for 
instance, lower in price and easier to use compared to an incumbents’ previously established 
value propositions of similar offerings for the low-end market or new market. Still the quality, 
brand recognition or technology of the new business model must be relatively inferior compared 
to the previously established profitable products in the main market. Assuming that an incumbent 
would react to any incursion by entrants into its established market, the key for success in 
creating a potentially disruptive market seems to be contingent on an entrant’s finding a niche 
market that is not likely to be attractive to industry incumbents’ revenue models. A historical 
example of a company that introduced a disruptive business model by identifying a previously 
un-served market segment is Southwest Airlines. 
 
Case example: Southwest6  
In the USA, Southwest introduced a low-cost, no-frills business model to price sensitive 
customers at the low-end market in the 1970s. At the time of its introduction, Southwest’s niche 
market was too small in terms of size and profit potential to attract attention from traditional 
premium airlines such as United, American and Delta. Most importantly, their mainstream 
passengers saw Southwest’s flying services an inferior relative to the conventional premium 
services. However, overtime passengers began to see value in Southwest’s cheaper, convenient 
and simpler value propositions. Consequently, Southwest Airlines disrupted a significant portion 
of the industry incumbents’ market. By May 2003, Southwest achieved the largest market share 
in the US airlines industry (Vlarr et. al., 2005: 160; Porter, 1996: 63). 
 
                                                 
6
 Vlarr et. al., (2005: 160); Porter (1996: 63). 
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From an entrant’s point of view, the paradoxical concept of a potentially disruptive innovation 
implies that an innovation with relatively lower or negative RA compared to established 
product’s value propositions, when measured by the mainstream customers, may create 
asymmetric motivation (AM). Theoretically, the value propositions of a potentially disruptive 
business model should take roots in a low-end price-sensitive and/or a small niche market or 
previously un-served market. When the innovation is likely to be perceived as inferior by the 
mainstream market, but attracts a low-end, low-margin market, it is less likely to provoke 
aggressive counter attacks from large established firms, consequently, creating “asymmetric 
motivation” (Gilbert, 2003: 32). Christensen and Raynor’s (2003: 44) disruptive innovation 
model theorizes that the absence of incumbents’ aggressive counter-attack and a lack of motive 
to be concerned about the entrant at the early stage of the innovation provide a potential disruptor 
with necessary impetus to experiment and improve its performance in a niche market. 
Hypothesis 1: All else assumed constant, an innovation’s Relative Advantage (RA) is 
negatively related to “Asymmetric Motivation” (AM) during the introduction period of 
innovation life-cycle.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Therefore, AM is positively related to potentially disruptive niche market 
innovation growth (IG).  
 
3.3.2  Differential Value Chain and Continuous Innovation   
The most salient cause of asymmetric motivation is a fundamental difference of economic 
transaction costs of producing and distributing of good or service between an innovator and an 
incumbent (Coase, 1937). This difference often results from configuring a direct, shorter or open 
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(distributed) value chain compared to traditional industry value chain. While the deconstruction 
of traditional value chain allows entrants to configure low-cost structure, incumbents already 
committed irreversibly to existing high capital and operating cost structure will continue to 
pursue the high margin market. As a result of their CAPEX and OPEX model, they will be less 
motivated to cannibalize the flow of income from the current (high or medium margin) market, 
in the face of emerging or latent (a low-margin) disruptive innovation (Adner, 2002; 
Chesbrough, 2006; Gilbert et. al., 1984; Reinganum, 1983). 
 
One of the major sources of innovation of a potentially disruptive business model is 
deconstruction of traditional value chains (and value networks). The advance of ICT threatens to 
undermine integrated value chains across many industries, thus forcing incumbents to rethink 
their business models in radical ways. The use of ICT and the Internet allows innovators to cut-
out intermediaries, to gain substantial reduction in costs, and increase efficiency and speed. 
Furthermore, it enables a company to convert previously physical products into digital solution 
systems (Lovelock and Writz, 2007: 108; Holmstrom et. al., 2000: 64; Evans and Wurster, 1997: 
18). Dell Computer’s direct business model is an apt case of a disruptive innovation that resulted 
from the deconstruction of a traditionally integrated value chain in the computer industry 
(Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001). 
 
Case example: Dell7 
The traditional value chain in the personal computer industry was characterized as “build-to-
stock”. It means that computer makers designed and made computers with standard components 
based on demand forecasts. The finished products were first stored in manufacturers’ warehouses 
                                                 
7
 Govindarajan and Gupta (2001: 5). 
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and then shipped to distributors and retailers who had to display the goods on their retail outlets 
for sale. These intermediaries typically added a 20% – 30% markup on the manufacturer’s price, 
in return for providing several customers services including a wide range of choices by 
representing multiple brands, the opportunity for customers to personally try the products before 
purchase, and accessible locations. In 1984, Michael Dell reinvented the value chain that 
dramatically changed the rules of the game in the computer industry in several ways, as Figure 
3.4 shows. First, Dell introduced a supply chain that cut-out all intermediaries and shipped 
directly to end users. Second, it received customized orders for hardware and software over the 
phone or via the Internet. Third, it designed an integrated supply chain that linked its suppliers 
closely to its assembly factories and the order-intake system. Fourth, it outsourced all 
components and performed only assembly tasks.  
 
Figure 3.4:  Example of Value Chain Reinvention 
Customer
R&D   Procurement    Production        Store            Agents  RetailersCustomer 
needs & wants Customer
Suppliers 
A. Traditional “build-to-store” value chain 
Procurement                  Assembly 
B. Dell’s “Built-to-order” value chain 
 
Michael Dell’s insights for the “build-to-order” value chain came from two observed trends. 
First, he realized that customers were becoming increasingly knowledgeable about computers 
and no longer required technical assistance from the sales force. Second, Microsoft had 
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transformed the computer industry by enabling all PC manufacturers to make standard 
components (monitor, key-board, memory, disk drive, software, and so on) and thus permitting 
mass customization in system configuration. Compared to industry incumbents, Dell’s business 
model was dramatically efficient. It enabled the company to gain speed by focusing only on its 
core competencies. It was found that the computer industry incumbents such as IBM and 
Compaq could not easily imitate Dell’s business model due to an ecosystem “lock-in” effect – 
i.e, due to specialized network linkages with their partners. The risk of these incumbents being 
alienated by their suppliers and distributors was real (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001: 5). 
 
When defining the concept of a business model earlier, it was noted that an existing value 
network linkages requires entrants to seek different ways to circumvent barriers. According to 
Christensen and Raynor (2003: 44), a potentially disruptive value network may emerge in the 
low-end section of the existing value network that might be perceived by incumbents as the least 
desirable. Another course of action is that a potentially disruptive business model can create an 
entirely new value network to serve a fundamentally different customer segment that was not 
part of the incumbent’s value network. A third possibility that seems to have received little 
attention is the use of an existing value network by diversifying entrants to introduce disruptive 
innovation into another industry (Danneels, 2004: 253).  
 
Business model innovation is the result of continuous and evolutionary innovation, rather than a 
well-though out plans. Continuous innovation is the function of a fundamentally different value 
chain which must possess three innovation capabilities. Firstly, a potentially disruptive value 
chain should yield a lower cost advantage to create and deliver cheaper and easier-to-use 
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products. Secondly, the extent to which the new value chain’s inherent capabilities enable the 
innovating firm to generate consumer insight, and thirdly, the extent to which it enables the 
innovator to take its innovation to market faster than the competition are critical factors for 
creating latent disruptive niche market (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001: 5; Holmstrom et. al., 
2000: 64; Evans and Wurster, 1997: 18). Based on the literature review and case studies, this 
study hypothesizes the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The configuration of fundamentally different value chain is positively 
related to continuous innovation (CI).  
Hypothesis 4: CI is therefore positively related to potentially disruptive niche market 
innovation growth (IG).  
 
3.3.3  The Constraint Factors 
While the above two hypotheses are set to test business model creation framework, internal and 
external constraints can have a disabling effect on business model innovation. The extent to 
which an innovating firm can obtain (a) access to generic resources, (b) customer accessibility to 
innovation (c) customer affordability to innovation (d) the nature of national policies and laws on 
innovation, and (e) technical and compatibility issues with existing technology or 
complementary assets can determine a firm’s ability to scale-up its innovation (Chesbrough, 
1999; Teece, 1986).  
 
Generic resources are general resources such as capital (finance), technology, equipment and 
machinery, buildings, skilled labor, general infrastructure, standard best practices, and 
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contractual supply and distribution channels. Existing research suggests that independent small 
start-up innovators, particularly those that are located in innovation clusters, may be generally 
capable of scaling up their innovation through the support of external capital ventures and 
investors (Chesbrough, 2003; Porter and Stren, 2001). This may be true in developed economies 
but it needs further consideration in developing economies. We assume that in oligopoly-type 
market structures prevalent in South Africa, large established corporations would most likely 
have control over key resources. Thus, from an entrant’s perspective, a small start-up may 
struggle to scale-up its innovation.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Constraint is negatively related to a potentially disruptive niche market 
innovation growth (IG). 
 
3.3.4  The Competition Factor  
In disruptive innovation theory, an innovation moves upward from initially poor performance to 
better performance in the mainstream market through an improvement performance trajectory. 
One of the factors that provide motivation for a disruptor to improve its product is said to be the 
absence of retaliation from industry incumbents (Gilbert, 2003; Charitou and Markides, 2003; 
Christensen and Raynor, 2003). This factor is well documented in the literature and will be 
discussed later. Competition is intuitively another key driver that incubates imminent disruptive 
innovation in a niche market (Porter, 1985).  
 
The Product Life Cycle (PLC) theory posits that growth of a new market attracts new entrants 
who expand the market further through competitive innovation (Walker et. al., 2006: 180). 
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Similarly, researchers have noted that the introduction of a radical technological innovation often 
attracts a flood of new entrants. During this period, intense rivalry among new entrants generates 
higher rate of successive innovations until a certain design combination is adopted by customers. 
The industry, in turn, adopts this standard that becomes a dominant design that stabilizes the 
market and ends the period of technological upheaval (Dewar and Dutton, 1986: Abernathy and 
Clark, 1985; Burns and Stalker, 1966). Building on these works, this study hypothesizes that 
competition among new entrants is key to stimulate the growth of a potentially disruptive 
innovation and propels it upward to the mainstream market.  
 
H6: Competition is positively related to a potentially disruptive niche market 
innovation growth (IG). 
 
3.3.5  Firm-Specific Strategic Capabilities  
In business science, innovation is defined as a process by which organizations exploit 
opportunities. An innovator firm’s ability to change disabling forces, such as constraints and 
competitive pressures, into innovation enabling opportunities are entrepreneurial prerequisites of 
business model innovation (Drucker, 1985: 19). Building on the RBV and Porter’s competitive 
strategy theories, this study proposes that developing organizational specific capabilities that are 
inimitable, superior, scarce among competitors and unique in strategic positioning will critically 
decide the innovator’s ability to capture and sustain value for itself (Porter, 2001; Teece et. al., 
1997; Collis and Montgomery, 1995; Grant, 1991). Firm-specific internal strategic capabilities 
include Intellectual Property (IP), and firm specific capabilities including codified knowledge, 
leadership, policies, processes/activities, brand, mission, firm’s reputation, firm’s identity and 
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culture. The significance of using IP as a specialized capability to capture and sustain value 
depends on the degree of technical uniqueness of a disruptive product compared to the 
competitive products, the nature of innovation (whether it is a product, process or business 
model), and the strength of intellectual property laws in a given country. These intangible assets 
are often intertwined, and when they reinforce each other coherently over time they can become 
firm-specific capabilities that are difficult if not impossible to emulate (Chesbrough, 2006: 8; 
Teece et. al., 1997: 519; Collis and Montgomery, 1995: 120).  
 
Hypothesis 7: Strategy is positively related to a potentially disruptive niche market 
innovation growth (IG). 
 
The conceptual model for creating a potentially disruptive business model in a niche market 
(Figure 3.2) assumes that, from an entrant’s perspective, a business model innovation is an 
evolutionary process across the five hypothetical interdependent relationships through successive 
and dynamic adaptations to endogenous and exogenous, enabling and/or disabling forces. When 
the variables evolve positively and coherently overtime reinforcing each other around a center of 
sustaining economic logic, they may create a potentially disruptive niche market (Govindarajan 
and Gupta, 2001: 3). The discussion below advances the argument of this thesis by stressing that 
succeeding in creating a potentially disruptive niche market is a necessary condition for a 
potentially disruptive business model innovation, but it is not a sufficient condition for effecting 
disruptive innovation. Stated differently, a commercially successful business model cannot, on 
its own, lead to disruptive innovation. Disruption occurs only when the new business model 
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encroaches an established market and disrupts fully or partially an incumbent’s established 
business model (Gilbert, 2003: 32; Rafi and Kamps, 2003: 117).  
 
3.4  Mainstream Market Disruption   
Figure 3.5 presents the second conceptual model for enabling disruptive innovation, from an 
incumbent’s perspective. This model describes seven hypotheses (H8 – H114) that are necessary 
to examine the disruptive impact of innovation on incumbents’ traditional business models and 
how incumbents adapt their organizations to deal with disruptive innovation. The emerging 
academic view elucidates that   disruptive innovation is a function of conflict between disruptive 
and traditional business models (Christensen, 2006; Markides and Charitou, 2004). The present 
study extends this view by hypothesizing that, from an incumbent point of view, disruptive 
innovation is a function of (H8) disparity between a disruptive and traditional models (Gilbert, 
2003: 32), (H9) conflict between a disruptive and traditional models (Markides and Charitou, 
2004: 23) and (H10) incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma (Christensen, 1997: 63; Henderson, 
2006: 5). First, disruptive innovation introduces a business model that is fundamentally different 
to that of industry incumbents. Theoretically, a potentially disruptive innovation creates and 
grows a niche market in a disparate trajectory in the form of new product, new competencies, 
new customers and/or new revenue model long before it directly encroaches on an established 
market (Gilbert, 2003: 30).  
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Figure 3.5:  Incumbent’s Perspective: A Conceptual Model for Enabling Disruptive 
Innovation 
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Second, the disparate paths between an incumbent’s established and historical business model 
cause real-time conflict when incumbent managers may decide to respond to disruptive 
innovation (Rafi and Kampas, 2002: 117; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000: 1147). In turn, the 
disparities and conflicts cause incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma which in turn effects 
disruptive innovation (Chandy and Tellis, 2000: 1; Vlaar et. al, 2005: 154). Disruptive 
innovation arises when disruptors rise to dominance, whereas the relative performance of the 
incumbent declines as a result of that dilemma (Christensen, 1997: xv; Hill and Rothaermel, 
2003: 259; Paap and Katz, 2004: 13). 
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Subsequently, the conceptual model hypothesizes that the extent of incumbent’s performance to 
enable disruptive innovation depends on (H11) reinventing a separate business model, (H12) 
creating a separate organization (Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 117), (H13) the level of senior 
management involvement (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004: 475), and (H14) appointing an outsider 
CEO to manage a disruptive innovation (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002: 501). The 
following sections will theoretically build and underpin each hypothesis.  
 
3.4.1  The Causes of Disruptive Innovation  
Gilbert (2003: 30) observes that  a potentially disruptive innovation creates and grows a niche 
market in a disparate trajectory in the form of new products, new competencies, new customers 
and/or a new revenue model long before it directly encroaches on an established market. The 
construct of ‘disparity’ entails that a potentially disruptive innovation creates a disparate path 
fundamentally different to an incumbent’s established sustaining trajectory of performance and 
market. This construct assumes that an incumbent’s senior management may ignore or overlook 
emerging or latent disruptive opportunities, probably due to their perception of disparities. This 
management wrong presumptions arises when management assume that  a potentially disruptive 
innovation may not pose threats to their established business models since it originates and 
characteristically evolves in a disparate path that is viewed outside of the incumbent’s core 
market boundaries. Disparities in paths between an innovator and an established incumbent in 
terms of one or more of the following; core product design, core competencies, market focus and 
business models may cause incumbents to struggle to adapt their organizations to disruptive 
innovation (Gilbert, 2003: 32; Henderson and Clark, 1990: 27; Tushman and Anderson, 1986: 
440). 
 96 
Dewar and Dutton (1986: 1422) argue that incumbents may struggle to adapt to the shifting 
environment when an innovation involves radical change in a set of scientific and engineering 
principles that displaces previously established dominant design of technology. Early entrants are 
likely to have the first mover advantage and gain experience for developing an emerging 
dominant design, whereas late followers may lag behind in acquiring the technical competence 
for developing radical innovation, especially where industry incumbents have already made 
substantial physical and emotional commitments to their previously established technology (Dess  
and Robinson, 1984: 270; Hannan and Freeman 1984: 149; Rothwell, 1986: 231). 
 
Shifting the argument from a technology dominant design to a systemic architecture of 
innovation, Henderson and Clark (1990: 27) argue that architectural innovation alters the 
relationships in which the components of a product are connected together, although it may not 
change the existing dominant design concept. Architectural knowledge is the know-how about 
how all individual parts of a product fit together to function as a system. According to the 
authors the lock-in effect of an incumbent’s evolutionary learning process in a previous 
architectural design can cause the firm to overlook a seemingly incremental change that alters the 
systemic architecture of the existing technological system. 
 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) earlier observed that competence-destroying discontinuities 
entail new capabilities (skills, abilities, and knowledge) that did not exist in the incumbent’s 
technical knowledge for product development process. According to Tushman and Anderson 
(1986: 461), competence-destroying innovations that fundamentally change the incumbent’s core 
competencies can create uncertainties and turbulence that create a favorable condition for entry 
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of new companies that have developed the necessary capabilities to appropriate the new market’s 
potential.  
 
From an incumbent’s perspective, although taking different views, all the above discussions 
seem to point to the causes of incumbents failure or entrants success arising due to the 
incumbents’ managers’ perception about the disparities between a potentially disruptive 
innovation and existing products, technologies, competencies, and/or business models.  
 
Hypothesis 8: Disparity is positively related to disruptive innovation.  
 
In this study, the notion of ‘disparity’ is distinguished from the construct of ‘conflict’. Disparity 
is defined as the dissimilarity of technology or business model progress performances and 
markets between a potential disruptor and certain incumbents that evolves before the innovation 
makes it to the established market and inflicts disruption. Particularly in this study, it refers to the 
failure of the incumbent’s managers to act early because of perception about the dissimilarity of 
an emerging or latent disruptive innovation that evolves outside of their main markets 
(Christensen and Bower, 1996: 198; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003: 259; Paap and Katz, 2004: 13). 
In contrast, conflict refers to real-time incongruence between the components of disruptive 
innovation and existing business models, even when managers are cognizant and willing to 
embrace a potentially disruptive innovation (Mason and George, 1994: 163; Chandy and Tellis, 
1998: 474).  
 
Core product design, core competencies, market segment and revenue models are intertwined 
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within a particular firm’s business model. Because each firm’s capabilities evolve in 
idiosyncratic ways contingent upon its own context and historical paths, the capabilities 
determine what a firm can or cannot do. When a firm’s environment is said to change fairly 
predictably, and that the firm has been successful in the past, its capabilities may feed each other 
dynamically to enhance its already successful business model in the future. But when a firm’s 
environment is said to be discontinuously changing, its current capabilities and business model 
may become sources of its rigidities causing an incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma (Foster and 
Kaplan 2001: 61; Normann, 2001: 82; Christensen, 1997: 23; Leonard-Barton, 1992: 111). 
 
Therefore, when an innovation is characterized as potentially disruptive to a specific established 
firm, managers may still face a dilemma due to the concomitant conflict between disruptive and 
traditional business models. The conflict may arise due to risk of cannibalization (Mason and 
George, 1994), risk of lowering profit margin (Abernathy and Clark, 1985), risk of degrading 
existing product quality, risk of damaging company image, risk of damaging relationship with 
existing distribution channels (Markides and Charitou, 2004) and/or risk of defocusing from the 
main strategic market (Porter, 2001).  
 
Hypothesis 9: The degree of conflict between disruptive and traditional business models is 
positively related to disruptive innovation.  
 
The delay and hesitation, or simply incompetence of the incumbent’s managers in properly 
addressing a potentially disruptive innovation, as the result of disparity and conflict, can be 
referred to as the incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma (Christensen, 1997), where disruptors 
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take the best advantage of this dilemma to rise to dominance, but the relative performance of the 
incumbent declines as a result of that dilemma (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Paap and Katz, 
2004).  
 
The incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma can be explained by failure to anticipate (Paap and 
Katz 2004) or recognize the threat of disruption (Gilbert, 2003; Henderson and Clark, 1990), 
framing disruptive innovation as the wrong way to do business (Markides and Charitou, 2004), 
inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984), management’s unwillingness to change or to take initiative 
(Beer and Eisenstat, 2000), failing to support high-risk ventures (Kuczmarski, 1998), fear of 
cannibalization (Chandy and Tellis, 2000), market parochialism (Day, 1999), ecosystem lock-in 
effect (Chakravorti, 2004) and incompetence (Henderson, 2006; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). 
Chandy and Tellis (1998: 474) argue that management’s unwillingness to cannibalize an 
established source of revenue deprives the incumbent from taking entrepreneurial risk in 
responding to potentially disruptive innovation effectively.  
 
Figure 3.6 below shows a conceptual diagram of the incumbent’s dilemma in dealing with 
disruptive innovation. It hypothesizes that an incumbent’s overall strength or weakness in these 
factors determine whether an entrant succeeds or fails to disrupt the incumbent’s main market. 
From the incumbent’s perspective, it assumes that disruptive innovation can be moderated and 
even prevented if the disabling forces are relatively high. When the incumbent’s problems in one 
or more of the factors are serious, the difficulties can feed on each other to create a vicious cycle, 
and pave the way for a disruptive attacker. From the insurgent perspective, the incumbent’s 
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weaknesses are enabling forces. Ultimately, a successful entry must translate into economic 
growth for the new entrant. 
 
Figure 3.6: Incumbent’s Entrepreneurial Dilemma 
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Anticipation of disruptive threat  
Some types of innovation can be difficult to anticipate until they become disruptive. In theory, 
disruptive innovation is less obvious for incumbents during the introduction phase because it 
appeals to small margin, low-end markets or non-customers who are not the concern of 
incumbents. The less obvious nature of disruptive innovation is thus an important characteristic 
that allows entrants to gain market footholds.  
 
An alternative view would suggest that when an incumbent is able to anticipate the threat or 
imminent disruptive innovation in its early stage, the incumbent can respond aggressively to 
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slow down or suppress the threat of disruption (Gilbert, 2003: 32; Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 
32-45; Christensen and Bower, 1996: 198; Henderson and Clark, 1990: 17).  
 
Framing disruption as opportunity  
Even when an incumbent is cognizant of a possible threat or emergence of latent disruptive 
innovation, whether the incumbent’s management views the disruptive innovation as an 
opportunity to grow a new business, or as a wrong business to ignore, will probably determine 
the possibility of disruption (Markides and Charitou, 2004: 28).  
 
Inertia or management unwillingness  
Organizational theorists use the theory of inertia to understand cognitive “lock-in” in 
organizations. As an organization matures, the forces of inertia tend to grow which are likely to 
prevent entrepreneurship and risk taking behaviours (Beer and Eisenstat, 2000; Blau and 
Schoenherr 1971; Terrien and Mills 1955).  
 
Abrahamson and Fombrun (1994: 751) found that some managers tend to overlook emerging 
disruptive opportunities due to macro-cultural homogeneity – a relatively industry-specific 
shared belief by managers across organizations about business models, customers, markets, 
competitors, technologies and how to choose the best strategy in a given situation. Chandy and 
Tellis (1998) argue that management’s unwillingness to cannibalize established sources of 
revenue deprives the incumbent from necessary funding, resources and support to respond to 
potentially disruptive innovation.  
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Fear of cannibalization 
One of the reasons for the state of dilemma is the threat of cannibalization. In marketing 
literature, cannibalization refers to decrease in sales revenue, sales volume or market share of a 
firm’s existing product due to the commercialization of new products of similar nature by the 
same firm. When a firm is said to be relatively successful in its current business model, managers 
may be reluctant to share necessary funding, resources, or provide autonomy to a spin-off 
venture to manage a new (potentially disruptive) business model separately in order to avoid 
erosion of existing sources of competitive advantage in their current markets (O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2004).  
 
Economic theorists argue that in the face of uncertainty, incumbents that are committed 
irreversibly to existing business models will be less inclined to cannibalize the flow of income 
from current markets (Gilbert et. al., 1984: 238; Reinganum, 1983: 741). This suggests that 
rational incumbents will be less inclined to disrupt themselves. The absence of retaliation from 
incumbents due to fear of cannibalization, therefore, is likely to encourage disruptors. 
 
Alternatively, it can be assumed that when the senior corporate management is willing to take 
risk and to cannibalize the company’s previously established product or service, the management 
may think about developing appropriate strategies to respond to disruptive innovation 
aggressively. This will mitigate the dilemma. The factors that need to be investigated in this 
study are therefore the incumbents’ managers’ willingness to cannibalize their established value 
offerings, their willingness to change – that is willingness to create a disruptive spin-off and 
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share resources with that spin-off company (see Markides and Charitou, 2004: 36; Chandy and 
Tellis, 1998: 474; Mason and George, 1994: 163). 
 
Market parochialism  
Another well documented reason for incumbents’ failure in the face of disruptive innovation is 
explained by the notion of “asymmetric motivation”. According to this concept, differential 
economic incentives tend to drive incumbents to advance sustaining innovations while new 
entrants seek disruptive innovations. Large firms that have already made substantial investments 
in the past will logically continue to invest more in opportunities that are proportionate to their 
sizes. On the other hand, small start ups often target small and low-margin markets that are 
proportionate to their cost structure but that are less attractive to incumbents profit models 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003). 
 
The absence of competition from incumbents as a result of “asymmetric motivation” can allow 
disruptors time and space to keep improving their products. An anti-thesis assumption can be 
conceptualized to argue that if incumbents perceive the small disruptive market to be desirable in 
the future, they may respond aggressively to preempt entrants invading their main market 
(Henderson, 1993; Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Reinganum, 1983). 
 
Ecosystem “lock-in” effect  
The ecosystem “lock-in” effect is the function of the relative strength/weakness of established 
customers’ switching barriers and the firm’s commitments with its long-term suppliers and 
distributors. The relative strength or weakness of the ecosystem “lock in” effect can determine 
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how effectively a firm adapts its organization to a disruptive innovation in the face of a radically 
shifting landscape. The firm’s depth of commitment with value network partners can determine 
its ability to adapt to disruptive change effectively. This is better explained by the concept of 
ecosystem, which is defined in business literature as a large business community consisting of 
economic communities of interest, and co-evolving organizations including suppliers, producers, 
channels, customers, competitors, government agencies and institutions (Leibold et. al., 2002: 
181; Moore, 1993: 76). An ecosystem approach to strategy shows that the creation and delivery 
of products or services depends not only on a single firm’s value chain but also on its external 
value network. A firm’s business model is part of a larger open and complex system (Iansiti and 
Levien, 2004; Leibold et. al., 2002; Gulati et. al., 2000). When the existing ecosystem or network 
is said to be healthy, a firm’s external value network linkages are beneficial for improving its 
performance. But when a potential disruptive innovation is likely to threaten the ecosystem 
dominant players’ business models and markets, it will be difficult, if not impossible; the 
ecosystem members are likely to raise barriers by taking individual or collective counter-actions 
(see Chakravorti, 2004, p. 65).  
 
Incompetence  
Incompetence is often cited as a reason to explain why incumbents’ performance declines in the 
face of discontinuous technological innovation. Tushman and Anderson (1986: 444) argue that 
decline in performance occurs because the core competence that brought incumbents to 
preeminence is likely to be rendered obsolete in the face of discontinuous innovation. Whereas 
new firms that possess the required capabilities to create and commercialize the discontinuous 
technology will capture the growth of the new market. Although this view comes from studies on 
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technological innovation, there is no reason not to assume that some incumbents’ may as well 
experience knowledge gaps in the face of the disruptive innovation. The incumbents’ learning 
lag (delay in developing competencies for the new market) can provide opportunities for 
disrupters to enter into the main market.  
 
However, it is important to note that an incumbent’s inertia and incompetence are not always 
insurmountable. In fact, some incumbents may deliberately destroy their old ways of doing 
things if they are willing to learn and employ new knowledge and skills. Particularly, if the threat 
of disruption is obvious from the beginning, an incumbent can minimize its impact if willing to 
unlearn old methods and develop new capabilities (Henderson and Clark, 1990: 17). A point that 
needs examination is therefore the extent of managers’ willingness to unlearn old methods and 
develop new capabilities as to deal with disruptive innovation. The above explanations suggest 
that the state of dilemma and uncertainties created in incumbent’s managers’ minds, due to 
disparities and conflicts between innovation and the traditional business model can provide 
disruptors with the necessary momentum to improve their product in ways that permit them to 
eventually invade the established market. Thus, disparity, conflict and dilemma reinforce each 
other to create a vicious cycle that paralyzes the incumbent in face of disruptive innovation.  
 
Hypothesis 10: Incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma is positively related to disruptive 
innovation. 
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3.4.2 Strategic Approaches for Enabling Disruptive Innovation  
The literature examination in Chapter 2 shows somewhat conflicting academic conclusions and 
recommendations with respect to the issue of dealing with disruptive innovation.  The academic 
recommendations range from complete “separation” at one extreme (Christensen and Raynor, 
2003), to “ambidextrous organization” (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004) and “contingency 
approach” (Markides and Charitou, 2004) in the middle to complete “integration” (Campbell and 
Park, 2004), at the other extreme.   
 
Building on existing literature, the second conceptual model (Figure 3.5) hypothesizes that the 
incumbent’s performance (IP) in enabling or disruptive innovation will depend on reinventing a 
separate strategic business unit (SBU) (H11) (Porter, 1996) in a separate organization (H12) 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003). Beyond creating a separate business unit and organizational 
structure, enabling disruptive innovation critical depends on the incumbent’s senior 
management’s involvement in ways of taking risk initiative, showing willingness, providing 
vision and championing the disruptive unit (H13) (Hamel, 2000), and appointing outside hired 
CEO to manage the disruptive company (H14) (Garvin, 2004).  
 
When incumbent firms mitigate the dilemma at an early stage, or when they make strategic 
decision to respond to disruptive innovation when it hits their established markets, managers face 
a critical challenge whether to integrate or separate a disparate business model (Adner, 2002; 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Christensen and Overdorf, 2000). Porter’s (1985: 16) 
‘trade-off’ principle of strategy theory states that firms are normally incapable of managing both 
differentiation and low-cost strategies simultaneously in the same business model. This is 
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because attempting to do both often results in compromising sources of competitive advantage in 
the established business model (Porter, 2001: 71; 1996: 62). Some scholars extend this view by 
contending that established organizations that adopt integration strategy are likely to fail because 
they attempt to manage disruptive innovations with the very capabilities, processes and values 
that brought the firm to success in sustaining innovations (Gilbert, 2003: 30; Adner, 2002: 681). 
Christensen and Overdorf (2000: 71) propose that when there is a relative high degree of conflict 
in processes, capabilities and values between disparate business models, an incumbent firm must 
create a separate strategic business unit (SBU) to manage disruptive innovation. Extending this 
view, this study hypothesizes that: 
 
Hypothesis 11: Responding to disruptive innovation in a separate SBU is positively 
related to incumbent’s performance (IP) in enabling disruptive innovation 
 
While H11 deals with the question of integrating or separating a disruptive innovation from 
existing business models by means of creating an SBU, a pertinent issue that needs further 
probing is whether the disruptive SBU requires isolation from the entire organizational structure. 
Ghoshal and Gratton, 2002: 31) argue that, in order to adapt to abruptly shifting complex 
business environments, many large corporations around the world opted to compromise their 
potential to exploit economies of scale and scope between business units in favour for creating 
autonomous and small entrepreneurial companies (see also Probst et. al., 2005: 90).  
 
Critics of organizational integration hold that emphasis on gaining economies of scale and scope 
can diminish both the internal autonomy and the competitiveness of a disruptive business unit
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(Chandy and Tellis, 1998: 475; Vlaar et. al., 2005: 165). A company that attempts to compete by 
integrating conflicting business units under one organizational structure could risk suppressing 
the novelty of a potentially disruptive innovation (Chandy and Tellis, 1998: 475).  In their study 
of the European airlines industry, Vlaar et. al., (2005: 165) found that the search for balance 
between exploitation of existing businesses and exploration of an emerging disruptive innovation 
under existing organizational structure contributed to compromising the differential advantages 
of the incumbents when compared to full commitment exhibited by independent disruptors. 
Extending these views, Christensen and Raynor’s (2003: 211) recommend that when a disruptive 
unit does not fit with the existing business models’ resources, processes and values (RPV), it 
requires an entirely autonomous organization with complete freedom to create its own new 
capabilities, processes and values. Taking this view, this study hypothesizes that: 
 
Hypothesis 12: Organizational separation of disruptive business model is positively 
related to incumbent’s performance (IP) in enabling disruptive innovation. 
 
The paradoxical challenge for incumbents facing disruptive innovation is that, on the one hand, a 
company that attempts to compete by integrating disruptive SBU under one organizational 
structure could risk eroding potentially disruptive innovation. On the other hand, disconnecting 
the new unit entirely from the parent company deprives the new unit from vital resources and 
experiences (Markides and Charitou, 2004: 22). In the RBV theory, one of the most salient 
strategic resources is the parent company’s senior management, often in the form of soft assets 
including knowledge, experience and capabilities (Grant, 1991: 114; Teece et. al, 1997: 511), 
which can play imperative roles in screening and approving projects (Cooper, Edget, & 
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Kleichmidt, 2003: 201), championing new ventures in critical phases (Hamel, 2000: 67; 
Takeuchi and Nonaka, 1986: 141), supporting new product development (Brentani, Kleischmidt 
& Salomo, 2010: 149) and resolving cultural and managerial conflicts (Garvin, 2004: 19).  
 
When an incumbent creates a separate organization, Garvin (2004: 10) observes that allowing 
different values and culture to that of a parent company will eventually lead to a recurring 
political struggle in which managers of the parent company will invariably win. Managers from 
both sides are likely to have little motivation to share knowledge or other resources since their 
performances are evaluated primarily against their immediate units. In such situation, the need 
for senior management involvement in addressing conflicts, championing the disruptive venture 
and ensuring some sort of synergy is critical. Recognizing the vital input of senior management, 
O’Reilly and Tushman (2004: 74) propose ambidextrous organization which is a type of 
management style that initiates a radical technology through a structurally independent venture, 
having its own processes, structure, and culture, but that is integrated at the senior executive 
level. 
 
Hypothesis 13: Senior management involvement is positively related to incumbent’s 
performance (IP) in enabling disruptive innovation. 
 
Another intriguing question associated with the problem of disruptive innovation management is 
the nature and degree of senior management involvement. While senior management’s 
willingness and involvement are important, some organizational behavior and strategic 
management studies seem to suggest that appointing an insider CEO from the current senior 
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management to run the disruptive innovation company may be seen as a misguided approach to 
enabling disruptive invocation (Beer and Eisenstat, 2000: 29; Prahalad and Bettis and 1986: 485; 
Von Krogh, Ichijo & Nonaka, 2000: 51; Weick, 1976: 1).  
 
Management decision making processes are influenced by a corporation’s ‘dominant logic’ 
(Prahalad and Bettis, 1986), ‘Values’ (Beer and Eisenstat, 2000) or ‘mental models’ (Foster and 
Kaplan 2001). These are ‘sense-making’ mental frameworks which help executives to reduce 
ambiguity and filter in information that conforms the previously successful ways of doing 
business and make decisions when faced with complex choices (Weick, 1976: 11). But these are 
not only abstract representation of models and processes within one’s head, but also feelings and 
belief systems that managers may not even be conscious of (Von Krogh et. al., 2000: 51). When 
the corporate values are explicitly or implicitly clear and broadly disseminated, they are useful in 
prioritizing tasks, making judgments and decisions that are internally consistent with the 
corporate objectives and missions (Teece et. al., 1997: 520).  
 
However, when internal managers are appointed to manage a disruptive company, the endeavors 
may fail because the values or cultures of the parent company may influence evolutionary 
adaptation process, consequently creating a de novo business model, rather than a disruptive one 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002: 550). Abrahamson and Fombrun (1994: 728) found that 
macro-cultural homogeneity, which is defined as a relatively industry-specific shared belief by 
managers across organizations about customers, markets, competitors, technologies and how to 
choose the best strategy in a given situation influences most managers to overlook emerging 
disruptive opportunities. In contrast, managers of disruptive entrant firms are likely to succeed 
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because they have no previously established values or they have fundamentally different values 
and belief systems Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002: 552 Foster and Kaplan 2001: 74; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990: 14). This suggests that incumbent firms should hire external CEOs 
that have good insights and experiences about the disruptive market.  
 
Hypothesis 14: An externally hired CEO is positively related to incumbent’s 
performance (IP) in enabling disruptive innovation. 
 
3.4.3  Measuring Entrant’s DI and IP in Enabling DI  
From the disruptor insurgent perspective, the problems of rival incumbents in dealing with 
disruptive innovation must be translated into growth. From an incumbent perspective, the 
success of its performance in face of disruptive innovation may be evaluated by the extent to 
which it has disabled or enabled a disruptive innovation, how effective its second business model 
has become part of a disruptive market in terms of regaining market share, and whether it has 
achieved synergy between its disruptive and traditional business models. From a theoretical 
perspective, the key success factor is to design a conducive organizational structure that allows 
close collaboration between managers for sharing and leveraging relevant capabilities and 
resources on one hand, and on the other hand that simultaneously nurture institutionalized 
independence of the disruptive unit to guarantee that the corporation’s established processes, 
identity, culture, brand and value systems that do not overwhelm the disruptive business model 
reinvention process (Dess and Robinson, 1984: 265; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004: 77). 
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3.5  Innovation Dichotomy and Relativity of Disruptive Innovation  
In order to address the first study question, this chapter presented the conceptual framework and 
hypotheses for examining business model innovation and reinvention processes for enabling 
disruptive innovation. The second research objective is to investigate whether a “market-driven” 
disruptive business model innovation has different processes, competitive dynamics and 
disruptive effects compared to technological disruptive innovation. This study aims to answer 
this question by introducing a dichotomy of technological versus market-driven business model 
innovations and subjecting each group to the same ten hypotheses outlined above and using a 
common research method.   
 
The concept of disruptive innovation is a relative concept, not an absolute one. Stated differently, 
a similar innovation that may constitute disruptive to a particular incumbent’s business model in 
a given context may be considered sustaining to other incumbent’s business model in another 
context (Christensen, 2006: 48). To determine the relativity of disruptiveness, i.e., whether a 
particular innovation constitutes disruption or not, the second question tries to examine 
disruptive innovation problem by disaggregating the sample data into technological and non-
technological market-driven innovations.  
 
3.6  Summary 
The purpose of this chapter was to develop a conceptual framework to inform and guide 
empirical investigation. To address the first question of this thesis, this chapter developed the 
conceptual framework with ten hypotheses for examining business model innovation and 
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reinvention processes for enabling disruptive innovation. The framework follows two logically 
linked processes. The evolutionary process is concerned with innovation of a potentially 
disruptive business model in niche market. The revolutionary process deals with the probable 
disruptive impact of an innovation on traditional business models and how incumbents reinvent 
their business models to deal with disruptive innovation.  
 
The conceptual model presented in the evolutionary section portrays three avenues through 
which managers can pursue business model innovation. A potentially disruptive innovation 
process may begin by the redefinition of existing value propositions or by identifying an un-
served or under-served price sensitive customer segment. Alternatively, redesigning of an end-
to-end value chain may create a new business model. The study proposes that when changes in 
some of the components are substantial and that they automatically cause other enabling 
conditions to fall in favorably, the alterations may lead to innovation of a potentially disruptive 
business model. Value innovation depends on changing constraints and competitive pressures 
into opportunities by identifying, developing, integrating and coordinating core capabilities. The 
chapter postulates that a new business model may create a niche market without necessarily 
being disruptive.  
 
In the disruptive (revolutionary) section, three major hypothetical factors that will probably 
determine the disruptiveness of a business model innovation are the disparity and conflict 
between an innovation and a traditional business model and an incumbent’s entrepreneurial 
dilemma. The study proposes four hypothetical strategic approaches, namely creating a separate 
SBU, isolating the SBU in separate company, significant but not overwhelming senior 
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management’s involvement and hiring an external CEO  that could probably determine the 
success or failure of incumbent’s performance in enabling disruptive innovation. Finally, the 
chapter further proposes re-examination of the replication of disruptive innovation theory across 
technological and market-driven disruptive innovations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 115 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1  Introduction  
The multi-dimensional, complex, holistic and dynamic natures of the concepts of disruptive 
innovation and business model demand a multi-method research approach including deductive, 
inductive, qualitative and quantitative. This study utilizes all these methods with the purpose of 
addressing the relevant research questions.  
 
4.2  Deductive and Inductive Approaches  
The process of reasoning from a theory to a particular phenomenon is known as the deductive 
method. Through the deductive approach, i.e. through constant examination and empirical testing 
of established theories research gaps are identified. In order to investigate the research gaps 
systematically, conceptual frameworks and hypotheses are developed in Chapter 3. A study that 
seeks to understand a relatively unknown social phenomenon needs to adopt an inductive 
approach. Although the concepts of a business model and disruptive innovation are well 
established in the literature of strategic management, disruptive innovation is traditionally linked 
to technological discontinuities.  
 
The question of how organizations enable disruptive innovation by reinventing their business 
models, particularly in a developing economy setting, is an under-researched phenomenon. In 
this study, the process of data collection, analyses, conclusions and formulation of the theoretical 
framework follows an inductive method. Therefore, the research approach used in this study is 
both deductive and inductive (Christensen, 2006: 40; Rafi and Kampas, 2002: 117). 
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4.3  Qualitative Method: Case Study Approach   
Disruptive innovation is an uncommon and evolutionary phenomenon. The rarity and dynamic 
nature of this innovation arguably makes a firm-level case study method the preferred approach 
to study disruptive innovation phenomena (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Hamel, 2000; 
Macher and Richman, 2004; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000 Voelpel et. al., 2005). 
 
A case study method is an in-depth qualitative investigation of a single phenomenon or case over 
a period of time. There are two ways to design a case study research: single case study or multi-
case studies. While a single case study is sufficient for studying a unique situation, multiple case 
studies are used to compare two or more similar cases by exploring common or different 
characteristics, themes and categories for generalization across similar contexts (Yin, 1994). 
 
Table 4.1: Case Studies of Pioneering Companies in South Africa 
 
Innovation 
Identification8  
Innovation  Comparable existing 
product/business model  
Type of 
innovation  
Industry 
Innovation 1  Instant mobile messaging 
(IMS) (MXit,) 
Short Message System 
(SMS) 
Technology  Mobile-phone 
Innovation 2 Mobile VoIP (V-mobile)  
via 3G network 
Voice via GPRS/3G Technology Mobile-phone 
Innovation 3 Mobile banking (M-
banking) 
Full-service banking 
model  
Business model  Banking 
Innovation 4 Hybrid-Direct (HD) short-
term  insurance model  
Broker’s model  Business model  
 
Insurance 
Innovation 5 Hybrid-Direct (HD) 
airlines model 
Premium model  Business model  
 
Airlines 
 
As described in Table 4.1, Chapter 5 presents five case studies of pioneering companies 
(insurgents) that have presumably introduced potentially disruptive technological and market-
driven business model innovations in four South African industries namely, mobile-telephony, 
banking, insurance and airlines. The case studies have been developed using multi-design 
                                                 
8
 Codes used in place of real pioneering companies names. 
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exploratory research including, but not limited to, open interviews with 32 top level executives in 
the mobile, banking, insurance and airlines industries, using open questionnaire (interviews 
lasted between 1 to 2 hours; see Appendix B for open questionnaire and Appendix C for list of 
interviews conducted), focus group discussions, company and industry archives, the Internet, and 
the media. Many of the interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. Disruptive innovation 
often attracts high attention, mostly from the media because it is new compared to what existed 
before it (Moore, 2004: 88).  
 
4.3.1  Reliability and Validity Measures in Qualitative Research  
In developing the case studies, the measures of credibility and transferability are used in place of 
internal reliability and construct validity. Credibility refers to the congruence between the 
constructed realities that exist in the minds of the respondents and the objects that are attributed 
to them. It involves establishing that the outcomes of qualitative research are believable and 
credible from the researcher’s perspective (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). 
 
In this study, credibility is achieved through prolonged engagement in studying the disruptive 
innovation phenomena, consistently seeking different influencing factors and interpreting the 
phenomena through a process of constant and iterative analysis and triangulation including, but 
not limited to, open interviews, focus group discussions, company and industry archives, the 
Internet, and the media (Babie and Mouton, 2001; Yin, 1994). Transferability refers to the degree 
to which the outcomes of a case study can be generalized or transferred to other contexts or 
settings. According to Yin (1994) a multi-case studies approach has a significant potential for 
generalization, if the researcher attempts to relate findings to similar cases and previous theory 
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and research. Although the researcher may have attempted to meet these requirements, in 
qualitative research all observations are defined by the specific contexts in which they occur. The 
case studies results of this thesis are peculiar to the four South African industries. Therefore, the 
case studies findings do not imply generalization to the universe across time and place (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985). 
 
4.4  Quantitative Method 
While the case study method investigates the process of disruptive innovation at a firm-level, 
some scholars have used survey-based quantitative method to indentify common patterns at a 
system-level (see Adner, 2002; Markides and Charitou, 2004). Thus, the purpose of survey-based 
quantitative method is to identify common patterns first on aggregate level of analysis (system-
level) that can be generalized across industries, and second to identify differences between 
technology and non-technological market-driven innovations. Chapter 6 presents the quantitative 
results for the first-order study. Chapter 7 discusses the differences or similarities between 
technology and market-driven disruptive innovations. In both empirical chapters, qualitative data 
will be used in interpreting the quantitative analysis, where relevant.   
 
4.4.1  Sample Design  
The study is conducted in South Africa. The country mixed economies structure provides a good 
case to represent a developing economic context. The problem of disruptive business model 
innovation is examined at a business unit (SBU) level of analysis. The sample selection is carried 
out over four course of selection process, i.e., searching for (1) disruptive innovation in South 
 119 
Africa, (2) industries affected by disruptive innovation, (3) firms and SBUs within these 
industries and (4) informants.  
 
1. The selection of potential disruptive innovations in South Africa is made based on the 
theoretically established characteristics of disruptive innovation: (a) the innovation is typically 
simpler, cheaper, and convenient to use relative to existing products, (b) it targets low-end or 
new customers (non-consumers) who were not part of the incumbent’s consumption trajectory of 
“sustaining innovations” due to lack of financial and/or technical abilities, (c) the quality is 
relatively inferior when measured by the performance dimension of the incumbent’s current 
customers, and (d) over time the disruptive technology improves its performance on the 
dimensions the mainstream market values and begins to displace previously existing products of 
similar nature (Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 32; Rafi and Kampas, 2002:16). From a number 
of seemingly disruptive innovations that were introduced into the South African markets in the 
last twenty years, the author selected five potentially disruptive innovations; (a) mobile VoIP (V-
mobile) via 3G network, (b) Instant Mobile Messaging (IMS), (c) low-cost no-frills airlines 
business model, (d) online direct insurance model, and (f) mobile (cell-phone) banking.  
 
2. Four South African industries; mobile-telephony, banking, insurance and airlines have been 
identified as industries that have been affected by the above potential disruptive innovations (see 
Table 4.1).  
 
3. Within these industries, the selection of sample firms and SBUs is made by identifying (a) 
new companies (business units) that have introduced potentially disruptive innovations, (b) 
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industry incumbents that have introduced a second business model in their industries and (c) 
industry incumbents that were (likely to be) affected by innovations introduced in their markets.  
 
4. To ensure that the right informant participated in the survey, a respondent selection was based 
on several criteria: (a) founders of a potentially disruptive business unit, spin-off or new 
company, (b) managers with responsibility for strategic business units (SBUs), (c) active 
involvement in managing innovation or major company transformation projects (d) seniority in 
management position and (f) possible familiarity with the practical business concepts of 
disruptive innovation and a business model. All means of communications were used in 
accessing managers including referrals, post office, email, fax and telephone. One of the most 
effective ways of accessing top level managers was attending executive seminars. The author 
attended a number of useful events, presentations and talks given by several top leaders of 
industries at many local events including the Wits Business School (WBS), University of 
Pretoria’s Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) and Sandton Convention Center. These 
conferences and seminars helped the researcher to get to know key industry players, establish 
contacts, collect business cards and ask senior managers for their willingness to participate in a 
survey.  
 
Based on the above selection criteria, a convenience sampling method was employed in choosing 
respondents. Because the focus of the research is on strategic business units (SBU), a single 
respondent is represented per SBU (managing a particular business model innovation). New 
companies are mostly represented by a single questionnaire. Some large corporations have a 
number of strategic business units (SBUs) managed by different managers.  
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4.4.2  Data Collection  
Using the insights gained from the literature review and case studies, a pilot survey of 200 
questionnaires was administered to middle level managers across the four industries; it yielded 
47% completed questionnaires. The returned questionnaires were examined for completeness of 
responses, reliability and construct validity. After necessary changes were made, a ten page 
structured questionnaire was developed with a seven-point (Likert) scale, “1” indicating the 
lowest value and “7” indicating the highest value (see Appendix A for a sample of the 
questionnaire).  
 
During the period January – December, 2008, three postgraduate research assistants were 
employed to administer the questionnaire, set up appointments, follow-up and conduct the 
survey. 500 questionnaires were distributed to various firms across the four industries (see Table 
4.2). 128 responses were obtained. Out of the total, 14 deemed unusable, yielding 114 usable 
responses representing 87 different firms. The total responses (114 = 100%) comprises 18% (n = 
21) representing 19 banking companies, 16% (n = 18) representing 18 insurance companies, 16% 
(n = 18) representing 15 airlines companies, and 50% (n = 57) representing 35 mobile (and IT) 
companies. Out of the total response (n 114), 77% (n = 88) represented business units that 
operated traditional business models in established markets before the introduction of respective 
disruptive innovation. This data represented 61 incumbent firms that responded to disruptive 
innovations in different ways. The rest 23% (n = 26) represented 26 entrant companies. This data 
comprises both start-up (new) and established companies that introduced disruptive business 
model innovations for the first time into the South African markets. 
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Table 4.2:  Description of the Survey Data 
Industry  Innovation  Sent Received  Unusable Net 
usable 
No. of firms  
Instant mobile messaging 100 25 2 23  Mobile 
V-mobile 100 38 4 34  
Technology                                    Total 200 63 6 57 35 
Banking M-banking  100 24 3 21 19 
Insurance Direct short-term insurance 
model  
100 23 5 18 18 
Airlines Direct airlines model (LCC) 100 18  18 15 
Market-drive innovation                  Total  300 65 8 57 52 
Grand Total 500 128 14 114 87 
 
The size of the 87 respondent firms measured in terms of employees numbers are 18% (n 16) 
small (< 50), 36% (31) medium (51 – 250) and 46% (n 40) large (250 <). The sample 
respondents are top level senior managers including CEOs, managing directors, business unit 
managers, innovation hub managers and executives in areas of strategic planning, marketing, 
finance and operations. Table 4.3 provides the profile of the 114 respondents. The total number 
of responses is divided equally into 57 technology and 57 business model observations. The 
sample selection ensured fairly equal representation across innovation dichotomy (technology vs. 
market-driven innovation), innovation types, industry types and firm size in terms of industry 
structure including large, medium, and small firms. Data was captured in Microsoft Excel and 
analyzed using SAS 9.2 software. Both descriptive and inferential statistics are used to test the 
conceptual model and hypotheses.  
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Table 4.3:  Profile of Respondents  
The mobile and IT industry The banking industry 
Position N Position N 
CEOs 7 CEOs 1 
Executive managers: Strategy, investment and 
business planning 
9 Executive managers: Strategy, investment and 
business planning 
2 
Executive managers: Retail business 3 Managers: Innovation & Customer Insight 4 
Executive managers: Network solutions  6 Business Development Executive 1 
Senior Manager: HR, training, leadership & 
talent management  
3 Managers: Micro finance, product and channel 
areas  
2 
Senior Manager: Sales, marketing & support 
services 
10 Senior Manager: Sales, marketing & support 
Services 
2 
Executive directors 5 Executive directors 1 
Senior management positions 14 Senior management positions 8 
Total 57 Total 21 
    
The Airlines industry  The insurance industry  
CEOs 0 CEOs 2 
Executive managers: Strategy, investment and 
business planning 
3 Executive managers: Strategy, investment and 
business planning 
2 
General manager: Operations 2 Managers: Innovation hub 1 
Senior Manager: HR, training, leadership & 
talent management 
3 Organization Development Manager 1 
Senior Manager: Sales, Marketing & Support 
Services 
2 Senior Manager: Sales, marketing & client 
networks 
6 
Senior management positions 8 Executive directors 2 
  Senior management positions 4 
Total 18 Total 18 
 
4.5  Model and Hypothesis Testing  
This study attempts to answer two questions. The empirical studies in Chapter 6 and 7 are 
systematically organized into the first and second orders of analysis respectively. The first-order 
level of analysis discusses the result of the study at a firm-level of analysis by aggregating all 
data into a single set. The second-order level of analysis presents the findings about the 
differences between technology and market-driven business model innovation by disaggregating 
the data into two groups.     
 
First-order analysis: The primary research purpose of this study is to develop an integrated 
framework for reinventing a business model to enable disruptive innovation. The core premise 
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underlying this purpose is the notion that disruptive innovation is a function of conflict between 
an incumbent’s traditional business model and an insurgent’s disruptive business model 
(Markides and Charitou, 2004). 
 
This premise suggests that a systematic investigation of the disruptiveness of an innovation must 
meet two prerequisites. The first is to describe the entrant’s business model development process 
for creating a potentially disruptive niche market. The second is to examine the disruptiveness 
impact of insurgents’ business model innovations on incumbents’ traditional business models. 
The first question is, therefore, by examining the two aspects of the disruptive innovation 
problem: how should incumbents reinvent their business models to deal with disruptive 
innovation? 
 
Research question 1: How should organizations reinvent their business models to 
enable internally or externally disruptive innovation?  
 
The first-level analysis is an overall aggregated statistical analysis that seeks to identify common 
patterns at a system-level. Following the case studies in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 attempts to 
examine the first conceptual model which is an evolutionary and proactive niche market 
innovation by testing seven hypotheses that form the model (H1 to H7). Chapter 7 examines the 
second model that deals with the revolutionary processes of disruptive innovation. It investigates 
the disruptive impact of the entrant’s potentially disruptive business model on the incumbents’ 
established market (mainstream), and how incumbents reinvent a second business model to deal 
with disruptive innovation by testing the next seven hypotheses (H8 – H14).  
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Second-order analysis: Markides (2006:19) notes that although the original theory of disruptive 
innovation was focused on disruptive technologies, the same theory has been used to explain all 
types of disruptive innovation over time. The basis of departure from established literature, and 
the need for this thesis, is therefore, the dearth of knowledge with regard to how (non-
technological) market-driven business model innovation can cause disruptive innovation. This 
study hypothesizes that the processes and evolutions for a disruptive non-technological market-
driven disruptive business model innovation are different than those for a technology-push 
disruptive innovation.  
 
Table 4.4:  Technological vs. Business Model Innovations 
Technological innovations  Business model innovations  
MXit - Instant mobile messaging (IMS) M-banking 
V-mobile Direct short-term insurance model 
 Direct airlines model (LCC) 
 
Within the generic integrated framework developed from the first-order analysis of the first 
question, this question attempts to identify the differences and commonalities between these two 
categories of disruptive innovation by applying the same hypothesis and statistical frames. The 
survey data are grouped into technological and non-technological market-driven business model 
innovations, as shown in Table 4.3: 
 
Research question 2: What are the differences between disruptive technology-push 
and disruptive market-driven business model innovations in processes and 
dynamics?  
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4.5.1  Operatioalization Construct Variables into Manifest Variables  
The conceptual framework chapter (Chapter 2) proposes two conceptual models. The first model 
conceptualizes an evolutionary phase where business model innovation process takes in niche 
market before it trespasses the mainstream market. This model puts forward five logically linked 
hypotheses that are assumed necessary for creation of a potentially disruptive niche market. The 
second conceptual model theorizes a revolutionary phase where the entrant’s business model 
infringes the mainstream market, and where an incumbent should strategize to enable disruptive 
innovation. The second model proposes seven hypotheses. The following sections describe key 
manifest variables (MVs) that represent and measure the latent or construct variables (LVs) that 
form the hypotheses.   
 
4.5.1.1.  Hypotheses for Business Model Innovation for Creating Niche Market  
H1: All else assumed constant, an innovation’s Relative Advantage (RA) is negatively related to 
“Asymmetric Motivation” (AM) during the introduction period of innovation life-cycle.  
H2: AM is positively related to potentially disruptive niche market innovation growth (IG).  
 
The construct of Relative Advantage (RA) of innovation is measured by the following five 
manifest variables (MVs) in comparison to previously established comparable product or service 
(Agarwal and Prasad, 1997; Kim and Mauborgne, 1999; Rogers, 1995):  
1. RA1 - Price 
2. RA2 - Ease-of-use 
3. RA3 - Technology “newness” 
4. RA4 - Quality 
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5. RA5 - Brand recognition. 
 
The construct Asymmetric Motivation (AM) is measured by the following four MVs (Abernathy 
and Clark, 1985; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Gilbert, 2003): 
1. AM1 - A low-end market not attractive to established incumbents  
2. AM2 - Innovation not attractive to mainstream customers  
3. AM3 - Previously un-served market  
4. AM4 - A niche market size not big enough to attract established competitors. 
H3: Configuration of fundamentally different value chain (VC) is positively related to continuous 
innovation (CI).  
H4: CI is therefore positively related to potentially disruptive niche market innovation growth 
(IG).  
 
The construct of differential value chain configuration (VC) is measured by different the 
components of entrant’s value chain are compared to the industry’s traditional value chain in the 
following four items (Adner, 2002; Chesbrough, 2006; Gilbert et. al., 1984; Reinganum, 1983): 
1. VC1 - Differences in production process  
2. VC2 - Differences in supply channels 
3. VC3 - Differences in distribution channels 
4. VC4 - Differences in marketing and sales. 
 
Continuous innovation (CI) is assumed to be a function of three components including 
(Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001; Holmstrom et. al., 2000; Evans and Wurster, 1997): 
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1. CI1 - Lower cost advantage 
2. CI 2 - Consumer-insight  
3. CI 3 - Speed-to-market factors. 
 
H5: Constraint is negatively related to a potentially disruptive innovation. The constraint factor 
(CINST) is operationalized in a manner of asking respondents to indicate their 
agreement/disagreement ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7) with 
respect to what level and nature of constraints an entrant start-up faces to scale up its innovation 
in the form of the following items (Chesbrough, 1999; Porter and Stren, 2001; Teece, 1986): 
1. CONST1 - Lack of access to generic resources (capital, skilled labor, technology, et…) 
2. CONST2 - Lack of accessibility (shortage of public and business infrastructure) 
3. CONST3 - Customers lack of affordability 
4. CONST4 - Lack of clear government or industry regulations 
5. CONST5 - Incompatibility of innovation with existing complementary devices. 
 
H6: Competition is positively related to a potentially disruptive innovation. Competition 
(COMP) is investigated by three MVs (Burns and Stalker, 1966Porter, 1985 Walker et. al., 
2006):  
1. COMP1 - The number of new competitors 
2. COMP1 - The level of intensity of competition among new competitors with new 
business models 
3. COMP3 - The level of intensity of competition coming from traditional competitors. 
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H7: Strategy is positively related to a potentially disruptive innovation. The construct ‘strategy’ 
refers to a specific firm’s ability to develop a unique strategic position or to build internal firm-
specific strategic capabilities Since the theory of strategy basically seeks to differentiate one firm 
from the competition, a survey-based quantitative method may be less suitable to investigate 
empirically the relationship between the construct of strategy and a pioneering firm’s growth or 
success in creating a  potentially disruptive niche market Therefore, building on the resource 
based view (RBV) and Porter’s competitive strategy theories, the preceding case studies chapter 
examined how an individual innovating firm develops (a) internal firm-specific capabilities and 
(b) competitive strategy to create potentially disruptive niche market and capture and sustain 
value it creates in the long term (Amit and Shoemaker, 1993: 35; Collis and Montgomery, 1995: 
118; Porter, 1985: 33). 
 
By investigating the innovating firm using case study method, we seek to investigate a firm’s 
ability to develop strategic positioning and firm-specific strategic capabilities that include both 
tangible and intangible assets: 
1. Intellectual Property (IP) 
2. Codified knowledge 
3. Leadership vision, strategic direction, governance, 
4. Human resources activities, process and policies including, selection, remuneration, 
motivation, skills development   
5. Processes/activities 
6. Exclusive membership in a certain ecosystem (value-network)  
7. Brand strength, firm’s reputation and organizational culture.  
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To provide competitive advantage these capabilities need to be (a) inimitable, (b) not readily 
substitutable, (c) superior to competitors, (d) scarce among competitors, and which (e) enable to 
leverage core competencies in related businesses (Chesbrough, 2006: 8; Clarke and Clegg, 2000: 
231; 70; Teece et. al., 1997: 511; Collis and Montgomery, 1995: 118). 
 
Dependent variable (DV): The construct of “creating a potentially disruptive niche market (a 
potentially disruptive innovation)”, simply referred in this study as innovation growth (IG), 
should have been ideally measured by objective financial measures such as market share and 
revenue growth. This data is proven to be difficult to obtain due to confidentiality issues, the 
financial indexes of the new start-up companies not being yet registered in public institutions as 
well as other strong unexplainable external forces such the financial crises and oil price crises 
during the writing of this thesis (2007 – 2010). In absence of objective financial measures, we 
followed other researchers’ recommendations to investigate an entrant’s potential in creating a 
niche market (see Dess and Robinson, 1984; Markides and Charitou, 2004). Thus, the three MVs 
used to measure growth are: 
1. IG1 - How big is the market share the innovation/new business model has achieved to 
date? 
2. IG2 - How big do you think the market share of all new competitors (with the new 
business model) is at this point? 
3. IG 3 - How big do you think the growth potential of this innovation in future? 
 
More importantly, due to the classified nature of individual innovator’s financial statements and 
other reasons mentioned above, the DV innovation growth (IG) is additionally examined by case 
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studies research in Chapter 5, including but not limited to, using open interviews, Internet and 
media sources.  
 
4.5.1.2. Hypotheses for Strategic Processes for Enabling Disruptive Innovation  
H8: Disparity is positively related to disruptive innovation. The construct variable (LV) 
“disparity” is operationalized by the following four manifest variables (MVs):  
1.  Disparity1 -  Disparity in core product design (Dewar and Dutton, 1986; Henderson  
     and Clark, 1990) 
2.  Disparity2 - Disparity in core competencies (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) 
3.  Disparity3 - Disparity in strategic market focus (Gilbert, 2003) 
4.  Disparity4 - Disparity in revenue models (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). 
 
H9: The degree of conflict between disruptive and traditional business models is positively 
related to disruptive innovation. The construct “degree of conflict” (CONFLICT) between 
disruptive and traditional business models is operationalized by the following six items:  
1. Conflict1 - Risk of cannibalization (Mason and George, 1994) 
2. Conflict2 - Risk of lowering profit margin (Abernathy and Clark, 1985) 
3. Conflict3 - Risk of degrading existing product’s quality (Markides and Charitou, 2004) 
4. Conflict4 - Risk of damaging company’s image (Markides and Charitou, 2004)   
5. Conflict5 - Risk of damaging relationship with existing distribution channels (Markides 
and Charitou, 2004)  
6. Conflict56 - Risk of defocusing from main strategic market (Porter, 2001). 
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H10: Incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma is positively related to disruptive innovation. 
Incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma is represented by seven MVs: 
1.  Dilemma1 - Failure to anticipate emerging or latent disruptive threat (Paap and Katz  
     2004) 
2.  Dilemma2 - Believing the innovation was the wrong way to do business (Markides  
     and Charitou, 2004) 
3.  Dilemma3 - Inertia or management unwillingness to take initiative (Beer and  
     Eisenstat, 2000; Hannan and Freeman, 1984) 
4.  Dilemma4  - Failing to take risk venture due to fear of cannibalization 
5.  Dilemma5 - Failing to take risk venture due to fear of losing main partners (Chandy  
     and Tellis, 2000; Kuczmarski, 1998) 
6.  Dilemma6 - Market parochialism (Day, 1999) 
7.  Dilemma7 - Management’s incompetence (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). 
 
The dependent construct variable (LV) - “disruptive innovation” (DI) should have been 
preferably measured by correlating a particular disruptor firm’s growth with  the incumbents’ 
underperformance in face of disruptive innovation using objective monetary measures including 
market share gained by the disruptor and, as a consequence, market share lost by the incumbents. 
The limitation of this study in meeting this criterion can be explained by  lack of access to 
financial data due to confidentialities and non-availability of public database of pioneering start-
up companies. It has been particularly problematic to correlate the disruptor’s growth with the 
incumbent’s underperformance on opposite sides due to the effect of unexplainable complex 
factors, such as the global financial crises and oil price that affected considerably many 
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industries market shares during the period of collecting empirical data for this research (2008 – 
2009). Following other established researchers’ recommendations (see Dess and Robinson, 1984; 
Markides and Charitou, 2004), the construct of disruption innovation (DI) is investigated by 
quantifying managers’ opinion by means of the following four questions: 
1.  DI1 - How big do you think the market share of all disruptive (new) competitors at this  
     point in time? 
2. DI2 - How big do you think the market share your company or other incumbent(s) in the    
      industry lost as a consequence of the disruptive innovation/new business model's growth? 
3. D3 - How big do you think the market share other incumbent(s) from other industry lost  
as the consequence of this innovation's growth? 
4. DI4 - How big do you think the future disruptive impact potential? 
 
H11: Responding to disruptive innovation in a separate SBU is positively related to incumbent’s 
performance (IP) in enabling disruptive innovation. The construct of “business model separation 
integration or separation” (BM_Separation) is examined by asking respondents to indicate one of 
the following choices that most likely demonstrate how their companies responded to disruptive 
innovation (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004): 
1. Stand-alone business unit via new company 
2. Separate business unit under existing corporate structure 
3. Integration without changing business model 
4. Other/ No response  
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H12: Organizational separation of disruptive business model is positively related to incumbent’s 
performance (IP) in enabling disruptive innovation. For respondents that indicated their 
companies had created a separate company to manage the disruptive innovation, a further 
question is asked to determine the extent of organizational separation (Org_separation) in terms 
of dissimilarities from the parent company in the following components (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1986; Chandy and Tellis, 1998; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004; Vlaar et. al., 2005):  
1. Org_separation1 - Brand   
2. Org_separation2 - Marketing and sales 
3. Org_separation3 – Distribution 
4. Org_separation4 - Production processes/activities 
5. Org_separation5 - Supply processes/activities 
6. Org_separation6 - Firm identity  
7. Org_separation7 - Organizational culture 
8. Org_separation8 – Management 
 
H13: Senior management involvement is positively related to enabling disruptive innovation. 
Senior management involvement (INVOLVEMENT) is measured empirically by looking into 
what extent the parent company’s top management is involved in the affairs of the disruptive 
(new) business unit or company in the following aspects (Brentani et. al., 2010; Cooper et. al., 
2003; Garvin 2004; Grant, 1991; Teece et. al., 1997) 
1. Involvement1 - Taking risk initiatives 
2. Involvement2 - Championing disruptive ventures 
3. Involvement3 - Resolving managerial conflicts 
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4. Involvement4 - Screening and approving projects 
5. Involvement5 - Setting strategic direction 
6. Involvement6 - Setting annual budget for the new unit 
7. Involvement7 - Exercising overall financial control 
 
H14: An externally hired CEO is positively related to incumbent’s performance (IP) in enabling 
disruptive innovation. The CEO factor (CEO_Factor1) is examined by asking respondents 
whether their companies appointed a CEO from inside or outside of the company (industry) to 
run the new disruptive unit/company (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1994; Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002).  
 
Two MVs are used to measure the dependent variable (DV) Incumbent’s Performance (IP) in 
enabling disruptive innovation (Dess and Robinson, 1984; Markides and Charitou, 2004): 
        1.  IP1 - Respondents are asked to rate the effectiveness of their disruptive business      
 models in becoming part of the emerging disruptive market on a seven-point Likert scale    
 ranging from (1) “Very ineffective” to (7) “Very effective”.  
 
       2.  IP2 – Respondents are asked to evaluate the level of synergy between the disruptive and  
            traditional business units by indicating their agreement or disagreement to what extent the   
            sharing has enhanced the competitive advantage of both units (if there is some nature of  
            parent company’s senior management involvement or some sort of organizational          
             integration), ranging from (1) “Strongly disagree” to (7) “Strongly agree”. 
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4.5.2    Reliability and Validity Measures in Quantitative Data Analysis and Reporting  
Reliability refers to the consistency of a set of measurement tools (Yin, 1994). The reliability test 
of the major constructs is examined using Cronbach coefficient Alpha. Table 4.4 below shows 
the Cronbach Coefficient Alphas for the major constructs that range from 0.61 the lowest and to 
0.90 the highest. These demonstrate sufficient internal consistency and reliability between inter-
construct MVs that measure a single construct or latent variable (LV) (Govindarajan and 
Koppale, 2006: 192; Nunnaly, 1978: 244).  
 
Table 4.5:  Cronbach Coefficient Alpha 
Cronbach Coefficient Alpha Constructs 
Raw Standardized   
Low Relative Advantage (RA) 0.822885 0.820675 
Asymmetric Motivation  (AM) 0.762196 0.760328 
New/different Value Chain Configuration (VC)   0.764542 0.769186 
Continuous Innovation (CI) 0.773943 0.774804 
Constraint Factor (CONST) 0.608196 0.614214 
Competition (COMP) 0.678278 0.674827 
Disparity   (DISPARITY) 0.746984 0.749602 
Conflict  (CONFLICT) 0.886515 0.890065 
Dilemma  (DILEMMA) 0.900433 0.900170 
Disruptive Innovation (DI) 0.797860 0.800024 
Organizational Separation (Org_Separation) 0.891172 0.890657 
Senior Management Involvement (INVOLVEMENT) 0.844355 0.843769 
Incumbent Performance (IP) 0.824618 0.832746 
 
Construct validity refers to what extent a scale measures or correlates within the conceptualized 
psychological construct that it claims to measure. In other words, it refers to the extent to which 
the study investigates what it purports to investigate (Yin, 1994). In measuring the construct 
validity, we test convergent and discriminant validities using SAS 9.2 PROC FACTOR code for 
exploratory factor analysis (Principal Component Analysis). While convergent validity tests 
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whether all MVs represent or load onto a single LV, the discriminant validity asses whether the 
MVs that load on a single LV discriminate adequately from other LVs (Hair, Babin, & Samouel, 
2003). All factors of the major variables are with Eigenvalues equal to 1; the percentages of 
variance explained for the major variables are above 0.5, and all relevant factor loadings are 
greater than 0.5 (see Appendix D pages 382 – 399 for detailed relativity and validity test results). 
These results demonstrate significant convergent and discriminant validity (Govindarajan and 
Koppale, 2006: 192; Nunnaly, 1978: 244).  
 
Content validity (also known as logical validity) evaluates to what extent a measure covers all 
facets of a construct(s) that made up the theoretical model in this study (Babie and Mounton, 
2001). The content validity of this thesis is measured in theoretical and empirical dimensions. 
First, the theoretical dimension assesses the extent to which the concepts of business model and 
disruptive innovation represent the methodologically agreed upon concepts in the established 
literature and thereof, the conceptual models cover the fundamental dimensions, elements and 
principles of a business model and disruptive innovation. From the theory test perspective, all the 
definitions and meaning of concepts that represent the hypotheses of this study are well 
theoretically grounded, and all the constructs that build the hypothesis are chosen from 
established academic works, as much as possible.  
 
Second, the empirical dimension attempts to measure the extent to which the survey samples 
represent the population of the study, i.e. disruptive innovation phenomena in the four South 
African industries, mobile telephone, banking, insurance and airlines. In this regard, content 
validity of this study is maintained by the informed identification of disruptive innovation 
 138 
phenomenon and sample selection made through consultations with academic and industry 
experts including professors at the School of Economic and Business Sciences (SEBS), and Wits 
Business School (WBS), University of Witwatersrand, Graduate School of Business, University 
of Cape Town and Gordons Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria and proficient 
observers of the industries.   
 
Content validity requires more meticulous and systematic qualitative and quantitative measures. 
The multiple case studies method is used to demonstrate a disruptive innovation process, first,  
by selecting five “archetypical” pioneering firms that introduced disruptive innovation in 
different industries, and then, making constant comparisons among these firms in order to 
identify common or different patterns, themes and categories for generalization across the 
population, or contextualization the findings (Yin, 1994).  
 
The case study method is triangulated by rigorous statistical method. In carrying out the 
empirical research, meanings and definitions of question items, and the format of the 
questionnaire were reviewed by panel of experts. A pilot survey was conducted and checked for 
completeness, reliability and validity, subsequently improving the design of the questionnaire to 
raise its content validity. In a self-administered questionnaire, a possible bias may arise 
concerning content validity, i.e., whether respondents comprehend some constructs and whether 
they match it with what the constructs seek to measure, and whether they give comprehensive 
and correct answers (Cooper and Schindler, 2001). To control this bias, about 90% of the survey 
was completed through face-to-face interviews. This task was accomplished by employing three 
post-graduate students. In addition, the author conducted open ended interviews with over 30 top 
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level managers. In conducting statistical analysis, this study relied on theoretical foundations as 
well as the case studies findings to interpret, confirm or reject hypothetical relationships (Hair et. 
al., 2003; Hoyle and Kenny, 1999; Kline, 2005).  
 
With respect to external validity, while the empirical findings may be generalized from the 
sample to its target population (the four South African services industries), this study does not 
claim that its findings can be, in effect, reproduced to the universe of other populations across 
time and place. However, the thesis’s integrated theoretical framework for “business model 
reinvention for enabling disruptive innovation” has been developed from both deductive and 
inductive research, through cross-examining and triangulation of qualitative and quantitative 
findings, and further referral to established theories. Thus, the study’s theoretical implications 
might be generalized across time and place (Yin, 1994, Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
4.5.3  Regression Analysis  
Chapter 6 and 7 present the analysis and results of the thesis. In this study, the major statistical 
instrument used to test the hypotheses is SAS 9.2 PROC REG (regression analysis). The 
regression analyses are conducted at two levels of analysis. 
 
• The first-order analysis (system-level) keeps all data together in aggregation to test the 
two models at a firm-level with the purpose of finding common patters that can be 
generalized across all industries.   
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Chapter 6 will present the analysis and results of the first-order investigation. In order to conduct 
regression analysis, a multivariate test and Cook’s D test were checked for outliers with residuals 
and for normality distribution. Residual data that with significantly higher <2 & 3 were identified 
and removed. The data are normally distributed in the norm <2 skewness and <4 kurtosis, 
passing the necessary assumption tests required for conducing regression analysis (Johnson, 
1998). Furthermore, the Pearson correlation coefficients (‘r’) of the two conceptualized models 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7 show statistically significant correlations  at p = 1%, 5% and only 
two variables marginally at 10% levels, thus most showing significant associations between 
hypothesized variables (Choudhury and Karaqhanna, 2008: 186; Govindarajan and Koppale, 
2006: 192).  
 
In regression analysis, the coefficient of determination (r2) assesses the proportion of the 
variance of the dependent variable explained by the independent variable(s); adjusted R-square 
values closer to 1 indicate a better fit of a model. The model accounts for a significant portion of 
variation in the data (fit) when F (p-value) statistic is 0.01, 0.05 and marginally at 0.10 level. All 
measures in this study are with F = p<0.0001, indicating a better fit of all models. The Variation 
Inflation (VIF) of all regression analyses in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 show no significant 
multicolinearity, indicating additional reliability of the statistic tests. The parameter estimates of 
the intercept and independent variables’ slopes (standardised correlation coefficient ) are 
statistically significant at p-value 0.01, 0.05 and marginally at 0.10 levels, indicating a significant 
relationship and whether this relationship is positive or negative (Johnson, 1998). When the 
independent variable is a categorical variable, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is used to 
compare the means of the dependent variable of the categorical subgroups. The Model shows 
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statistically significant difference if the Pr > F at 0.01, 0.05 and marginally at 0.10 levels. The 
Tukey Studentized Range farther determines where the difference lies at the alpha = 0.05 level.  
• The second-order study investigates the differences between non-technological market-
driven and technological disruptive innovations by subjecting each category of 
innovation to the same hypothesis and statistical unit.  
 
Chapter 7 will present the analysis and results of the second-order analysis. A dichotomous 
categorical variable (technology innovation vs. business model innovation) has been set up to 
examine the two categories in opposition. The total number of observation 114 is divided equally 
into 57 technology and 57 business model observations. By using the same entrant’s and 
incumbent’s conceptual models and the 14 hypotheses, a moderated regression analysis tests 
whether the hypothesized relationships between the independent and dependent variables vary 
across the two groups of innovation. To get a standardized solution, the business model 
innovation group is set as a dummy variable (-1) representing a reference group, while the 
technology innovation category represents an effect coding group (1). The moderated regression 
results of significant (or insignificant) effects (differences) are interpreted by reporting the p-
value of the interaction effect coefficient slop. We reject the null hypothesis that the two groups 
of innovation are the same if the p-value is 0.01, 0.05 or marginally 0.10. The limitation of 
moderated regression analysis is, however, that its the chi-square (χ2) and interaction effect 
statistic significant difference tests are power sensitive. In other words, they have the downside 
effect of ignoring differences of relatively small sample size such of this study (they are more 
reliable for more than 200 sample size). Thus, in interpreting the results and provide a visual 
(different) direction of the slopes of the two groups, the moderator and interaction effect 
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coefficient slopes are plotted graphically. In addition, the thesis uses Student’s t distribution 
(paired two sample t-test:  –test) to support the significant difference analysis (Lee, 2008: 242; 
Kline, 2005:146; Oczkowski, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, when necessary, a central tendency (mean) measure is used when we try to identify 
the most significant contributing MVs to a single LV. In using the mean analysis in a seven-point 
(Likert) scale, following inferential logic and referring to previous research, the author decided, 
with some degree of subjectivity, the cut-off mean point for each aggregate indicator to be 3.5. 
This means that a mean score above or below this point indicates significant (or insignificant) 
probability of accepting or rejecting a variable with higher/lower value, further in order to 
strengthen accepting or rejecting a hypothesis.. Moreover, in some instances, the statistical 
analysis alone cannot capture the complex and dynamic phenomena of disruptive business model 
innovation. Therefore, in all hypothesis testing and concluding the outcome, the dynamics and 
contextual factors are explained by drawing insights from the case studies, and further by 
referring to established theories (Shimp, 2010; 70; Markides and Charitou, 2004: 34; Rafi and 
Kampas, 2002: 116). 
 
4.6  Ethical Considerations  
This study has taken care of the ethics requirements to carry out this research activity (see 
Appendix E for letter of ethics clearance). In collecting the primary data, permission was granted 
from people participated in this research through open interviews and self-administered 
structured questionnaire. This study focused strictly on innovation process and the respondents 
were chosen based on their relevance to the study. The respondents were experienced top level 
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managers who participated in this study voluntarily. As stated on the questionnaires (see 
Appendix A & B), the participants were notified for the confidentiality and anonymity of the 
study and that the information gathered from the research will only be used for academic 
purposes. Therefore, the observations and findings are kept anonymous. As mentioned in 
Chapter 5, the names of case companies are also kept anonymous. One company gave a written 
permission to use its name. The researcher adhered to the basic research principles in order to 
ensure that the observations are free from the researcher’s personal bias and that the findings 
represent accurately what were observed and told by respondents. This is maintained through 
prolonged engagement in the phenomena under investigation and through the process of constant 
and iterative analysis and triangulation including, but not limited to, survey, open interviews, 
focus group discussions, company and industry archives, the Internet, and the media (Babie and 
Mouton, 2001; Yin, 1994). 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDIES 
5.1  Introduction  
This chapter explores five case studies comprising two technological innovations and three 
market-driven business model innovations, representing four South African services industries, 
namely mobile, banking, insurance and airline industries. The case studies have been developed 
from interviews, focus group discussions, desk research and literature review. Yin (1994) argues 
that a multiple case study method is useful when exploring relatively less known phenomena, for 
it helps to investigate common patterns, themes and differences among the case studies for 
possible generalization across similar contexts.  
 
Chapter three presented the conceptual framework with two major evolutionary and 
revolutionary models of disruptive innovation. The case studies explain the business model 
evolutionary processes in creating a potentially disruptive niche market, and how incumbents 
responded to each innovation. Thus, the five case studies sections are structured based on the 
conceptual models. This study withholds the names of case companies unless permission is 
obtained from a certain company to use the name. Therefore, the five companies are identified 
here as innovations 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.   
 
5.2  Innovation 1 - Mxit9  
MXit is a “free” instant mobile messaging software application pioneered in 2005 by Herman 
Heunis, the current CEO of the company. The innovation, which was launched under the same 
                                                 
9
 Permission is granted from the company to use the name.  
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company name, MXit, is a social networking technology that allows users to exchange instant 
text messages and multimedia via a mobile phone. This case study examines the probability of 
MXit to be disruptive to the Short Message System (SMS) product. SMS is offered by three 
large mobile network operators (MNOs): Vodacom, MTN and CellC, hereafter referred to as 
incumbents.  
 
The incumbents’ revenue models are made to charge subscribers 86 cents per a text message sent 
via SMS10. In contrast, MXit has a radically different business model. To be a member of MXit, 
the company charges its customers nominal fees for signing up. Once a customer is a member, 
MXit charges only 2 cents per text message (98% less compared to the MNOs), plus the Internet 
data costs. 
 
I.  The RA of Innovation 
The core product: The traditional SMS is a one-to-one text messaging communication product. 
MXit is a mobile social networking product that runs on java application that enables multiple 
users to chat instantly over the Internet using GPRS11 packet data. The RA of the innovation can 
be examined in terms of price, ease of use, quality, brand recognition and technology “newness” 
in comparison to an existing comparable product’s value proposition (Rogers, 1995).  
 
                                                 
10
 Retrieved on 12 January, 2008 from ttp://phonecard.bootsnall.com/southafrica_sim.htm 
11
 General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) is a packet oriented Mobile Data Service available to users of   
   Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) (mobile phones). 
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Price advantage: Tables 5.1 shows that MXit charges 2 cents per text message, plus the Internet 
data costs12. The GPRS/3G13 data tariff is about R 1.2 a megabyte14. In comparison, MNOs 
charge 86 cents per SMS15. This shows that MXit has a price advantage over the SMS.  
 
Table 5.1:  The Relative Advantage of Mxit in Comparison to SMS 
Value propositions  MXit 
 
MNO’s SMS 
Price 2 cents per text message 86 cents per a text message 
Ease of use Mobility, interactive, social networking. 
Requires handsets enabled by Java with 
mobile Internet capabilities 
Single use, one-to-one, not 
interactive. Can be used by older 
handsets with no access to the 
Internet 
Quality Limited product Incumbents offer multiple products 
Brand recognition Not known in the mainstream market. 
Popular among the teen-agers 
Well established in the mainstream  
Newness of   
technology  
Incremental technology  MXit is not radical compared to SMS 
technology 
 
Ease-of-use advantage: The SMS technology can be used on any handsets with no access to the 
Internet. MXit combines mobility, instant messaging and social networking, which are not 
possible with SMS. Its interface is simple and can work on average handsets that are enabled by 
Java with mobile Internet capabilities (GPRS/3G).  
 
Quality advantage: MXit provides limited functionality, i.e., only instant mobile text messaging. 
In contrast, incumbents offer multiple communications products in which SMS is just a single 
product, adding quality value to the user.  
 
Brand recognition: The incumbents have well established brands that extend across all market 
segments. MXit brand is not known in the mainstream mobile market. But the company has 
                                                 
12
 MXit website:www.mxit.co.za. Retrieved on 12 January, 2008. 
13
 3G is the latest GPRS technology. 
14
 Vodacom website:www.vodacom.co.za. Retrieved on 12 January, 2008. 
15
 Retrieved on 12 January, 2008 from ttp://phonecard.bootsnall.com/southafrica_sim.htm 
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effectively established its brand among the teenagers through low-cost viral marketing and word 
of mouth. As one of its managers says, this has been one of its critical key success factors: 
 
I think it was the fact that we used viral marketing very effectively. Our users like us, they 
still do, they are very loyal to the brand. So they didn’t mind paying, not at all, we were 
giving them an opportunity to speak to their loved ones and friends for free. So to buy 
something from us to help paying for this was actually a very pleasant experience for them. 
 
Technology newness: Instant mobile messenger is a mobile extension to instant messenger over 
the Internet. It makes social networking possible via instant messaging over a cell-phone that 
was previously only possible over the Internet. It blends both the SMS mobility and the instant 
messaging element of the Internet. From a technology newness perspective, the innovation is 
simply an incremental improvement to SMS and may not be radical to users and the industry. 
 
The purpose of analyzing the above five attributes here is to examine the innovation’s probability 
of cannibalizing the SMS market. When we compare the two products on the above five 
attributes, typical to a low-cost technological innovation, instant mobile messaging appears to 
have relatively better price and ease of use advantages, and lower quality and brand recognition 
advantages.  
 
Some managers argue that the technology has the potential to cannibalize SMS. The CEO of 
MXit defies this argument saying that the two products are fundamentally different. Both 
products can co-exist with enough markets for both of them: 
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Now when we started initially the Telco’s (MNOs) – I think they were of the opinion that we 
cannibalized their SMS revenues. MXit is not a SMS replacement, its different. SMS, you 
send to someone, it is unsolicited, you respond maybe once or twice, but you cannot have a 
conversation with SMS, its not the same. MXit, it is a communication for communities, and 
that’s a big difference. 
 
The above examination suggests that MXit does not pose a significant cannibalization to SMS. 
Conceptually speaking, if the instant mobile messenger poses a direct threat of cannibalization to 
SMS, we expect incumbents to respond to this innovation aggressively.  
 
I.  Low-End Market Creation  
Theoretically, if the innovation does not pose a direct threat of cannibalization to an established 
product’s stream of revenue, it may create “asymmetric motivation,” where incumbents are less 
likely to be provoked to take aggressive counter-actions (Christensen et. al., 2004: 13). 
 
With telecommunication being a necessity basic product, MNOs serve virtually all markets. 
MNOs offer multiple products in which cellular voice calls are a vital source of revenue. In 
addition, SMS revenues cover some of the operating costs. To be able to use SMS, one has to 
buy airtime. The denomination of airtime vouchers range from R1000 for the top high-end user 
to R5 for the lowest-end user.    
 
 149 
MXit targets largely teenagers, mostly high-school and college students, who cannot always 
afford to use voice calls even at its minimum tariff of R5. To make money from this market, 
MXit requires a low-margin and high-volume business model. According to one of its managers, 
the secret behind its success was developing a technology driven business model that meets this 
requirement: 
 
I mean it is much easier to sell content to a user for 5 cents and make a lot of money if you 
have four or five million users than to have 20 users and you try and charge them R1000 or 
R2000 for something, its much easier going for large volumes and smaller amounts. I think 
that was the secret. 
 
The profile of the much lower-margin target market does not seem to fit even to the lowest end 
of the MNOs market segment. Incumbents use traditional and expensive advertising mediums 
such as TV to reach a large customer base. The challenge for an innovator with a low-cost – 
high-margin volume business model would be to reach a much larger customer base at low cost. 
The CEO comments that, five years after its launch, its low-cost creative marketing and the 
rebellious notion of the brand have been a critical source of success: 
 
We acquired a big user base very quickly, and having a big user base makes the whole 
monetization of that much easier. The fact is that we realized we could monetize things that 
initially we didn’t think would generate revenue. I mean we started charging for chat rooms. 
No-one charged for chat rooms in the world, we are crazy, but we did that and it actually 
worked. Part of it was because we were a very desirable product at that stage when we 
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started, and we had a very loyal user base, and also we had this rebellious nature of the 
brand.  
 
This insight reveals that an instant mobile messenger does not only create “asymmetric 
motivation” based on economic differential revenue models, but also the fact that it is a mobile 
social networking product means it is a fundamentally different product to SMS that created a 
new consumption pattern for an entirely new market that has never been the domain of the 
mobile industry incumbents.   
 
III. Cost and Continuous Innovation Factors  
The higher RA price and ease-of-use of innovation often stem from configuring a shorter and 
lower cost value-chain when compared to the traditional industry value-chain.  Once an 
innovating firm achieve this, it is critical that the firm continues to improve its performance in 
order to move up market from its initial low-end niche market to the mainstream market.  
 
The three essential tests towards this goal are first, the extent to which an innovating firm can 
gain lower cost advantage to create a cheaper and simpler product, second the extent to which it 
can gain consumer insight so as to continue improving its innovation from the customer 
perspective, and thirdly the extent to which it can take its innovation to market faster 
(Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001: 5).  
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Cost advantage: The traditional mobile network industry business model is characterized by high 
CAPEX and high OPEX16 cost structure. Data transmission through the GSM17 network require 
extensive capital investments to build GPRS/3G networks, towers and dedicated channels to 
transport data through circuit switching infrastructure. Additionally, the rapidly changing 
technological landscape in the telecom industry means that MNOs have to invest in upgrading 
their network infrastructure from time to time.  
 
The use of large established retail intermediary services providers adds a significant portion to 
the MNOs cost structure. This requires them to generate revenue by offering higher margin 
services at the high-end of the market, and through economies of scale by stretching their cellular 
network to maximum possible capacity to generate revenue from relatively low-margin and high-
volume mass market.   
 
MXit uses the public Internet to transmit data through the MNOs’ network. Its major fixed asset 
is basically a server that can host a bigger ISP18. The company’s mobile instant messaging 
software was originally developed from open source (e.g. Linux). Its biggest cost is the software 
development that can provide features and Value Added Services (VAS) with the basic mobile 
text messaging. This suggests that MXit has a better cost advantage than the MNOs in operating 
a mobile instant messaging.  
 
Consumer insight and speed-to-market: Although the company interacts directly with its users 
locally and internationally, it goes to market through partners around the global and locally using 
                                                 
16
 CAPEX = Capital expenditure, OPEX = Operating expenditure 
17
 Global System for Mobile Communications 
18
 ISP = Internet Service Provider
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its direct Internet channel. In South Africa, prospective users visit its website to sign up and to 
download the MXit application software. Internationally the company partners with national IT 
terminators around the world including Malaysia, India, Indonesia, United Kingdom, United 
States, Nigeria, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The partners assist MXit in 
converting the program into local languages and deliver the service to their domestic markets. 
This allows MXit to focus on its core competencies which is developing software programs. This 
is also known as a distributed model that refers to an open system where different independent 
companies work in collaboration across the value chain to create and deliver a single product 
(Chesbrough, 2006: 10). Domestically, the company relies on its virtual brand that has been 
effectively built through viral marketing, as a major driver of building customer base and 
pushing sales.  
 
Examining the hypothesis, the company’s technology-based direct, distributed and shorter value-
chain is fundamentally different to incumbent MNOs’ traditional value chains. Therefore, MXit 
has relatively better cost, consumer insight and speed-to-market advantages. 
 
IV. The Constraint Factor   
The instant mobile messenger technology was launched by an independent small start-up 
company called Swist Group Technologies that was established in 1994. In July, 2006 the 
company was named MXit Lifestyle (Pty) Ltd. With no major external financing, the initial 
development costs almost drove the company to bankruptcy. The founder of the company shares 
his experience as follows: 
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That was extremely difficult. First of all, we go to banks – they were not interested, we were 
too high a risk. Then we go to VC’s (venture capital)– they want your whole company 
before they give you money. It was tough; I tell you it is very tough to start a company from 
scratch. So yes finding finance is a huge problem, and our saving grace was that we started 
generating revenue much earlier than what we anticipated. If it wasn’t for that I don’t think 
we would have made it. 
 
Introducing a technology that allowed a low-margin and high-volume business model allowed 
the company to make profit quickly within seventeen months of its launch. When its business 
model became successful, one of South Africa’s largest media companies acquired a 30% stake 
in MXit, further ensuring its future through that equity capital infusion. 
 
MXit is un-supported and stand-alone business model that has succeeded through creative 
endeavors. When examining the relationship of access to generic resources and MXits ability to 
scale up its business model, this company’s experience seem to suggest that, although financial 
support would have made a difference, this kind of information technology innovation may not 
entirely be constrained by this barrier. Typical to an information technology product, such as 
Google and Facebook, MXit software is scalable over the Internet to an extent of a global reach. 
This nature of the product allows the company to reach a critical mass necessary for its low-
margin and high volume business model. 
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V.  Firm–Specific Strategic Capabilities  
Developing firm-specific strategic capabilities is critical for a firm to capture value it creates. 
The core value creation capability of MXit is its mobile instant messaging software that runs on 
GPRS/3G mobile phones and on PCs. Because of the open nature of this software, it is probably 
difficult to use Intellectual Property (IP) to protect its technology. The company’s business 
model is to charge for signing up subscribers, service fee and to provide an advertising platform 
via its social mobile networking technology. This business model does not seem difficult to 
imitate by rivals either. Its key source of value capture and sustainability comes from its first 
mover advantage, network economies of scale and continuous innovation. By being the first to 
introduce this innovation, it has achieved a critical mass of a 12 million customer base in less 
than five years. Having a social networking product in such a massive base means that the 
greater the number of people connected, the greater the value of being connected; therefore, 
generating network economies of scale (Evans and Wurser, 1997: 23).  
 
In the information technology business, where the technological and competitive environments 
change constantly, these advantages alone may not guarantee the firm’s value capture 
sustainability. There were virtually a handful of competitors when the company started. Today it 
faces competition both from within the country and around the world. The company does not have 
a clear strategic position to compete against its rivals. A closer look at the company’s situation 
provides us with two key secrets for its success. The first is the company’s commitment to 
innovation, as it is slogan says “We don’t compete, we create”. The CEO explains how its 
innovation process works: 
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We have an innovation team which is a very small team. It is only like five engineers and all 
they do is listen to what our users want. We've got a very active forum. The last time I 
checked it was 150 thousand users on our forum.  
 
We have beta testers also from our user base. So what this innovation team is doing is that, 
they get input from our users saying we would like to see this and this and that and so on. 
They also look at what is happening in the technology space. So we have input coming from 
our users, and we have input coming from our innovation team, and then we have input 
coming from everyone in the company. And most people in the company are software 
engineers, and they are very well aware of what's happening in the technology space.  
 
We have got enough ideas to keep our development team busy for the next 2 – 3 years. And 
it boils down to take a 2 – 4 year look at where technology is going and take a bet and start 
developing for that, most of the time it comes off, sometimes it doesn’t come off.  
 
What we do is we have got a steering committee with its chairman. His job is to take these 
ideas and make a business space out of it and then it goes to the (approving) committee, 
which I am head of it and all the heads of all the departments sit in on it every Wednesday, 
and we take a decision. This is so important that we adjust the priority depending on the 
amount of work we have got. So its a very structured approach and I think our biggest 
challenge at this stage is that we don’t have enough developers, we are continuously hiring 
developers, but still we have not got enough. 
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The second is that the management firmly believes its innovation process cannot work without 
staff motivation. The company has few but well trained and above average paid software 
developers. As the result of such structured innovation process, it releases new version of MXit 
every eight to twelve months, and has developed many products over the last five years 
including, MXit Café and MXit Music.  
 
VI. Niche Market Growth 
One of the growth indicators of the company is that, in five years time since its inception, it has a 
registered user-base of about 12 million and over 230 million messages traffic per day on 
average worldwide. It has officially obtained licenses to operate in Malaysia, India, Indonesia, 
United Kingdom, United States, Nigeria, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
 
This case study seems to suggest that MXit has successfully met the five business model 
innovation determinants namely (a) RA of innovation for (b) a particularly low-end market, (c) 
continuous innovation, (d) overcoming constraints and (e) competitive barriers. The key research 
question is whether this innovation amounts to disruptive innovation from an incumbents’ 
perspective, to what extent the company’s market growth has disrupted the MNOs’ SMS 
revenue, and how should incumbents respond to this innovation.  
 
VII. Incumbents’ Response to Potentially Disruptive Innovation  
The interviews conducted with managers reveal that initially most managers perceived MXit to 
be highly disruptive and problematic to integrate the innovation into their existing business 
model.  This is because MXit users use massive data at a very low tariff for MNOs, which 
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creates a bottleneck on the incumbents’ network capacity, blocking and interfering with cellular 
voice and SMS traffic. Over time, as the market of MXit became clearer, the MNOs found that 
MXit was not disruptive. Instead, manager realized that it might create a new source of revenue. 
MXit users are using the network to send more messages more efficiently. Thus, the bigger the 
data, the more the revenue for incumbents. A top executive commented as follows:  
 
We have got first hand experience from more than one operator [MNOs] that is saying to us 
that it is not disruptive. The amount of revenue generated from [MXits] GPRS data for the 
MNOs is quite satisfactory. If I can just give you an example; in South Africa the operators 
here charge roughly about R2.00 a megabyte. What happens now is on MXit, because users 
can send pictures and voice clips and text, they start sending more and more pictures, they 
start forwarding video clips, MP3’s, all of those sort of things, and the Telco’s are charging 
R2.00 a megabyte. So they are making a substantial amount of money. 
 
Having realized that MXIt was not disruptive to their traditional revenue models, most MNOs 
incumbents responded by integrating the IMS without changing their business models. In 2007, 
two years later after MXit was launched, two of the countries largest MNOs launched their own 
version of instant mobile messenger called “Nok-Nok” and “the Grid” within their existing 
business models. 
 
5.3  Innovation 2 –VoIP Mobile 
Three computer science honours students at the University of Cape Town, who were not able to 
afford talking on their mobile phones, wondered why they couldn’t use VoIP on their cell phones 
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for free. In 2006, the students opened their start-up company called “Innovation 2”, at about the 
right time when GPRS and 3G technology was setting off in South Africa.  
 
The company launched its first mobile V-mobile product in February, 2007. The cellular voice 
calls market in South Africa is dominated by two large MNOs, Vodacom and MTN, with Cell-C 
as the medium player, and Virgin Mobile, a small virtual mobile operator (VMO). Innovation 2 
uses a fundamentally different business model compared to the traditional mobile industry. 
MNOs charge their subscribers per minute for cellular voice calls. Company 2 distributes its V-
mobile voice call services through voice over IT terminators (intermediaries) for a flat license fee 
for about R10 (USD$1.3) per subscriber per month. This case study explores the potential 
disruptiveness of VoIP-mobile (V-mobile) relative to the MNOs’ cellular voice calls revenue. 
 
I. The RA of Innovation  
The core product: V-mobile is a mobile extension to VoIP over a fixed-line telephone network, 
which is transmitted through the public Internet to mobile phones via existing GPRS/3G 
networks. The traditional cellular voice calls are transmitted via capital intensive GPRS/3G 
networks.  
 
Price advantage: Innovation 2 distributes its V-mobile through voice over IT terminators 
(intermediaries), for a flat license fee of about R10 per subscriber per month. Table 5.2 presents 
a price comparison between incumbents’ cellular voice calls and one of Innovation 2’s 
distributors in South Africa. For off-network local calls (V-mobile to other MNOs), the V-
mobile price is about 50% cheaper compared to traditional voice calls. For international calls, the 
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tariff is about 80% cheaper depending on destinations compared to fixed line international calls. 
The V-mobile terminator offers free on-network calls (V-mobile to V-mobile users). It charges a 
flat fee of R25 per month subscription. In addition, subscribers pay for the Internet data costs 
charged by MNOs. A mobile VoIP call may use about 250k per minute which costs between 
about 8 – 20cents.   
 
Table 5.2:  Price Comparison between MNOs and Innovation 2’s VoIP mobile19 
Call Type Contract Cellular 
Phone tariff* 
Pre-paid Cellular 
phone tariff 
 V-mobile tariff  
On-network calls  (e.g. MTN 
to MTN) 
R1.75 per minute 
Typical peak-rate cost 
R2.35 per minute 
R2.50 - R2.89 per 
minute        
Typical peak-rate 
cost R2.90 per 
minute 
 FREE for Innovation 2-
to-Innovation 2 calls. 
Subscribers pay R25 flat 
fee per month, plus 
Internet data costs 
Off-network calls (e.g. MTN 
to Vodacom) 
R2.35 per minute  R2.90 per minute R1.30 per minute   
Calls to Telkom lines  R1.75 per minute R2.90 per minute R0.59 per minute   
International calls Between R2.90 & R5 
per minute according 
to destination 
Prepaid cellular 
customers cannot 
make international 
calls 
Main destinations are 
between only R0.46 & 
R1.00 per minute 
* This is a typical price. But charges could vary depending on demand and capacity fluctuations and a particular 
MNO’s dynamic tariffing scheme.  
 
Ease of use: The V-mobile technology is simpler to use compared to GSM cellular calls. In the 
traditional GSM cellular voice services, a user has to follow a series of codes to perform a 
particular task. For example, a user needs to dial 121 to check voice mail or to dial *111# to 
check his/her balance. In the V-mobile application software, a user can simply select from a 
menu and simply click a button to perform a particular task.  
 
                                                 
19
 www.primetel.co.za/index.php. Retrieved on 4 November, 2008.  
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However, its price and technical convenience benefits are severely compromised by the 
technology’s incompatibility with the existing average cellular handsets and its limited area 
coverage. At present, V-mobile requires WiFi enabled Smartphones, and to some extent more 
expensive 3G enabled handsets, which are not affordable by the low-end market segment. It is 
accessible only within Wi-Fi access points or 3G covered metropolitan areas.  
 
Quality advantage: The greatest disadvantage of VoIP at present is its poor quality and limited 
functionality. A voice call over the Internet is carried through the public Internet that 
intermingles with many complex elements at varying levels in the Internet wireless where some 
packets can be lost or delayed in transmission. There is a significant voice interruption and voice 
quality degradation which makes it unreliable for important and urgent calls.  
 
Brand recognition: The country’s MNO’s brands are well-established. Typical to low-cost 
innovation, Innovation 2 does not spend money on marketing and branding. It focuses on 
developing the innovation while partnering with distributors who control their own brands and 
customer base. 
 
Technology newness: V-mobile is an incremental improvement to VoIP over fixed line. It does 
not constitute a radical change to users and incumbents.  
 
In view of the question whether V-mobile has the possibility to cannibalize cellular voice calls, it 
can be understood that the innovation has considerable price advantage. But this is significantly 
compromised by inferior quality and lower brand recognition. Based on the above five value 
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attributes, at present its cannibalization potential seems low. With its current limitations, the next 
section explores what type of market segment may adopt this innovation presently, and whether 
this target market draws incumbents’ attention.  
 
II.  Low-End Market Creation 
Cellular voice communication is a public utility that appeals to every person and business who 
can afford to make calls. MNOs serve virtually all markets including high-end corporate, middle 
and small enterprises and personal markets, with the denomination of airtime vouchers that range 
from R1000 for the top high-end to R5 for the lowest-end user.  
 
Although, the V-mobile “free” on network calls may attract the lowest end or previously un-
served market segment, that may not be attractive to incumbents revenue model. The 
technology’s incompatibility with low-end handsets and its restricted coverage may be major 
obstacles to create a low-margin – high-volume market foothold. The company presently targets 
medium and small businesses that can afford to own sophisticated handsets. As the founding 
director of the company says, V-mobile is nontheless offered as a part of a total fixed-mobile 
converged business communication solution: 
 
Right now Voice over IP is the big hype and that is what everyone talks about and that 
is what we do to get into the market, but it is a very, very small component of it. Our 
(Innovation 2’s) valued proposition is the ability to deliver services on a fixed and 
mobile platform.  
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The innovation is creating a very small niche market in the lower-end commercial market, 
targeting the small and medium enterprises. A crucial point to examine in the next chapter is, 
whether this innovation will be perceived, from the incumbents’ perspective, as disruptive to 
cellular voice calls and whether the market is likely to be attractive to incumbents. 
 
III. Cost and Continuous Innovation Factors  
Cost advantage: The GSM20 cellular voice network requires extensive capital investments to 
build GPRS/3G networks, towers and dedicated channels to transport data through circuit 
switching infrastructure. The rapidly changing technological landscape in the telecom industry 
means that MNOs have to invest in upgrading their network infrastructure from time to time.  
 
V-mobile technology can be transmitted via the public Internet using the mobile existing 
network infrastructure including the GPRS/3G network, fiber optic, as well as the fixed-line 
Public Switched Telephone Networks (PSTN) infrastructure. As any mobile Internet user, 
specialized V-mobile companies can pay MNOs for using the existing mobile network for data 
transmission. By using the established infrastructure, a small start-up V-mobile may not be 
deterred by the need of costly investments in GSM, cable wire or fiber-optic physical network 
infrastructures. Similar to MXit, Innovation 2’s only major capital expenditure is the cost of 
software development. This indicates that V-mobile has a massive cost advantage over the 
MNOs’ GSM cellular’s value chain. 
 
The lower cost advantage may be moderated by the mobile industry’s specific conditions and 
practices. The high CAPEX and OPEX costs, the perishable nature of service (cost always incur 
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whether or not people call), the wide fluctuation of demand that characterize the industry put 
pressure upon MNOs to use a dynamic pricing model to adjust prices to these variables.  
 
Consumer insight: Innovation 2 concentrates on creating and developing V-mobile. It licenses its 
innovation to established companies with major brands and distributions channels in order to get 
its product to market. Company 2 therefore also adopts a distributed model.  As one of its 
managers’ comments this model may limit the company from learning first-hand about its users. 
 
Yes (answering to the question whether the model limits the company to get first hand 
customer insight), that is definitely, because we are not directly in touch with the 
client base. That is a bigger problem. We would like to be conducting more usability 
tests with our clients or any sort of random people we decide to collect into a user 
group or focus group and that will get better in touch with the market.  So this far we 
have unfortunately not conducted enough usability testing or product and the like. 
 
Speed-to-market: The greatest benefit of a distributed model, as the CEO of the company, argues 
is its speed-to-market.  
 
It [the distributed model] is much better for us to work with a company that has 
resources, established distribution, user base and knowledgeable of a particular market. 
It is a shorter lead-time before you start making money, it is a lower investment on our 
part and it allows us to scale up (our innovation) globally. 
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IV.  The Constraint Factor  
Graduating from college with a viable business idea, the entrepreneurs faced serious challenges 
in raising capital to finance the development costs. Responding to the question how can 
innovators in South Africa access capital, one of the founders of Innovation 2 replied as follows: 
 
South Africa has got no capital markets whatsoever for start up. In America and the 
UK, yes, they have got support structures like that where literally you can walk out of 
varsity, go somewhere, where in three to six months they do something for you and 
then by which time you are ready for investment and you go on.  There is nothing like 
that in South Africa. 
 
One of the major reasons Innovation 2 adopted a distributed business model is to overcome the 
generic resources limitations including capital, brand recognition, customer base and distribution 
channels. One of South Africa’s largest voice over IP terminator acquired the majority ownership 
stake (51%), with the founders holding the remaining stake (49%). The core competencies of 
these two companies fit appropriately with each other in that, whereas Innovation 2 specializes 
on software development, the service provider has the IT capabilities to carry and terminate the 
V-mobile calls.  
 
The present major hurdles of V-mobile innovation are quality, compatibility, accessibility and 
affordability. Technically, the VoIP-mobile currently suffers from quality and functionality 
limitations. The innovation is not compatible with the low-end handsets that can be used by the 
mass market. It requires a high-end Smart phone devices equipped with Wi-Fi and Internet 
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capabilities. The current penetration of Smart phones globally is only 10% of the global mobile 
market share. At present only very few people in South Africa own such high-end latest handsets 
such as NEC N900iL, i-Mate, HTC, etc.. In an attempt to overcome this hurdle, Innovation 2 
uses a lighter version Java enabled device that can operate on most average handsets. However, 
this does not provide all the functionality and version that is suitable for Smart phones. On the 
Java enabled handsets, users make calls in slightly different ways. A user has first to call a 
central place that calls out destination. Thus, it basically connects two calls and this will increase 
the cost slightly higher relative to Internet calls via WiFi enabled Smart phones.  
 
Yet, the entry of VoIP-mobile, even with Wi-Fi enabled Smart phones, into the mass market 
entirely depends on the availability and access to broadband Internet. At present broadband 
Internet such as Wi-Fi, W-Max and iBurst have limited geographical coverage to cellular 
networks in South Africa.  
 
V.  Firm–Specific Strategic Capabilities  
To protect its innovation the company uses a copyright protection for its software. But since the 
V-mobile technology is entirely software based, and not a radical innovation originally invented 
by the company, it may be difficult to use this protection alone to prevent imitation by rivals, as 
one of the managers says: 
 
Our product is entirely software based. So we have not patented anything. We simply 
have a normal copyright protection.  In South Africa it is extremely difficult to patent 
software.  In the US you might be able to get a few things here or there, but from our 
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perspective, it is not worthwhile because it costs a lot of money and a smart developer 
can just find a small variation and then they can use a similar [technology], and they 
can have some something similar working.   
 
In terms of competitive environment, similar to MXit, Innovation 2 does not have a competitive 
strategic position per se. It’s strategy to capture and sustain value depends significantly on 
continuous innovation. 
 
Being its sole core competency is software development, and not having to worry about 
marketing and sales problems, the company sees itself as a center of innovation. The present 
challenge for the company is to address the compatibility and technical performance problems of 
V-mobile, rather than introducing new products, as one of the innovators says:  
 
It is not so much about coming up with new features because people are still getting 
used to the idea of Voice over IP software on the cell-phone. So we focus a lot on the 
innovations on making a more seamless, more enjoyable mobile experience. 
 
VI. Niche Market Growth 
V-mobile is at its early stage globally. Likewise in South Africa, it is apparent that the innovation 
has a long way to go. The current global market share of Smartphones that are compatible for V-
mobile is only about 10%.  Its economic benefit is again offset by functional wireless coverage 
limitations. Yet, this South African pioneering company is hopeful that the V-mobile is an 
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imminent disruptive to cellular voice calls, and having nothing to lose, it is poised to surf in the 
next waves of disruptive growth of the mobile industry.  
 
VII. Incumbents’ Response to Potentially Disruptive Innovation  
When we examine all traditional MNOs that are said to be affected by V-mobile in future, we 
find that only one agile MNO incumbent embraced the innovation. Other incumbents did not 
respond to the latent disruptive V-mobile in any organizational way. For example, the second 
largest MNO of the country introduced very strict clauses requiring its subscribers not to use its 
GPRS, GPRS+, EDGE or 3G networks for transmission of mobile VoIP.21 Some managers 
interviewed shared their concerns that some MNOs try to discourage use of V-mobile by 
increasing tariff when they detect it on their network. One manager commented as follows: 
 
Some operators increase this rate by ten fold, or throttle the traffic or introduce latencies, 
if they detect VoIP over their network. 
 
The leading traditional mobile incumbent that embraced the V-mobile innovation, it created a 
new division, as part of its large-scale move into the fixed-mobile convergence landscape, that 
comprises WiMAX22, Wi-Fi, NGN23 and V-mobile. One of the main reasons to introduce a 
separate business division was to prevent “risk of cannibalization” and “conflict” with its 
traditional cellular network voice revenue model. To achieve this, it used the Multi Protocol 
                                                 
21
 MTN Product Terms and Conditions. Retrieved on 3 November, 2008 from 
http://www.mtn.co.za/Support/Legal/TermsAndConditions/Pages/ExtendedData.aspx  

22
 Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access 
23
 Next Generation Networks is a general term used to describe some major architectural innovations in the 
telecommunications that will be utilized over the coming 5 – 10 years.  
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Label Switching (MPLS)24 IP network that can route over, and terminate the mobile VoIP voice 
calls. This eliminates the possibility of network congestion (conflict) with its traditional voice 
network. Additional insights emerging from the qualitative research is that, beyond the “degree 
of conflict”, another major reason for the MNO incumbent to launch a separate business unit 
appears the maturing of the cellular voice calls market in South Africa, as one senior manager 
explained: 
 
This is the innovation (fixed-mobile convergence) that’s going to take mobile operators 
forward. Because we are in a market that is certainly reaching saturation point in terms 
of mobile subscribers, mobile operators need to find new avenues of revenue and I guess 
the logical extension for a mobile operator is to expand its services horizontally into the 
ICT space.  So, what we have done is we’ve set up a separate business unit.  
 
5.4  Innovation 3 – Mobile Banking 
In March, 2005, Innovation 3 was launched as the first South African virtual branchless mobile 
bank (m-bank). Innovation 3 uses a “pay-as-you-go” business model in which it does not charge 
monthly fees, compared to the full-service banking model that charges monthly fees even if 
customers do not use the services. This case study examines the disruptive potential of pure 
mobile banking (m-banking) to traditional full-service branch-based banking model in the South 
African banking industry setting.  
 
                                                 
24
 Multi Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) is a data-carrying mechanism that belongs to the family of packet-
switched networks.
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I.  The RA of Innovation 
The core product: Innovation 3 is a low-cost, high-volume pure mobile banking model that offers 
two limited low-value transactional products; a P-SMS (cell-phone) and a debit card, with no 
minimum balance requirement. Its cell-phone services include payment and transfer money, 
purchase prepaid electricity and prepaid airtime for a mobile phone. Since the mobile phone 
cannot be used to withdraw cash on its own, the company issues its customers a debit card to 
withdraw cash from ATMs, deposit cash at specified branches, and pay for goods at point of sale 
(POS). 
 
At this early stage of the innovation, its relative advantage can only be compared with the 
lowest-end limited product offered by the South African traditional banks called Mzansi. In 
October 2004 the country’s four largest banks known as “Big Four” (ABSA, Standard Bank, 
First National Bank and Nedbank) and the Post Bank25 jointly launched the low-end Mzansi 
account as part of the FSC26 initiative. Mzansi’ banking fees are cheaper 35% to 60% compared 
to the traditional banks’ fees. It offers a debit card and no-fee banking as long as transactions are 
limited to debit card purchases, a single deposit, and a limited number of ATM withdrawals each 
month.  
 
Price/fees advantage: Table 5.3 shows that the comparison of fees among Innovation 3, Mzansi 
and the Big Four full-service branches. Innovation 3 uses a “pay-as-you-go” model in which it 
does not charge monthly fees (the table shows monthly summed figures). Its monthly fees (R36) 
appear 35% cheaper than the Big Four’s (R55) and 27% cheaper than Mzansi’s (R49). 
                                                 
25
 A state agency fully owned by the South African Post Office.   
26
 The Financial Sector Charter (FSC) was signed in October 2003 by the private finance sector to voluntarily extend 
the banking facilities to the under-banked and un-banked population. 
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According to FinMark Trust27, the minimum cost that poor people can afford to access a bank is 
2%. While Innovation 3 falls within this range (2.1%), the Big Four and Mzansi’s annual 
banking cost as percentage of annual income are above the threshold (Mitchell and Heil, 
2006a: 9). 
 
Table 5.3:  Comparison of Innovation M-Banking Relative to Mzansi and the Big Four 
Same transactions fees Innovation 3 Big Four Mzansi 
 Rand USD Rand USD Rand USD 
Bank fess per month (total transactions fees) 36 5 55 7 49 6 
Airtime fees per month 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Transport to bank per month 7 1 11 1 11 1 
Total monthly cost 45 6 66 9 60 8 
Annualized cost 537 70 790 103 718 94 
Annual cost as days of time 7.5  11  10  
Annual cost as % of annual income 2.1%  3.1%  2.8%  
Source: Ivatury and Mark, (2006: 3). 
 
Ease of use: Mzansi account does not offer cell-phone banking. Innovation 3 uses the cell-phone 
as the primary channel, with no physical presence. In theory, this saves transport time and costs. 
Its disadvantage is that its low-end target segment cannot be signed up and reached using a cell-
phone alone. Since the company does not own ATMs and branches, customers incur additional 
monetary and non-monetary (transport) costs to withdraw or deposit cash from third party banks.  
 
In an effort to address this problem, the company recruits young agents from its low-end market, 
the previously disadvantaged community to sell mobile banking face-to-face. Innovation 3 
charges a customer R39.99 to open an account in which R19.99 goes to the agent as a 
commission. In addition, support services are provided by an in-house call-center located in the 
                                                 
27
 FiMark Trust is an NGO whose objective is to take banking to the poor.  
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Innovation 3 office. The call-center communicates in 11 South African languages for 18 hours a 
day.  
 
Quality and brand recognition advantages: As a branchless virtual bank, Innovation 3 services 
are very limited compared to face-to-face services of Mzansi, which is offered within the full-
services branch model and under the well-established brands of the Big Four. As a low-budget 
independent, standalone star-up, it lacks capital to spend on marketing and branding. 
 
Technology newness: M-banking is an extension to online banking that has already been 
integrated easily by banks within the full-service branch based model.  
 
When we compare the pure m-banking innovation with Mzansi on the five attributes, it has 
relatively higher price advantage, but lower ease-of-use, quality, brand recognition benefits. 
This suggests that its cannibalization potential is significantly low.  
 
II.  Low-End Market Creation 
Traditional banks mainly compete in the established high-end and middle markets that are 
characterized by predictable revenue and low risk. Innovation 3 mainly targets the low-end 
“under-banked” and “un-banked” segments. “Under-banked” is a person who has a bank account 
but not fully integrated into the mainstream banking system, and who is still dependent on non-
bank services. The “un-banked” refers to a person who does not have access to basic banking 
 172 
services. According to Finmark Trust, about 16 million South Africans are un-banked and under-
banked that fall below the category of 5 LSM28 (Finscope, 2003). 
 
Some bank managers believe that the Big Four banks do not generate profit from the low-end 
Mzansi account. As part of the FSC initiative, they argue that banks subsidize the account mainly 
due to their corporate responsibilities in order to extend banking access to the poor. Other 
managers argue that there is an increasing awareness at present that the activity and size of the 
informal economy have long been underestimated by the formal economy. With technology 
advancement, banks can capitalize on their economies of scale to make money by introducing 
low-margin and high-volume business models. With these two opposite views in mind, the next 
chapter will systematically examine managers’ views whether this market segment creates 
asymmetric or symmetric motivation between the innovating firm and incumbents.  
 
III.  Cost and Continuous Innovation Factors  
Cost advantage: Similar to the mobile industry, the traditional banking cost structure is 
characterized by high CAPEX and OPEX components. Banks recover costs and create value 
through both economies of scope and economies of scale. The economies of scope advantage 
come from product bundling and cross-selling. The vertical integration of the value chain 
coupled with the application of IT platform enable banks to control their costs and achieve 
economies of scale, that also permits low-margin – high-volume business at the low-end of the 
market (such as Mzansi).   
                                                 
28
 The Living Standard Measure (LSM) is applied to categorize the population according to income and asset levels, 
based on household assets including, land, dwelling, productive assets and durables. It categorizes customers into to 
groups, with LSM 10 representing the most asset rich and 1 signifying the most asset poor people in the society. 

 173 
 
Compared with traditional banking value chain, as a virtual banking operator Innovation 3’s 
value chain is much shorter and cheaper that operates with very few people. Innovation 3’s 
pure m-banking model blends the banking and cellular mobile network capabilities. To access 
these capabilities from both ends, Innovation 3 adopts a distributed model. For banking 
capabilities, it outsources the back-end activities to the Bank of Athens, in return for a 
management fee. For mobile capabilities, it uses Vodacom mobile network as a virtual 
distribution channel to reach customers, which is supported by in-house call center. Its m-
banking software runs on a USSD29 and WAP30 technologies platforms that processes virtual 
transaction on any cell-phone via any network.  
 
Table 5.4: Banking and MNO Core Capabilities 
Banking MNO 
• Banking license 
• Banking technology 
• Payments skills 
• Payment interoperability – local and 
international 
• Physical and virtual channels   
• SIM and handsets 
• Distribution  
• GSM network access 
• GSM interoperability  
 
 
Although USSD is similar to SMS in terms of technical and functional features, it is an 
interactive system with continuous online session that informs customers about their 
transaction immediately when it is executed. The Innovation 3 mobile transaction 
processing systems are certified by MasterCard, a global financial organization. The USSD 
technology can be scaled up to operate high volume limited transactions with efficiency 
(Mitchell and Heil, 2006a: 9; Wright, 2005: 2). 
                                                 
29
 Unstructured Supplementary Service Data (USSD) is a GSM supported technology for real-time or instant 
messaging mobile phone services, which is generally quicker and cheaper than the short message services (SMS). 
30Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) is an open international standard for application layer network 
communications which connects a mobile phone to the Internet.  
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Theoretically Figure 5.1 can be used to analyze the disruptive potential of m-banking to 
incumbents’ full-service business model. Figure 5.1 shows that for a traditional banking model, 
the high-value physical and virtual channels are credit cards, POS31, cheques, Swift32 and EFT33. 
The low-value physical and virtual accesses include cash (branch), ATM, money transfer, M-
Wallet34, and Internet payments. The arrows in Figure 5.1 indicates that USSD technology has a 
probably potential to disrupt the physical low and high value channels.  
 
Figure 5.1: The M-Banking (USSD) Disruptiveness Potential to Full-Service Model 
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According to Wright (2005) and (Deloitte. 2004), partly because of the high CAPEX and OPEX 
cost structure and partly because of the cosy-oligopoly industry structure, the South African 
banking fees are among the highest in the world – in some levels 14 times higher compared to 
                                                 
31
 Point of Sale 
32
 The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication manages worldwide financial messaging 
network that enables a secure and reliable exchange between banks. 
33
 Electronic Funds Transfer, a computer-based financial transaction.  
34
 M-Wallet is an electronic wallet used to store a person’s confidential details such as bank accounts, credit card, 
insurance policies, memberships, passwords, etc… 
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the United States fees. Some of the major transaction revenues for banks are third party bank 
charges that are called “interchange fee” and “carriage fee”. 
 
If a customer conducts the transaction electronically via the cell-phone, the third party costs can 
be eliminated. In the USSD technology, operating a single transaction costs only 60c per minute 
on any mobile networks, which is much lower to what banks currently charge.  
 
In theory, this may suggest that the m-banking has the possibility to cannibalize both the high-
value and low-value transactions, eliminating the charges of a branch, ATM, POS, credit cards 
and cheques. In reality, however, perhaps due to lack of physical banking infrastructure the m-
banking model has increasingly gone from purely virtual to physical face-to-face services. As 
one bank manager commented a banking sales force needs to be well trained and FICA35 
certified which would add extra costs:  
 
To be a FICA agent you have to have a minimum of a Matric [high school degree].  
You have to have a certain minimum of qualifications, and one of them is that you 
have to have a bank account. So what you end up with is a costly sales force.  
 
Consumer insight and speed-to-market: In its distributed model, Innovation 3 is located at the 
front end of the value chain where it interacts directly with the customer. This has helped the 
company to improve its internal processes and systems considerably. For example, when the 
company discovered that some of its customers are well-educated about the m-banking product, 
it employed some qualified people at its call center to deal mainly with this segment.  
                                                 
35
 One of the South African banking regulations, Financial Intelligence Center Act. 
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The company relies on its call center and face-to-face consultation with customers for consumer 
insight and sales. For a low-cost model, these mediums may be costly. According to one 
manager interviewed, the company does not provide free call access to customers who may 
provide some insight. It costs about R20 per minute for the company to answer calls from a 
customer. Another manager doubts that the amount of commission given to a sales 
agent/consultant can hardly motivate them to be creative in acquiring more customers:  
 
An agent is only making ten bucks an account.  With all due respect, how much does a 
local bread cost right now? You know, like the bread cost; a pint, a liter of milk cost, 
R17 for a little of milk. So you are telling me that for every account they are only 
going to get half a little of milk. Then they are actually not making enough money as 
individuals to be viable individuals.  
 
In examining the relative advantage of Innovation 3’s value chain relative to traditional banking 
model, we observe that it capitalizes on technological changes to gain substantial cost advantage. 
However, given the South African informal economy conditions and infrastructure it faces stiff 
challenges to overcome distribution and innovation constraints.  
 
IV.  The Constraint Factor  
Innovation 3 faced critical challenges to enter into the banking industry and to raise capital. The 
South African banking industry historically maintains a cosy-oligopoly structure with high entry 
barriers where few large banks dominate the financial market. Banking license costs R250 
million (Mitchell and Heil, 2006b:1). To overcome this barrier, it used the Bank of Athens 
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license in South Africa to operate as a virtual bank. After its new business model started to show 
some progress, one of the country’s trade unions acquired 30% share of the company.  
 
V.  Firm-Specific Strategic Capabilities 
Innovation 3’s m-banking capabilities USSD and WAP technologies cannot be considered as 
firm-specific specialized capabilities for value capture and long-term sustainability, since 
these technologies are accessible for competitors. The company seems to rely on a focused 
low-cost strategy to create value from its low-margin – high-volume business model.  
 
VI. Niche Market Growth 
Innovation 3 (m-banking) showed some growth in a very small, low-end price-sensitive niche 
market, reaching about 300,000 total customers by the end of 2008. This number is a far lower 
volume for a low-margin and very high volume business model. Managers of these companies 
expressed concern that the low level of transactions and the large number of dormant accounts 
have somehow delayed the potential growth of m-banking as a standalone business model in the 
country.  
 
Innovation 3 faces a typical challenge of a low-end Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP) innovation in 
developing economies. The lack of accessibility (lack of banking infrastructure in rural and 
townships areas) and lack of affordability (low-level of income, low-education and 
unemployment) are key challenges for the m-banking innovation in South Africa. As quoted 
by Wright (2005:1), its founding director is hopeful that the innovation will succeed; “We 
think we can achieve what everyone says in unachievable: a profitable transactional bank at 
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the low-end of the market.” In the following chapter, we will examine if this innovation poses 
any threat to incumbents’ established source of revenue and how they adapt their business 
models.  
 
VII. Incumbents’ Response to Potentially Disruptive Innovation  
All South African traditional banks integrated the m-banking without changing their existing 
business models. This practice appears in line with their previous experience on online banking, 
which they had easily integrated that otherwise have been disruptive to airlines and insurance 
companies (Enders et. al., 2006). One of the major reasons is that banks can easily integrate 
direct models is that they do not face significant degree of conflicts between the innovations and 
their business models, simply because they own their distribution channels. One insurance 
manager explains why this is the case:  
 
I think banks own their channels. So it was quite the rational decision to go direct, it is a 
cheaper and more efficient touch point than branches. So going direct makes more sense for 
a traditional bank. The problem is that if you look at the traditional insurance model, we 
don’t own that channel. Those people are our business partners. So you stand the risk of 
damaging to your partnerships. And I think that has slowed the process down significantly.  
 
Nevertheless, in 2005 one of the Big Four leading traditional banks has introduced a separate 
stand-alone pure virtual m-banking company in a 50-50 joint venture with one of the country 
leading MNOs, in addition to integrating the mobile banking within its full-service banking 
model. There are three possible explanations why this bank did so. 
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The first possible reason is to prevent an uncertain or probable future disruption coming from the 
mobile industry into banking. As the cellular voice market is reaching its maturity, MNOs could 
embark on the cell-phone banking by offering it as a value added service in order to retain their 
existing subscribers. As one manager puts it: 
 
You see, they [The MNO company] were going to launch it any way. So they wanted 
to do it, we wanted to do it.  By doing it together we minimize our risk jointly.  If we 
did it ourselves we would have turned them into an enemy. The idea was a bank and a 
mobile company to get together in a 50-50 joint venture, focusing initially at a 
transactional banking. The prepaid SIM card is distributed through the MNO channels in 
the normal course of events. So the SIM is both an airtime and a banking capability.  
 
The second reason is to meet the corporate citizen obligation in compliance with the Financial 
Sector Charter to extend banking access to the poor. The third possible reason was to generate 
revenue from the previously untapped un-banked and under-banked low-end market.  
 
While the incumbent bank launched the m-banking model officially in a separate organizational 
structure via a spinoff company in partnership with the traditional MNO, a qualitative 
investigation suggests this partnership model has three possible problems. The first is that the 
model is built on two seemingly conflicting interests and objectives. Unlike the MNOs that 
launched the V-mobile, there seems luck of a unified top management commitment to bring 
these interests together. The MNO company saw the m-banking as a means to retain its customer 
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base and to cut intermediaries. Its cellular subscribers can use their cell-phone bank account to 
top up their airtime directly. The bank saw it as filling its corporate citizenry obligation by 
extending access to the poor, and perhaps as a means to prevent potential future disruption 
coming from MNOs. One manager said: 
 
The MNO guys core business is to sell airtime, not banking. The bank guys see us as a 
threat to their core business. These corporate antibodies are a big, big issue. The 
most important thing is you have to have champions at very senior executive levels 
from both companies, who can say (to corporate antibodies) ‘if you do this again I 
will fire you.  
 
A greater influence comes from the MNO company since the m-banking head office sits in its 
innovation center building. The second is that the virtual m-banking is, on one hand, 
organizationally separated, on the other hand, it relies heavily on the traditional bank branches 
for distribution. As organizationally separate company, without having its own distribution 
channel, this appears to be problematic, as one manager said:  
If you send the m-banking customer to collect a card from a branch, they say they are 
not there to sell cards (for the m-banking spin-off), they are there to sell accounts of 
their own. So the people at the junior level have got to appreciate the strategic 
collaboration. 
 
The third factor concerns with the very question of financial viability of the pure virtual mobile 
banking model itself in developing countries. In Chapter 5 it was uncovered that the m-banking 
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has gone increasingly from purely virtual to low-end physical banking, relying more on physical 
branches and face-to-face sales, thus adding extra costs to its original pure low-cost virtual 
network structure. One senior bank manager questions the feasibility of the model as follows:  
 
I do not think it was foreseen by the virtual m-banking guys that the costs to acquire a 
bank customer relative to the costs to acquire a (cellular) network customer is quite 
high, simply because fundamentally banks cannot just acquire customers by phone, 
but they have to sell face-to-face, one-on-one.   
 
The total customer base of all m-banking companies is about 700,000. This number is a far lower 
volume for a low-margin and very high volume business model. Bank managers expressed 
concern that the low level of transactions and the large number of dormant accounts have 
detained the potential growth of m-banking as a stand-alone business model in the country.  
 
5.5  Innovation 4: Direct Insurance Model 
In 1998, one of South Africa’s largest financial conglomerates launched a direct short-term 
insurance model called “Innovation 4”. This case study examines the disruptive potential of 
Innovation 4’s direct model relative to the traditional full-service broker’s model in the short 
term insurance industry in South Africa.  
 
I.  The RA of Innovation 
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The core product: As indicated in Table 5.5 below, in comparison to multiple insurance products 
offered by the broker’s model, the direct model offers limited products such as vehicle and 
household insurances.  
 
Table 5.5:  Comparison of Value Propositions between the Direct and Broker’s Models 
Value propositions  Broker’s model Direct model 
 
Core product Multiproduct 
• Business products 
• Consumer/personal  
Limited products  
• Vehicle insurance 
• Household insurance  
Price: premium is determined 
based on risk factors 
Generally higher: Includes 
insurer’s premium plus broker’s 
commission   
Generally lower: no broker’s 
commission 
Ease of use Intermediation, complicated and 
longer processes 
Direct, simpler, quicker and 
efficient  
Quality • Face-to-face consultation 
• Good risk assessment  
• Selection is purely based on 
price 
• Speedy service  
Brand recognition High brand loyalty and trust  • Low brand recognition 
• Benefits from low-cost to 
build brand  
Target market • High-end commercial market 
• Upper and middle LSM 
personal markets  
• Upper/middle FSM36 
 
Price advantage: The premium offered to an insurance customer is usually customized along the 
lines of individual risk factors including age, marital status, residential address, and model of a 
vehicle. In general, the price of direct short term business model is cheaper relative to the 
broker’s model primarily because it cuts broker’s commission.37  
 
Ease of use: The greatest advantage of the direct online model is that supplier selection and 
evaluation process is simpler, quicker and cheaper compared to the broker’s model.  
                                                 
36
 Financial Sophistication Measure (FSM) measures individuals, among others, their financial knowledge and 
control, financial discipline, and connectedness and optimism (quality of life and future outlook), and by their 
abilities to access formal institutions in terms of distance and time (eg., access to Internet). FSM 8 signifies most 
sophisticated and FSM 1 refers to the least financial sophisticated consumer. 
37As per actual quotation obtained on 8th January, 2008, a monthly premium for a comprehensive insurance cover for 
2008 Toyota Corolla 1.4 Professional owned by a 40 years old male, married and living in a secure middle-class 
Johannesburg neighborhood is R800 from Innovation 4 compared to R1070 from a broker. 
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Quality advantage: The direct model is efficiency driven where quality is somewhat 
compromised. In the broker’s model quality may be derived from a number of elements 
including a broker’s full knowledge of underwriting risk and actuarial rating, face-to-face 
consultation, brand equity, ambience of offices, and the largeness and charm of a company’s 
building. Many of these are lacking in the low-cost direct model. From a client perspective, 
selection of a supplier is primarily based on price. 
 
However, an Innovation 4 manager contends that their direct model’s has good risk assessment 
capabilities and quality service: 
 
We are talking to the consumer directly. So we ask the right questions, so we would like to 
think that we are slightly more scientific. Because we speak to the consumer first hand, we 
probe for a lot more information than the broker, who is not going to ask for the same kind 
of information, because you must understand that his commission is at stake here. Its not 
him paying the claims, its actually the parent company paying the claim. In terms of quality, 
we are definitely not a low cost operator. We are a low-cost operative from an operation 
efficiency point of view, but we certainly are not giving a customer bare bone service. 
 
To add value to its insurance services, Innovation 4 pioneered the concept “Outbonus,” that 
offers customers a payback bonus if they don’t claim within a certain period of time.  
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Brand recognition: The greatest disadvantage of the direct model is the Internet’s lack of 
visibility in the physical world. Innovation 4 managers believe that they need to spend 
considerably on marketing and branding for two reasons. First, while traditional insurers rely on 
brokers to acquire and retain customers, the direct player must advertise extensively to acquire 
customers. Second, because of intensive competition among the direct players in the South 
African market, Innovation 4 seeks to differentiate itself by redirecting its cost saving gained 
from disintermediation into building its brand.  
 
Technology newness: a direct model is an Internet business model innovation, with nothing new 
for incumbents about the application of Internet as a distribution channel.  
 
When the RA of innovation of the direct short-term insurance model is compared with the 
broker’s model based on the five features, it appears significantly higher in price and ease-of-use 
benefits and moderately lower in quality and brand recognition. This may suggest that it has a 
moderate degree of cannibalization effect.   
 
II.  Low-End Market Creation 
Traditional insurance incumbents primarily target the profitable commercial market (business to 
business). In addition, they generate substantial revenue from the higher and middle personal 
markets (above 6 LSM). 
 
The direct-hybrid model does not necessarily target customers below the category of 5 LSM, for 
instance, such as that of the mobile banking. Nevertheless, the need of familiarity with SST (self-
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service technology) and with the insurance concept may suggest that not all above 5 LSM 
household can be an ideal target of direct models. About 55% of the South African population is 
generally categorized as financially unsophisticated in terms of knowledge and access38. 
According to interviews conducted with insurance managers, about 1/3 of vehicle owners in the 
country are not insured. 
 
The appropriate way to identify the target market of the direct insurance model is by using the 
FSM model. The short-term direct-hybrid model, in principle, targets the personal market 
comprising middle class, young professionals who are fairly sophisticated in term of knowledge 
of finance and use of self service technology (SST) (FSM 6 & 7). After the transformation of the 
economy in 1994, the number of people who own a vehicle dramatically increased. With access 
to education and the global spread of the Internet and Information Technology (IT), many people 
have become knowledgeable about insurance products, thus no longer requiring the professional 
intervention of intermediaries. In the next chapter, it would be interesting to explore incumbents 
managers views whether this market segment would be attractive to large established insurance 
corporations.  
III.  Cost and Continuous Innovation Factors 
The traditional insurance model sources of revenue are economies of scale and scope. Economies 
of scale advantage stem from both supply and demand sides. As shown in Figure, 5.2 the supply-
side scale efficiency comes from massive corporate financial power and massive capabilities in 
underwriting, administration and marketing.   On the demand side, the quasi-oligopoly market 
structure where few companies dominate the insurance market with massive customer base 
enables the carrier (insurer) to spread the insurance business risk. This can be achieved by 
                                                 
38
 FinScope (2006).  
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imposing strict and standard clauses in policies and enforcing implementation of risk prevention 
mechanisms. 
 
Economies of scope are generated from product bundling and cross-selling. There is often a 
trade-off between scale and scope as a result of higher brokers fees, who are mainly small and 
geographically scattered. In addition, there is relatively higher inefficiency resulting from 
channel conflicts as a result of diverse business units within a corporation competing for the time 
and resources of the same broker. Thus, economies of scale and scope are rarely translated into 
lower premium to customers. 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that a risk policy originates from customer acquisition. Value flows from a 
customer through the broker to the risk carrier in terms of monthly premium collection. On the 
opposite side, value flows to the customer through the broker from the carrier in terms of claims 
payments, customer services, branding and trust that together comprise the value proposition. 
Figure 5.2 shows that although the direct player (Figure B) performs similar activities in the 
upstream value chain, they use the Internet and call centers, displacing brokers, to reach the 
customer directly. When the value chain is deconstructed form model A to model B, the value to 
the direct player and the customer can be greater. From a customer value proposition point of 
view, a customer may care less as to who provides the service as long as the service is efficient 
and there is one contact place.  
 
Figure 5.2: The Comparison between Traditional Insurance and Direct Value Chains 
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The direct-insurance market is highly competitive in which a lower cost advantage alone cannot 
create a sustainable competitive advantage. Innovation 4 pioneered the concept of “Outbonus,” 
the first innovation in the South Africa that offers clients financial rewards for not claiming for a 
period of three years. Although the company does not have a defined innovation process, the 
management puts high emphasis on innovation. It believes in employees satisfaction. It has 
created conducive organizational environment for innovation, such as open door policies, in an 
effort to encourage its staff to share ideas openly. Innovation 4’s key emphasis of innovation is 
on marketing and branding, always looking for creative ways to draw customers to visit its 
website or call its call center.  
 
This implies that the direct player model’s value chain has better advantages in cost, consumer 
insight and speed-to-market factors compared to the broker’s model. On the distribution side, the 
direct model’s electronic channel and a large call center base can be more scalable than the small 
and geographically scatted brokers. 
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IV.  The Constraint Factor 
Being a supported model (launched by a major finance corporation), Innovation 4 obtains similar 
supply-side scale capabilities. It was launched in a stand alone company with different identity, 
brand, organizational culture and management with full managerial freedom to run the company.  
 
V.  Firm-Specific Strategic Capabilities  
As of end of 2008, there are about 80 long-term and 109 short-term registered insurers in South 
Africa. Today, five pure direct companies including, Auto & General, Dial Direct, Budget, 1st 
for Women, MiWay and Innovation 4 compete intensely in the direct short-term insurance39. 
Auto & General Insurance Company Ltd. was the first to introduce the direct model in the 
country in 1985. In the past two decades, while a number of entrants have advanced the direct 
model, many believe that it was the late entrant, Innovation 4’s latest innovation of the Outbonus 
concept that marked a “tipping point” for the potentially disruptive direct short term business 
model in the South African insurance industry.   
 
In such intensively competitive environment and given the generic nature of direct insurance 
business model, the key challenge for a direct player is differentiation. In such effort, Innovation 
4 spends heavily on marketing to build a strong brand, around its popular “Outbonus” 
proposition.   
 
VI.  Niche Market Growth 
                                                 
39
 Financial Service Board Annual Report 2008. Retrieved on 17 Feburary, 2009 from: 
ftp://ftp.fsb.co.za/public/documents/AReport2008.pdf 
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In South Africa, the direct insurance short-term has grown rapidly achieving 25% market share 
in the last ten years. Currently, Innovation 4 is the leader of the direct insurance market with a 
12% market share. Coming from “no-where” into the insurance industry, the company has 
achieved a total asset of R2.6 billion with a solvency of 42% as of 30 June, 2007. Having proven 
successful its business model in South Africa, the company (Innovation 4) is going global40.  
 
VII. Incumbents’ Response to Potentially Disruptive Innovation  
One of the leading traditional leaders of the insurance industry responded only when the 
disruptive innovation affected its market. It responded in 2008, 10 years later after the 
introduction of the disruptive short-term direct model insurance by the case pioneering company. 
The main reason for the long delay in responding was, among others, the disparity between 
innovation and the traditional models. The “disparity” in the insurance case can be inferred to the 
difference between direct and broker’s based model. One senior manager explains:   
 
We had the largest market share in the short-term market until the direct insurance model 
hit us. On the one hand, we said that maybe you should not do anything about it. On the 
other hand, you want to prevent it. When you start to do something about it, you have 
exceptional broker reaction to it. I mean your large brokers threaten to leave, they threaten 
to take away all their books, they look to you as a supplier as someone who should support 
them in their value proposition going out there saying, direct is not the way to go, this is the 
value of the broker and we should all be broker-driven. Because our brokers are so 
important to us and they have made us the successful company that we are today, we've 
                                                 
40
 Innovation 4 Annual Report (2007). 
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operated in this way for the past 90 years, so we have continued operating through a broker 
channel.  
 
Pointing to the “entrepreneurial dilemma”, probably arising due the disparity and conflict factors, 
another insurance executive said: 
 
We have always worked through brokers. In the beginning everyone was saying it wouldn’t 
work and it wouldn’t go anywhere. There was a bit of denial and a bit of “let’s watch and 
see”. We looked at international things and thought that the South African domestic market 
was thin and wasn’t evolved as Europe and America to accept a direct model. So there was 
still an element of denial in it. 
 
Considering the conflicts the company faced to integrate the disruptive innovation, the company 
introduced a separate company in 2008. A senior manager explains the degree of conflict faced 
by one incumbent company as the major reason for introducing a second business model in a 
separate organizational structure: 
 
Should I change my business model? And then what impact did it really have on the 
traditional model, because I am still strong on the existing markets? And then there is new 
market that you never thought was a market of insurance, then all of a sudden it is a market 
of insurance. Can we take our premium business model and run it successfully in that 
market?  So the way we make money, the way we price, the way our systems work etcetera, 
can we really introduce that in the new market? If you see our (brokers based) business 
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model, it is very difficult being the lowest cost supplier, and at the same time a value adding, 
or a premium supplier in one business model. You can't, I don’t know, I haven’t seen it in 
any other industry. 
 
5.6  Innovation 5: Direct Airlines Model  
In August, 2001 Comair introduced the first Low Cost Carrier (LCC) called Innovation 5. 
Established in 1932, for almost a century, the state owned South African Airways (SAA) was a 
monopoly in the country’s civil aviation industry. In 1996, Comair, which had been operating in 
the domestic air travel since 1946, acquired a franchisee license to operate British Airways 
business in South Africa, thus becoming a major rival to SAA in the domestic market. SAA and 
BA are known as a full-service model or premium model. In this study, these models are 
alternatively referred to as a network carrier or a legacy carrier.  
 
In February, 2004, a second LCC, 1Time was launched by independent entrepreneurs. In 
September, 2006, the South African Airways (SAA) responded by launching the third LCC 
called Mango (with 51% majority share holding). Originally, the first LCC business model in the 
world was introduced by Southwest Airlines in 1971 in the USA (see Anon 2006; Francies, 
Humphreys & Aicken, 2005; Alamdari and Fagan, 2005). This case study provides bases for 
examining the disruptive potential of Innovation 5’s LCC relative to the leading incumbent, 
SAA’s premium model. 
 
I.  The RA of Innovation 
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The core product: The traditional full-service model value attributes comprise multiple service 
tiers (first class, business and economy), advanced ticketing procedures, multiple aircraft types, 
pre-arranged bookings, free meals, marketing and branding, interline agreements, international 
routes, connecting flights, use of the Global Distribution System (GDS), and code-share 
agreements. In comparison, the generic LCC model is configured to offer cheaper fares, direct 
booking, no free meals or drinks on board, non-allocated seating, higher density standard seats, 
and no loyalty programs (see Table 5.6).  
 
Table 5.6: Comparison of LCC and Full-Service Value Propositions 
LCC Full-service 
Cheaper fares Premium fares 
Direct booking  Intermediary agent 
No free meals or drinks on board Meals and drinks are included in the fare 
Non-allocated seating Allocated seating   
Higher density standard seats Business and economy classes 
No loyalty programs  Loyalty programs  
 
The investigation of LLC in South Africa reveals that its introduction does not only entail 
possible disruption to network carriers, but also probably to the long haul bus industry. The 
following analysis thus includes the bus industry.  
 
Price advantage: Before the introduction of LCC in South Africa, SAA virtually dominated the 
domestic market. It charged about R3,000 in economy class between Johannesburg and Cape 
Town. Innovation 5 introduced its hybrid LCC with a cheaper price in the range of R400-R1000 
for one way in the same route. In late 2006, Mango brought the fare down, offering its lowest 
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R200 and its maximum fare R100041. As shown in Table 5.7, when we compare the September 
2008 – January, 2009 fares, the premium fares (SAA and BA) are higher, on average, about 40% 
than all LCCs (Innovation 5, Mango and 1Time).  
 
The table indicates that the LCCs fares are, on average, higher compared to the bus fares (except 
to that of the premium bus Baz Bus). But on low peak season, the LCC fares can be competitive 
to bus fares. For example, in March 2009, Margo’s lowest fare was R485 for one-way 
Johannesburg to Cape Town.  
 
Table 5.7: Fares Comparison of Different Flights and Long-Haul Bus Companies42 
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10 Jan 
2009  928 1177 913 - 1207 1200 380 450 510 399 450 
29 Nov 
2008 810 1564 959¹ 899 976 1200 420 450 620 599 550 
18 Oct 
2008  876 1514 729 690 1536 1200 380 450 500 399 450 
 
Ease-of-use advantages: LCC uses the Internet as a primary distribution channel. Travelers are 
able to book directly bypassing agents by using their credit cards. 
 
                                                 
41
 Adams, Sheena, ( 2006).  
42
 Retrieved on 30 January, 2009 from http://www.southafrica.to/transport/Airlines/South-Africa-within/fli 
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Quality advantage: As a no-frills business model, the LCC quality proposition is generally 
perceived lower relative to the premium airlines.  To differentiate itself from other pure low-cost 
competitors, Innovation 5 offers some extra quality features, which adds a level of complexity 
and cost to the operating model. 
 
Brand recognition: Traditionally, brand recognition is a major component of premium carriers’ 
value propositions. Similar to Innovation 4, Innovation 5 redirects a substantial amount of its 
saving to marketing and branding. The philosophy behind this is that, as one senior manager 
commented, in absence of travel agents advertising is the only medium to get Innovation 5’s 
“product on the shelf” as well as to differentiate the company from other low-cost competitors.   
 
“Innovation 5” is very much a retail environment, so you need your product on the shelf in 
order for it to sell. BA on the other hand is very much wholesale based; we still get a large 
percentage of our business through the travel agents, so we focus our efforts on the travel 
agents. So when we talk about marketing, a lot of money has been spent on building the 
brand (Innovation 5) to differentiate from other LCCs.  
 
Technology newness: A direct model is an Internet business model innovation, with nothing new 
for airlines about the application of Internet as a distribution channel.  
 
When the RA of the innovation (Innovation 5) is compared with the full-service network model, 
it has substantial benefits in price and ease-of-use, but moderately lower in quality and brand 
recognition. The model can be identified as a hybrid, as one of its senior managers claims:  
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We lean towards a hybrid model, and the reason being is that its the way we have positioned 
Innovation 5 in the marketplace. We are of the belief that we positioned Innovation 5 
slightly more premium than our competitors. Our customer proposition and the customer 
experience is invariably quite well received, which is a nice benefit to have, because what 
you’ve got is the expectation of the customer who is usually down at the bottom when 
booking with a low cost carrier, yet provide them with this experience that they weren’t 
expecting, and you get really good feedback, and by word of mouth sells more tickets. 
 
II.  Low-End Market Creation 
The major source of revenue for the state-monopoly incumbent SAA is international travel. In 
addition, it had also dominated the domestic routes of few major cities for almost a century, 
which have later been major battle grounds for SAA and BA after the introduction of the latter 
into this country. For the full-service models, the market segments are generally classified as 
business to business and middle and high-end leisure markets. Innovation 5 created a niche 
market by targeting the price-sensitive leisure market. It tapped into this market simply because this 
segment was already educated about the concept of flying, possessed credit cards and had access to 
car transport to/from the airports. The lower fares allowed price sensitive previously “flown” 
passengers to fly more frequently. After the transformation of the economy in 1994 with more 
people having disposable income, the market also attracted some of the previously “un-flown” 
market, probably entailing a disruptive threat to bus operators. This market would ideally fit into the 
direct short term insurance model customer profile, who is fairly sophisticated in terms of the 
concept of flying and the use of self service technology (SST) and possesses credit cards (FSM 6 
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& 7). The following chapter will investigate whether Innovation 5’s target market motivates 
incumbents to respond.  
 
Table 5.8: Cost Advantage of LCC over Full-Service Operators 
LCC Full-service (legacy carrier) 
Direct distribution (no commission paid to agents) Use of intermediaries (commission paid to agents) 
No free meals or drinks on board Meals and drinks are included in the fare 
Non-allocated seating. Standard high-density seating Allocated seating. Services tiers: first class, business 
and economy classes 
Use of homogenous small air craft. Utilizing latest 
generation planes such as Boeing 737-800 that are 
more fuel efficient fleet and higher seat density43. 
Use of older and larger aircraft 
High capacity utilization. LCCs fill approximately 
80% capacity utilization out of maximum 150 seat 
capacity on average.  
53% utilization out of maximum150 seat capacity on 
average.  
High frequency flights. LCC can operate 12 to 15 
hours a day. 
Low frequency flights. Network carriers operate for 
an average of 8 hours a day. 
Point to point domestic flights  International and transit flight  
Quicker turn-around (shorter waiting times). Focus 
exclusively on passengers, not cargo. Passengers will 
need to pay for any excess baggage44 
Longer waiting times at major airports 
Low maintenance cost Higher maintenance costs 
 
III.  Cost and Continuous Innovation Factors  
Table 5.8 summarizes the comparison of cost efficiency between LCCs and legacy carriers. It 
shows that the LCCs low cost advantage results from the elimination of commissions paid to 
agents, costs of providing free meals and drinks on board and seat assignments.  
The LCC model uses high density latest aircrafts, higher frequency flights, point to point short 
haul services, quicker turn-around (shorter waiting periods in airports) and low maintenance 
costs. There are three factors that may moderate the LCC’s lower cost advantage. First, similar to 
                                                 
43
 According to one senior manager, being the latest mover of all three LCCs, Mango’s aircraft are almost 30% more 
fuel efficient than the traditional carriers older fleets in the skies. 
44
 Some LCCs offer sometime special fares to encourage passengers to fly with less weight of a luggage. One 
manager interviewed said that each kilogram that an aircraft travels lighter saves Mango about R40,000 a month in 
aviation gas costs. From 1 August 2008 to 31st August Mango Airlines offered a 10% discount voucher on their 
next Mango flight for passengers with less than fifteen kilograms of luggage. 

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the telecommunication industry, the airlines industry is characterized by high CAPEX and OPEX 
cost structure, perishable nature of service (cost always incur whether or not people fly) and wide 
fluctuation of demand and capacity. These cost drivers put pressure on incumbent airlines to use 
the revenue management model to lower prices to adjust demand in low demand seasons. 
 
Second, compared to developed countries, the South African LCCs do not have the benefit of 
low cost advantage emanating from using a secondary airport. Major airports are expensive for 
LCCs because they have regulated fees on passengers service, airport tax’s, landing, etc…which 
make them costly for LCCs. Innovation 5 is the only LCC to use Lanseria that is the only secondary 
airport in the country, located on the outskirts of Johannesburg. 
 
Third, the biggest cost of LCC which makes about 50% - 60% is fuel. Worldwide, the sharp 
increase of oil price during 2008 had put considerable pressure on airlines cost structure 
requiring them to find ways to cover costs. The network carriers have been cutting some of the 
value added options to save costs. Whilst the LCCs that started out as pure low-cost models, 
have been adding up other services in order to cover costs.  
 
The Innovation 5’s experience suggests that, when an input cost is highly variable, such as the oil 
price, an integrated hybrid model may have a relative benefit in absorbing costs. An integrated 
model refers to a system that manages conflicting new and old business models in one 
organizational structure (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004). Comair manages the two models in one 
organizational structure. It initiated a special organizational-wide program headed by senior 
managers to identify cost cutting opportunities across both models. By the end of 2008, the 
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company reported that its program, driven by creativity and commitments of its employees, 
resulted in R100 million cost savings.45 One of its manager argues that: 
 
Its been helpful having the Innovation 5 model within our organization structure. So the full-
service premium business has got these high costs and these high costs have been driven 
down on the Innovation 5 side. But Innovation 5 has benefited from the premium model, 
from its service offering around the customer proposition – the brand, and that’s fed into the 
Innovation 5 model. So we have benefited on both sides from understanding both models. 
 
IV. The Constraint Factor  
Similar to Innovation 4, Innovation 5 was introduced by an established corporation, Comair. The 
parent company manages the disparate models simultaneously in the existing organizational 
structure under one license and one management of Comair.  
 
V.  Firm-specific strategic capabilities 
In South Africa, competition among the LCCs on one hand, and between the LCCs and the 
premium models, on the other hand, is fierce for the thin domestic market. Apparently this 
competition has been a key driver for advancing the LCC model in South Africa. Presently there are 
three types of models in the South African passenger airlines industry as shown in Figure 5.3 
depicted by A, B and C.  
Figure 5.3: Three Types of Airlines Business Models 
                                                 
45
 Comair Ltd Annual Report 2008. 
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B. Hybrid – direct model 
C. Low-cost – distributed model 
Sourcing         Operation        Marketing Customer
Online distributionInput 
supplies
Input 
supplies
Sourcing        Operation        Marketing Customer
Distribution
Agents
Online distribution
Input 
supplies
Customer
Sourcing       Operation Mass retailers’distribution
Determinant factors
• Trust 
• Convenience/Accessibility 
• Exclusive agreement 
Cell-phone distribution
A. Legacy operators: Intermediation
 
At the backstage of the value chain, the core activities and processes of the three types of 
business models are somewhat similar. The management, crews and ground technicians perform 
similar activities in sourcing fuel, to fly, to ensure the safety of passengers and to manage the 
operations and liaise with regulators. The key differences between these three models are 
marketing and distribution channels.  
 
Figure A shows the typical legacy model with emphasis on marketing and using agents to reach 
the final customer (intermediation). Figure B shows the direct model of Innovation 5, in which 
marketing plays key role in the model. It uses the Internet as a primary distribution channel. For 
majority of South African previously “un-flown” customers, with no credit card and access to the 
Internet, the direct model is not accessible.  
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Figure C shows the distributed model introduced by Mango (re-intermediation). Mango uses a 
different kind of intermediaries (mass retail outlets and cell-phone banking) in addition to its 
online distribution channel, to reach the mass market enabling customers  to buy airfares at any 
of the country’s largest mass retailers (Checkers/Shoprite and Edcon stores), while doing daily 
shopping in retail stores. In addition, by entering into agreement with one of the Big Four banks, 
customers can buy tickets directly via their cell-phone accounts. Mango’s managers point out 
that for their distributed model there are three factors that are important for sustaining 
competitive advantage; trust, accessibility (convenience) and exclusive agreements. 
• Trust: Customers have an existing trusting relationship with large well-established 
retailers. In these times where online fraud is prevalent, even some customers with credit 
card and access to the Internet would trust the face-to-face channels rather than online 
transactions.  
• Accessibility (convenience): Customers can buy their air tickets while shopping around 
in malls. The physical retail outlets provide access to many people with no credit card 
and Internet access. 
• Exclusive agreement: The critical determinant of competitive advantage for the LCC 
partnering with a mass retailer is to have an exclusive agreement to exclude competitors 
from using the same channel.  
In view of this competition, an important question is how Innovation 5 should develop firm-
specific strategic capabilities. The problem of managing conflicting models in one organizational 
structure has always been regarded as the most difficult managerial challenge (O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2004; Porter, 1996).  
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Comair management addressed this problem by taking a number of strategic decisions: a) phased 
integration strategy, b) setting the boundaries of two separate strategic markets, c) setting 
imperative for collaboration and e) having a two CEOs managing the two models jointly.    
 
a) Phased integration strategy: Initially, the company followed a separation strategy. Innovation 
5 was created as a pure low-cost model in a completely separate structure for some years until it 
was proven commercially successful. Gradually the management looked for ways to integrate the 
two models in the back-end upstream value chain where it made sense (Markides and Charitou, 
2004). 
 
b) Setting the boundaries of two separate strategic markets: Innovation 5 primarily focuses on the 
low-end SMME (small and medium enterprises) and price sensitive leisure markets. BA mainly 
targets the high-end corporate clients and high-end leisure travelers connected via the British 
Airways international networks. The two models have separate brands, crew cabin, marketing 
and the distribution channels. While British Airways use the services of agents, Innovation 5 
entirely depends on online channels and a call center. Given the different cyclical variation of 
demands between the business and leisure seasons, having two models in one organization 
protects the company against demand downturns in one market, and thus ensuring continuity of 
revenue streams.  
 
c) Setting imperative for collaboration: As Innovation 5 moves from low-cost to hybrid, 
resembling more like BA, it has recruited top salaried marketing managers and staff to build its 
brand. Likewise BA marketing department strive for resources and top management attention to 
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continue to excel in the high-end market. Comair management understood that the key for 
prevention infighting and conflicts in a simultaneous integration and separation strategy is setting 
imperatives and priorities where separated departments could collaborate, while operating 
independently. A weekly management meeting sets priorities and evaluates performance in 
operation, marketing and human resources.  
 
e) Having two joint CEOs: The common failure of corporations that attempt to diversify into 
multiple markets is losing focus in main market as the result of stretching management 
capabilities. Comair seems to address this problem by having two joint CEOs equally responsible 
for the entire organization. Interviewed managers express this by saying that when one CEO is 
addressing the issue of BA, and the other manages Innovation 5’s problems. The strategic 
priorities and directions they set finally integrate their decisions.     
 
The fierce domestic competition and the generic nature of low-cost business model design makes 
differentiation a serious challenge for LCC competitors. While building strong Innovation 5 
brand, the management believes on innovation as the only sustainable way of survival in the long 
term. Comair has a well-defined innovation process and formal staff motivation programs in which 
employees are rewarded for their creative ideas and commitments. A senior manager from the 
company shares his company’s experience as follows: 
 
The first key thing for our success is our people (employees). You cannot talk enough about 
the expertise that our people have got that have driven both brands (Innovation 5 and 
British Airways) to where they sit today. The second thing is our ethos around innovation. 
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The base of people (customers) that we have got on the Internet site is in excess of 1 million. 
So those are people that are interacting with us more than once for our performance 
improvements. Its a huge success story to say that, we have got two airlines that are 
currently rated the best service airlines in the country.  
 
VI. Niche Market Growth 
Presently, the LCC total market share is about 25% in the passenger domestic market, with 
Innovation 5 holding about 14%. Within two years of its launch, Innovation 5 grew the total 
domestic passenger market by 10%.  
 
VII. Incumbents’ Response to Potentially Disruptive Innovation  
Similar to the insurance industry case, the major incumbent in the airlines industry responded 
merely when the disruptive innovation hit its market. In 2006, the traditional state-monopoly 
airlines responded five years later after the introduction of LCC disruptive innovation in South 
Africa. The main “disparity” cause in the airlines case could be particularly referred to the 
differences in strategic market focus and market size, and asymmetric motivation. The 
incumbent’s managers believed the thin domestic market is not big enough to be the priority of 
the network carrier. Referring to the small travel domestic market which is not the main strategic 
focus of the major incumbent, one airlines manager argued that:  
 
Thin markets (domestic) mean that there’s not a lot of traffic on that market. Now LCCs 
serve thin markets. Network carriers are not good at servicing thin markets. Okay? So, 
we needed… and that’s why… one of the reasons… we always said we will launch a LCC 
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and we will embark on overhaul of the legacy business. Our whole overhaul plus our 
restructuring was part of positioning ourselves again… away from the low cost market, 
because we’re not a low cost carrier. 
 
The incumbent’s “entrepreneurial dilemma” encountered, probably as the result of disparity and 
conflict in markets, was one of the main reasons for disruption, as another manager explained as 
follows: 
 
We did try to be all things to the market when the current proliferation of LCCs entered 
the SA market, but we could not make it work.  Finally, we learned that the remedy to this 
was to stratify the market into the two segments and create two brands and two products 
designed to best fit each sector – hence the launch of the new LCC company. 
 
5.7  Conclusions 
The purpose of this chapter was to explore the conceptual framework developed in Chapter three 
with regard to how insurgent firms introduce a potential disruptive innovation. Through 
exploratory case studies, this chapter analyzed two technological innovations and three market-
driven business model innovations, representing four South Africa services industries, namely 
telecommunications, banking, insurance and airlines.  
 
The chapter discussed how pioneering insurgents develop their value innovation, configure new 
value chains and strategize to overcome constraints and capture value. The two technological 
innovations studied in this chapter, namely MXit and Innovation 2 introduced a typical low-cost 
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technology that has yet to resolve many technical and functional hurdles. To overcome capital 
and market channel constraints, the two innovators constructed open business models where they 
rely for generic resources market channels on others while they focus on their core 
competencies; innovation. Market-driven innovations such as Innovator 4 and Innovator 5 are 
launched by major corporations. The constraints that have the potential to constrain these 
innovations are poverty, low education and lack of public and business infrastructure that 
provides bases for their innovation.  
 
This chapter briefly explained how incumbents responded to these various types of potentially 
disruptive innovations. This chapter has provided exploratory case studies. The next two chapters 
will examine the disruptiveness probability of these innovations, and how incumbents responded 
to them based on our two conceptual models using statistical analysis.  
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CHAPTER SIX: DISRUPTIVE BUSINESS MODEL 
INNOVATION PROCESS AT A FIRM LEVEL 
6.1  Introduction  
To reiterate, the primary research question of this thesis is: How should organizations reinvent 
their business models to deal with internally or externally induced disruptive innovation? In 
order to examine this question empirically, chapter three proposed two conceptual models of 
disruptive innovation. From an entrant perspective, the first conceptual model proposes seven 
hypotheses that determine the evolution of a new business model in creating a potentially 
disruptive niche market. From an incumbent perspective, the second conceptual model again 
offers seven hypotheses that posit the causes of disruptive innovation, and how incumbent firms 
should reinvent a second business model to enable disruptive innovation. The purpose of this 
chapter is to conduct a first-order (system-level) empirical analysis to identify common patterns 
of disruptive innovation phenomena across industries based on the two conceptual models. The 
next chapter will present the empirical results of the second-order comparison study between 
technology vs. non-technological market-driven innovations. 
 
6.2  The Entrant’s Model: Creating Disruptive Niche Market  
The entrant’s conceptual model for creating a potentially disruptive niche market proposes the 
following hypotheses: Note that the seventh hypothesis (H7) that assumes a relationship between 
strategy and a potentially disruptive innovation is not included in the statistical analysis. This has 
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been examined in Chapter 5 using only case studies and the qualitative outcome will be 
presented in this chapter in conjunction with the statistical analysis discussions. 
 
H1: All else assumed constant, an innovation’s Relative Advantage (RA) is negatively related to 
“Asymmetric Motivation” (AM) during the introduction period of a potentially disruptive 
innovation life-cycle.  
H2:  AM is positively related to potentially disruptive niche market innovation growth (IG). 
H3: Configuration of fundamentally different value chain is positively related to Continuous 
Innovation. 
H4: CI is positively related to potentially disruptive niche market innovation growth (IG). 
H5: Constraint is negatively related to a potentially disruptive innovation. 
H6: Competition is positively related to a potentially disruptive niche market innovation. 
 
Table 6.1: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Entrant’s Model  
N = 144, Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0  
  
RA AM VC CI Const Comp IG 
-0.19** 1 -
0.401*** 
-0.32*** -0.21** 0.12 0.10 AM 
       
0.47*** -0.41*** 1 0.71*** 0.30*** 0.094 0.162* VC 
       
0.56*** -0.33*** 0.71***  1 0.10 0.15 0.31*** CI 
       
-0.01 -0.21** 0.30*** 0.10  1 -0.12 -0.47*** Const 
       
0.41*** 0.12 0.09 0.15 -0.12  1 0.30*** Comp 
       
0.34*** 0.09 0.16* 0.31*** -0.47*** 0.30*** 1 IG 
      
 
 ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10 
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Table 6.1 shows the first-order aggregate results of Pearson correlation statistics for the six 
hypotheses that build the entrant’s model. Figure 6.1 encapsulates the emerging empirical 
correlations between the hypothesized variables shown in Table 6.1 diagrammatically.  
• H1: Consistent with the hypothesized H1, Figure 6.1 shows that RA is negatively 
associated AM at 5% significance level (r=-0.19, p = 0.04).  
• H2: Contrary to H2, there is no significant correlation between AM and IG (r=0.095 
p=0.31).  
• H3: Supporting H3, there is a strong positive correlation between differential value chain 
(VC) and continuous innovation (CI) at 1% significance level (r = 0.71, p<.0001).  
• H4: Confirming H4, CI is significantly associated with IG at 1% significance level (r = 
0.31, p<.0001).  
• H5: As hypothesized, there is a significant negative correlation between constraints 
(CONST) and IG (r=-0.47 p<.0001).  
• H6: Consistent with H6, the “intensity of competition” (COMP) is positively correlated 
with IG at 1% significance level (r=0.30 p=0.0013).  
 
It is worth highlighting that although the emerging Pearson intra-construct correlations are useful 
to infer statistically the positive or negative associations, they do not in principle predict the 
causal relationships between variables in a hypothesis. This study uses the PROC REG SAS 9.2 
multiple regression analysis to test the causal relationships of hypotheses.  
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Figure 6.1: Emerging Pearson Correlation Model for the Entrant’s Business Model 
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Note that H1 measure a relationship between exogenous variable RA and endogenous variable 
AM. Similarly, H3 assumes a relationship between exogenous variable VC and endogenous 
variable CI. This means that RA and VC variables do not have direct relationships with IG. IG is 
a function of AM, CI, Constraint and Competition variables. Understandably, we have three 
regression models that need to be tested. In symbolic notation these models are written as: 
                        Y =  0+ 1X i1 +  2X i2 + e 
Model 1 H1 AM = 0 + 1 (RA) + e 
Model 2 H3   CI = 0 + 1 (VC) + e 
Model 3         IG = 0+ 1 (AM) +  2 (CI) + 3 (CONST) + 4(COMP) + e 
 
Where Y is the value of the independent variable, 0 is the value of the intercept where X = 0,  Xi 
is the value of the interdependent variable, ‘e’ is the value of errors or residuals.  
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First the regression analysis runs on model 1 (H1) and model 2 (H3) separately. This is because 
hypotheses H1 (model 1) and H3 (model 2) are analyzed as a baseline to test the theoretically 
established characteristics of disruptive innovation, not central contributors of innovation growth 
(IG). Next, we run a multiple regression analysis on model 3 to determine the effect of each 
independent variable (IV) on the response variable IG, holding other IVs constant (H2, H4, H5 & 
H6). 
 
6.2.1 Relative Advantage (RA) and Asymmetric Motivation (AM) 
H1: The PROC REG SAS 9.2 output (Table 6.2) shows that RA is negatively related to AM ( = 
-0.145 p = 0.0427). This result supports H1 at 5% significant level. In producing this outcome, 
the regression model is fit at 5% significance level (Pr > F 0.0427), with adjusted r2= 0.0276. 
The latter means that the independent variable (RA) explains 2% of the variance in dependent 
variable (AM), which is significant to explain the relationship. 
 
Table 6.2: Model 1 PROC REG for H1 Dependent Variable AM 
Model  Pr > F 0.0427, Adjusted r2= 0.0276, Dependent Variable AM 
Parameter Estimates  
Variable  B SE      VIF 
Intercept  13.22*** 1.24318 0 0 
H1: RA  -0.15** 0.07102 -0.19 1.00 
   ***p<.01, **p<.05 
 
Supporting H1, the first-order result suggests, that at a system (aggregated data of all firms) 
analysis of a firm-level study, most of the innovating firms share significant common pattern 
with regard to the negative relationship between Relative Advantage (RA) and Asymmetric 
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Motivation (AM). The result is consistent with the established disruptive innovation theory. The 
paradoxical concept of disruptive innovation suggests that an innovation that is perceived as 
negative or as having significantly lower RA by mainstream customers should create asymmetric 
motivation (AM) during the innovation’s introduction life-cycle stage. Asymmetric motivation is 
created where a low-end innovation is likely to attract price-sensitive low-end or previously un-
served market segments – which should be profitable to start-up innovators – but the same might 
not motivate incumbents to take action, or it might encourage them to flee that market in order to 
concentrate on the more profitable market segments (Gilbert, 2003: 32; Christensen and Raynor, 
2003: 32). 
 
6.2.2  Differential Value Chain Configuration (VC) and Continuous Innovation (CI)  
H3: Table 6.3 shows that the PROC REG results strongly support H3 at 1% significance level 
(Pr > F <.0001). The adjusted R-square indicates that 49% (adjusted r2= 0.4927) of variance in 
continuous innovation (CI) is explained by VC (configuring a different value chain). The 
intercept coefficient slop B of VC (independent variable) suggests that a unit change in value 
chain is responsible for 0.58 change in innovation performance (CI) (B = 0.58 p<.0001).  
 
Table 6.3: Model 2 PROC REG for H3 Dependent Variable CI 
 
 
        
 
 
***p<.01 
Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2= 0.4927, Dependent Variable CI 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable B SE  VIF 
Intercept 3.01*** 1.17 0 0 
H3: VC 0.58*** 0.06 0.71 1.00 
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This positive significant regression outcome for the relationship between VC and CI (H3) is well 
established in business model innovation studies (Kim and Mauborgne, 1999: 85; Voelpel et. al., 
2005: 27). Continuous innovation is a function of three factors: lower cost, consumer insight and 
speed-to-market. Initially a potentially disruptive innovator may begin by offering below 
standard customer value proposition (compared to similar traditional product) to low-end or 
previously un-served market segments (negative in overall RA). Over time, the extent to which 
the innovator’s ability to improve the relative advantage of innovation considerably depends on 
creating and sustaining a new continuous innovation trajectory (Evans and Wurster, 1997: 18; 
Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001: 3; Holmstrom et. al., 2000: 64).  
 
The case studies clearly provide supporting evidences for H3, as discussed in Chapter 5. They 
showed that all traditional value chains in the four services industries (telecommunication, 
banking, insurance and airlines) are characterized by high capital expenditure (CAPEX) and high 
operating expenditure (OPEX) cost structures. All innovator firms obtained essential cost 
advantage, consumer insight and speed-to-market capabilities by capitalizing on technology, 
such as the Internet, mobile cellular network and software to configure a direct and shorter, or a 
distributed and lower cost value chains that eliminated much of the CAPEX and OPEX elements.  
 
6.2.3  Predictors of the Growth of a Potentially Disruptive Niche Market 
Next we test the effects of asymmetric motivation (AM), continuous innovation (CI) constraint 
(CONST) and competition (COMP) factors on the growth of a potentially disruptive niche 
market (IG) using a multiple regression analysis, model 3: This regression model explains 0.37 
variance in IG (adjusted r2= 0.37), and the model is fit at 1% level (Pr > F <.0001).  
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Table 6.4: Model 3 PROC REG for Dependent Variable IG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***p<.01, p<.05 
 
 
H2: Christensen and Raynor’s (2003: 44) disruptive innovation model proposes that the absence 
of incumbents’ aggressive counter-attack and a lack of motive to be concerned about the entrant 
at the early stage of the innovation (AM) provide a potential disruptor with necessary impetus to 
experiment and improve its performance in a niche market. While this assumption may hold 
valid in the experimentation and validation stages of disruptive innovation, Table 6.4 of model 3 
shows, contrary to our hypothetical expectation, the variable AM does not seem to have 
significant effect on IG (B = 0.09 p=0.259). Therefore, H2 is rejected. 
  
H4: CI is strongly related to IG at 1% significance level (B = 0.39 p<.0001). The result suggests 
that, from an insurgent disruptor perspective, the most important factor for creating and growing 
a potentially disruptive niche market is the innovator’s ability to create and sustain continuous 
innovation, rather than the lack of retaliation from incumbents (asymmetric motivation).   
 
H5: Table 6.4 shows that, as hypothesized, there is a strong negative association between 
constraint and innovation (B = -0.41 p<.0001). Complementing the statistical result, the case 
Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2= 0.37, Dependent Variable 
IG 
 
    
 
    
Variable B SE  VIF 
Intercept 12.56***       2.58      0 0 
H2: AM 0.096        0.08      0.09       1.19 
H4: CI 0.39***        0.09      0.39       1.17 
H5: CONST -0.41***       0.07      -0.47       1.06 
H6: COMP 0.18  **      0.08      0.18       1.07 
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studies reveal that in general South Africa innovating firms face considerable constraints in their 
innovation processes. These include lack of R&D centres, innovation clusters, capital venture 
markets, strong national innovation policies, skilled labour, a vast poverty that affects 
affordability and lack of accessibility to innovation and to business infrastructure such as 
secondary airports, and in low-end population areas such as access to ATMs, branches banks and 
Internet.” 
 
H6: Supporting the hypothesis, competition is positively related to potentially disruptive 
innovation (B = 0.18 p = 0.0212). Although competition is a key driver for innovation, the five 
types of innovations face considerably varying degree of competition, possibly due to the nature 
of innovation, innovating firm’s context and product-life cycle. The next chapter will further 
investigate this relationship at the second-order level of analysis.  
 
6.2.4 Strategy and Disruptive Business Model Innovation  
H7: Note that due to the firm- specific nature of strategic capabilities, H7 is exclusively 
examined using case studies compiled from, including but not limited to, open interviews with 
above 30 top level executives and exploratory qualitative research. Building on the resource 
based view (RBV) and Porter’s competitive strategy theories, the preceding case studies 
investigated how innovating firms develop (a) internal firm-specific capabilities and (b) 
competitive strategy to capture and sustain value in the long term (Collis and Montgomery, 
1995: 118; Amit and Shoemaker, 1993: 35; Porter, 1985: 33). 
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A.  Internal Firm-specific Capabilities: In general, the five innovations are of a generic nature 
where open innovation designs and principles make it difficult for innovators to use any kind of 
intellectual property (IP) as a protection. The author finds that, regardless of differences in 
innovations and business models, there are three key firm-specific strategic capabilities that 
differentiate successful innovators from others: (a) A well-defined innovation process; (b) focus on 
human resources (HR) development and motivation; and (c) nurturing eco-system from the 
beginning. 
 
Firstly, managers of those successful firms understand that in environments where technological 
and competitive drivers change the landscape constantly, developing a well-documented 
innovation process is vital for maintaining continuous innovation. Secondly, their focus on 
human development and motivation suggests that managers also understand the chain 
relationships between employees’ competence and satisfaction on one hand, and the link 
between HR development and innovation and growth on the other hand (Anthony et. al., 2008: 
171; Lovelock and Wirtz, 2007: 312; Govindarajan and Trimble, 2005: 149). 
 
Thirdly, the successful firms are found to nurture a healthy ecosystem early from the beginning. 
Our case study of the disruptive business model in the airlines indsutry shows an interesting 
example of partnership between the LCC model and the country’s largest mass retailers. This 
entrant leverages the retailer’s eco-system to reach their established customer base through their 
existing distribution channels in the whole country. In this innovation business model, customers 
can book their travel while shopping in supermarkets without the need to have access to the 
Internet or posses credit cards. The study shows that this model works well where all partners 
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have clear understanding, such as exclusive agreements, standard technology and ecosystem 
platform that provides stability for all contributors in the value chain (Chakravorti, 2004: 65; 
Gulati et. al., 2000: 203; Moore, 1993; 81).  
 
B. Competitive Strategy: The second challenge for an innovating firm is to develop a strategy to 
compete and sustain competitive advantage in the long-run. Depending on the nature of 
innovation and firm specific competitive environment, different firms pursue different strategies. 
Thus, this question is more suitably examined at the second level of analysis in the next chapter.  
 
In summarizing the entrant’s model for creating and growing a potentially disruptive niche 
market, it can be said that asymmetric motivation does not seem to have significant effect on the 
disruptor’s process in creating and growing a potentially disruptive niche market. Business 
model innovation is the result of a complex interplay between an innovating firm’s internal 
ability to innovate continuously and exogenous constraint and competitive forces that shape the 
evolution of the business model. From an insurgent perspective, value innovation depends on the 
management’s ability to change constraints and competition forces into innovation opportunity 
as well as finding creative ways to develop firm-specific strategic capabilities capture and sustain 
value in the long-run.  
 
6.3  The Incumbent’s Model: Enabling Disruptive Innovation  
This section examines the impact of a potentially disruptive innovation on incumbents’ 
traditional business models, and how incumbents strategize to deal with disruptive innovation. 
This section examines only the results of data from n = 88 respondents (representing 61 
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incumbent firms) that indicated their companies responded to disruptive innovation in different 
ways. The incumbent’s model for enabling disruptive innovation has two parts; the causes of 
disruptive innovation and strategic approaches for enabling disruptive innovation. These two 
parts are constituted by the following seven hypotheses: 
 
H8: Disparity is positively related to disruptive innovation.  
H9: The degree of conflict between disruptive and traditional business models is positively 
related to disruptive innovation.  
H10: Incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma is positively related to disruptive innovation. 
H11: Responding to disruptive innovation in a separate SBU is positively related to incumbent’s 
performance (IP) in enabling disruptive innovation 
H12: Organizational separation of disruptive business model is positively related to incumbent’s 
performance (IP) in enabling disruptive innovation. 
H13: Senior management involvement is positively related to incumbent’s performance (IP) in 
enabling disruptive innovation. 
H14: An externally hired CEO is positively related to incumbent’s performance (IP) in enabling 
disruptive innovation. 
 
Table 6.5 summarizes the first-order data of Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables that 
cause disruptive innovation (H8-H10). 
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Table 6.5: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Factors that Cause Disruptive Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.010 
 
 
 
The next table (Table 6.6) presents the first-order aggregated data of Pearson correlation 
coefficients for H12 and H13. The independent variables of H11 and H14 are categorical 
variables namely, Business Model Separation and the CEO Factor. The ANOVA results for H11 
and H14 will be discussed below.  
 
 
Table 6.6: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Strategic Approaches for Enabling 
Disruptive Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<0.1 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 88 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 Disparity   Conflict Dilemma DI 
H8: Disparity              1      0.083  
         
0.22*** 
           
0.17 * 
                         
H9: Conflict 0.083     
 0.3781                      
1       0.41*** 
             
0.44*** 
                       
H10: Dilemma 0.22*** 
         
0.41***  
                         
1        0.78*** 
                         
DI 0.16* 
             
0.44***  
             
0.78*** 
                            
1           
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 88 
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 
 H12 Org_separation H13 involvement IP 
H12: Org_ 
separation 
1          -0.16* 
            
0.68*** 
 
H13 Involvement  -0.16 *  
                              
1     0.17* 
 
IP 0.68*** 
 
0.17* 1 
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Diagrammatically, figure 6.2 below encapsulates the emerging empirical structure combining the 
results of Pearson correlation and ANOVA for the (a) causes of disruptive of disruption and (b) 
strategic approaches for enabling disruptive innovation (inputs from Table 6.5 and 6.6).  
 
Figure 6.2: Pearson Correlation Coefficients and ANOVA results for the Incumbents 
Model 
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Causes of disruptive innovation  
• H8: Figure 6.2 indicates that somewhat inadequately supporting the hypothesis, Disparity 
is weakly correlated with Disruptive Innovation (DI) at 10% level (r = 0.17 p = 0.07). 
• H9: Confirming to hypothesis, Conflict is strongly correlated with DI at 1% significance 
level (r = 0.44 p<.0001). 
 220 
• H10: Supporting the hypothesis, Dilemma is strongly correlated with DI at 1% 
significance level (r = 0.78  p<.0001). 
 
Strategic processes for enabling disruptive innovation  
• H11: The ANOVA results show that, as hypothesized, BM Separation is strongly 
associated with incumbents performance (IP) in enabling disruptive innovation at 
significance level 1% (F test  = p<.0001 and alpha 0.05). 
• H12: The Pearson Correlation Coefficient shows that, confirming to hypothesis, 
Organizational Separation is significantly correlated with IP (r = 0.68  p<.0001). 
• H13: The Pearson Correlation Coefficient shows that, somewhat weakly supporting the 
hypothesis, Senior Management Involvement is poorly associated with IP at 10% 
significance level (r = 0.17  p = 0.07). 
• H14: The ANOVA results show that, conforming to the hypothesis, the (outside hired) 
CEO Factor is positively associated with IP at 1% significance level (F test  = p<.0001 
and alpha 0.05). 
• In addition, the emerging correlation structure shows interesting positive correlations that 
were not a priori hypothesized (see dotted arrows labeled un-hypothesized correlations) 
between DI and Org. Separation (r = 0.53 p<.0001). DI does not show significant 
correlation with Involvement (r = -0.13 p = 0.1726). 
 
As it has been said earlier, the Pearson correlation coefficient is a necessary statistic inferential 
method to indicate basic correlations between variables, but it is adequate to test the hypothesis. 
We use the results of regression and ANOVA analysis and case studies findings to Test the 
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causal relationships in our conceptual models. In accepting or rejecting hypotheses, we further 
compare the outcomes with the case studies, established theories. 
 
6.3.1 Understanding the Causes of Disruptive Innovation 
The first part of the incumbent’s model assumes that disruptive innovation is a function of 
disparity, conflict and dilemma. The importance of this assumption in the model that incumbent 
firms must understand the root causes of disruption in order to find the best strategic solution to 
address the problem. Table 6.7 shows that the multiple regression model is fit to explain the 
relationships between the causes of DI and DI at 1% significance level (Pr > F <.0001), with 
61% of the DV (DI) variance explained by the independent variables (Adjusted r2= 0.6115).  
 
 
Table 6.7: PROC REG for Dependent Variable DI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
***p<.01, **p<.05 
 
H8: Disparity: Theoretically, a potentially disruptive innovation creates and grows a niche 
market in a disparate trajectory in the form of radical product, new competencies, new customers 
and/or new revenue model long before it directly makes inroads into an established market 
(Gilbert, 2003: 32). Statistically, holding other variables constant, the result shows that the 
independent variable (IV) “disparity” does not have significant relationship with the dependent 
Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2= 0.6115, Dependent Variable DI 
Parameter Estimates  
Variable B SE  VIF 
Intercept 0.31       0.41      0 0 
H9:   Disparity -0.00        0.07     -0.00       1.05 
H10: Conflict 0.15 **      0.06      0.15       1.20 
H11: Dilemma 0.71***       0.06     0.72       1.25 
 222 
(D) variable “disruptive innovation (DI)” (B = 0.31247 p = 0.4438). This result rejects H8. This 
means that the emergence of a successful business model innovation that creates and grows a 
niche market in a disparate path relative to established incumbent’s business model and market 
does not, on its own, lead to disruptive innovation (Rafi and Kamp, 2003: 117).  
 
H9: Conflict: This study distinguishes the notion of ‘disparity’ from the construct of ‘conflict’. 
Disparity is understood as incumbent’s management’s perception about an emerging or latent 
disruptive innovation long before it becomes partially or fully fledged disruptive innovation, or 
long before incumbents decide to act. It was hypothesized that the disparate trajectories between 
emerging disruptive innovation and established business models will cause incumbents’ 
managers to overlook or to ignore emerging or latent disruptive innovation that grows in a niche 
market, beyond their established industry and market boundaries, and this in turn will cause 
disruptive innovation. This is not proven at a firm level. In contrast, conflict is not a perception. 
It refers to real-time incongruities between the components of disruptive business model and 
existing business models that managers encounter, even when managers are cognizant and 
willing to embrace a potentially disruptive innovation (Mason and George, 1994: 163; Chandy 
and Tellis, 1998: 474). 
 
Supporting H9, Table 6.7 indicates that conflict between the two disparate models has significant 
effect on disruptive innovation (B = 0.14922 p = 0.0220). Likewise, the case studies findings 
disclose that, particularly in non-technological firms such as the insurance short-term direct 
model and LCCs, incumbents faced real-time conflicts that could have caused considerable 
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dilemma, which in turn allowed the disruptive innovation to make inroads into the mainstream 
market.  
 
H10: Incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma: It is hypothesized that disparity and conflict will 
cause managers to frame the disruptive innovation in a wrong way, to be hesitant, or simply not 
being able to know how to properly address a potentially disruptive innovation, which directly or 
indirectly allows disruptors to take the best advantage of this dilemma to rise to dominance, but 
the relative performance of the incumbent declines as a result of that dilemma (Christensen, 
1997; Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Paap and Katz, 2004).  
 
The regression results (Table 6.7) shows a strong common pattern among incumbents across the 
four industries with regard to the relationship between incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma and 
disruptive innovation among the majority of companies surveyed (B = 0.70095 p<.0001). The 
case studies further support this finding, revealing a positive relationship pattern between 
dilemma and disruptive innovation (refer to Chapter five).  
 
6.3.2  Strategic Approaches for Enabling Disruptive Innovation  
The second part of the incumbent’s conceptual model posits that incumbent’s performance in 
enabling disruptive innovation depends on creating a separate business model, creating a new 
organization, significant senior management involvement and hiring an outside CEO. 
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H11: Separation of disruptive business model: The survey captured three general categories of 
responses (1) a separate business unit via a new company, (2) a separate business unit in an 
existing company and (3) integrating the innovation in an existing business unit. The ANOVA 
results suggest a significant differences among the three types of response (F test p<.0001). The 
Tukey Studentized Range mean comparison across the three categories further shows that type 2 
response yields the highest performance relative to the two types of response (at the alpha = 0.05 
level). Type 3 response has the lowest performance mean (see Table 6.8). Nevertheless, the case 
study finding shows that strategic organizational responses to potentially disruptive innovation 
considerably vary depending on the nature of innovation and firm’s context. For instance, most 
incumbents in the mobile industry have introduced a separate business model in an existing 
company structure. Most incumbents in airlines and insurance industries created a separate 
business model due to the high conflict between disruptive and their broker-based traditional 
business models. But most South African banks and MNOS have integrated mobile banking 
and instant mobile messaging technology without changing their traditional business models. 
This will be further discussed at the second-order analysis in the next chapter.  
 
Table 6.8 ANOVA: Comparing the Mean of IP across BM Separation categories 
Difference 
BM_separation1       Between     Simultaneous 95% 
Comparison           Means    Confidence Limits 
 
2 - 1             1.2589      0.4235   2.0943  *** 
2 - 3             2.3231      1.4652   3.1809  *** 
1 - 2            -1.2589     -2.0943  -0.4235  *** 
1 - 3             1.0641      0.5009   1.6274  *** 
3 - 2            -2.3231     -3.1809  -1.4652  *** 
3 - 1            -1.0641     -1.6274  -0.5009  *** 
    *** F test p<.0001 
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H12: Organizational separation: In the present study’s survey, respondents that indicated their 
companies had created a separate business model to deal with disruptive innovation were further 
asked whether their companies created a separate company. Although the ANOVA results above 
show that firms that introduced a business unit within existing parent structure have achieved 
higher mean performance, the majority of the respondents replied their companies created 
separate spin-off companies. Therefore, Table 6.9 of the multiple regression analysis shows a 
strong positive association between organizational separation and IP (B = 0.86, p<.0001). 
 
Table 6.9: PROC REG for Dependent Variable IP 
                     Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2= 0.5365, Dependent Variable IP 
Parameter Estimates  
Variable  B SE  VIF 
Intercept  -1.24     0.53      0              0             
H12 Org. Separation  0.86 ***       0.77       0.73        1.03 
H13 Involvement   0.37***        0.08       0.29        1.03 
           ***p<.001 
 
A closer look at the study results suggest that incumbents firms tend to separate the disruptive 
spinoff companies at the downstream value chain components including brand, marketing and 
sales, distribution, as well as at organizational components such as production processes, firm 
identity, organizational culture and management. But they seem to have some sort of integration 
at upstream value chain in supply processes. Figure 6.3 shows the mean values of manifest 
variables (MV) that construct the latent variable “Organizational Separation” in a survey of a 
seven-point Likert scale. Statistically the cut-off point (mean value) is 3.5. Therefore, the mean 
value of “supply process” is 3.2 which is below the cut-off point.  
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Figure 6.3 Mean Differences of MVs within the Construct of Organizational Separation  
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H13: Confirming the hypothesized relationship between senior management involvement and IP, 
Table 6.9 shows positive association at 1% significance level (B = 0.37, p<.0001). In similar 
fashion to the above analysis, if we scrutinize the statistical mean differences of MVs that 
collectively construct the latent variable “Senior Management Involvement”, we see significant 
involvement of top management of the incumbents that launch disruptive spinoffs at major 
strategic levels including taking risk initiative, championing the disruptive unit, screening and 
approving investments, setting strategic direction and particularly exercising overall financial 
control. But senior managements do not seem satisfactorily involved in resolving managerial 
conflicts (3.4 mean score is slightly below the cut-off point). 
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Figure 6.4 Mean Differences of MVs within the Construct of Involvement   
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H14: The CEO Factor: The ANOVA analysis tests whether incumbents that assigned (1) an 
insider CEO or that (2) hired outside CEO have achieved higher mean of performance. 
Statistically, the ANOVA F test result shows a significant difference between the inside and 
outside hired CEO categories at 1% significant level (p =0.0039). The Tukey Studentized Range 
mean comparison across the two categories shows that type 2 response (outside hired CEO) 
yields higher performance relative to type 1 response (inside hired CEO) at the alpha = 0.05 level 
(see Table 6.10).  However, the case study finding shows that the question of hiring inside or 
outside CEO depends on the firm’s context. This factor will be further probed in the second-
order study at a firm and innovation category level in the next chapter.  

Table 6.10 ANOVA: Comparing the Mean of IP across CEO Factor categories 
Difference      Simultaneous 
CEO_factor1       Between     95% Confidence 
Comparison          Means         Limits 
 
2 - 1           0.7447     0.2443  1.2450  *** 
1 - 2          -0.7447    -1.2450 -0.2443  *** 
                                                            ***p<.001 
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Table 6.11 below presents a summary of the hypotheses testing, findings and conclusions. The 
conclusions in accepting or rejecting hypothesis are reached by triangulating the statistical results 
with case studies and established research findings.  
 
Table 6.11: First-Order Hypothesis Testing, Findings and Conclusions 
 Hypothesis Findings B Rejection/support 
for hypothesis 
H1  RA is negatively 
related to AM.  
There is somewhat significant 
negative relationship between 
RA and AM at 5% level. 
-0.15 ** H1 is supported. 
at a system level. 
H2 AM is positively 
related to GI. 
AM does not seem to predict 
IG. 
0.09 H2 is rejected. 
H3  VC is positively related 
to CI. 
There is a strong positive 
relationship between VC and 
CI.   
0.58*** H3 is strongly 
supported. 
H4 CI is positively related 
to GI. 
CI is strongly associated with 
GI. 
0.39***  H4 is strongly 
supported. 
H5 Constraint is negatively 
related to GI. 
Constraint significantly but 
negatively moderates 
disruptive niche market 
growth (GI).  
-0.41*** H5 is strongly 
supported. 
H6 Competition is 
positively related to GI.  
On average, competition is a 
key driver of an emerging 
disruptive innovation (GI).  
0.17**  H6 is supported. 
H7 Strategy is positively 
related to GI. 
 
Three common key firm-
specific strategic capabilities 
are (a) a well-defined 
innovation process (b) focus on 
HR and (c) nurturing eco-
system from the beginning. 
Case study 
analysis  
H7 is supported  
H8 Disparity is positively 
related to DI. 
Disparity does not have 
significant effect on DI. 
0.31 H8 is rejected. 
H9 Conflict is positively 
related to DI. 
Conflict appears to cause 
disruptive innovation. 
0.15**  H9 is supported. 
H10 Dilemma is positively 
related to DI. 
Dilemma and DI are strongly 
and positively correlated.  
0.70***  H10 is strongly 
supported. 
H11 Separation of business 
model is positively 
related to IP.   
Separation of business model 
is positively related to IP.   
Pr > F***  
Alpha 0.05 
H11 is supported. 
H12 Organizational 
separation is positively 
related to IP. 
There is a strong positive 
pattern among incumbents 
across industries.  
0.86 ***       H12 is strongly 
supported. 
H13 Senior management 
involvement is 
positively related to IP.  
There is a strong positive 
pattern among incumbents 
across industries. 
0.37*** H13 is strongly 
supported. 
H14 Outside hired CEO is 
positively related to IP.  
No common patterns at a 
system level. 
Pr > F 
Alpha 0.05 
H14 is supported. 
***p<.01, **P<.05, *p.1 
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6.4  Conclusion  
The key research question of this thesis is: How should organizations reinvent their business 
models to deal with internally or externally induced disruptive innovation? This chapter 
addressed this question at a system-level (firm-level) by presenting the results of empirical 
analysis based on the two conceptual models. The entrant’s model discusses key endogenous and 
exogenous factors that drive the evolution of a potentially disruptive business model innovation. 
The mainstream disruptive innovation literature largely focuses on the process of disruptive 
innovation merely from an incumbent perspective. Among the present thesis’ core contributions 
are a more granular conceptualization of the factors that drive the growth of a potentially 
disruptive niche market long before the innovation infringes disruption in the main market.   
 
The entrant’s model was tested at two levels. In the first level, the two hypotheses (H1 and H3) 
test the disruptive phenomenon identified by this study against the theoretically established basic 
assumptions of disruptive innovation theory. Theoretically, disruptive innovation should create 
asymmetric motivation during the early innovation life-cycle. Innovators should not only 
discover disruptive value innovation, but also maintain continuous innovation afterwards by 
configuring fundamentally different value chain. 
 
From the entrant’s perspective, the empirically emergent significant, but not particularly strong, 
result for H1; the relationship between RA and AM may be inferred to the paradoxical nature of 
a potentially disruptive innovation. Initially, a potentially disruptive innovator may begin by 
discovering low-end customer value propositions that are significantly negative in overall RA 
compared to similar traditional product, when measured by the mainstream customers. This 
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negative RA initially creates AM where entrants target a low-end or previously un-served market 
that generates low-margin that may not encourage incumbents to counter-attack. Although, this 
result proves the basic assumption of disruptive innovation, a caveat must follow that not all low-
end innovations that emerge in low-end or previously markets that do not motivate established 
large incumbents’ revenue models will ultimately become disruptive.  
 
The result of H3 test asserts the basic assumption that infers innovators discover value 
innovation by configuring fundamentally different value chain relative to the traditional 
industry’s value chain (H3). This new value chain configuration must meet three key factors to 
create a new (disparate) innovation trajectory namely, lower cost, consumer insight and speed-to-
market factors. Firstly, the new value chain should yield lower cost advantage to create and 
deliver cheaper and easier-to-use product. Secondly, the extent to which the new value chain’s 
inherent capabilities enables the innovating firm to generate consumer insight in order to keep 
improving the innovation constantly up-word, and thirdly, the extent to which it allows the 
innovator to take its innovation to market faster than the competition, or faster than other 
external changes, are critical for creating latent disruptive niche market.  
 
The second part of the entrant’s model tests the core factors that are hypothesized to effect the 
creation and growth of a potentially disruptive niche market. In this study, the absence of 
incumbent’s reaction during the initial period of emerging disruptive innovation plays a 
significant role in stimulating a latent disruptive niche market is not empirically established. 
From an insurgent perspective, the most important factor for creating and growing a potentially 
disruptive niche market is the innovator’s intrinsic ability to create and sustain continuous 
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innovation, rather than the lack of retaliation from established incumbents. The emerging 
insights suggest that a potentially disruptive business model innovation is a process that evolves 
in a complex interplay between constant innovation, constraints and competition. 
 
The statically strong negative relationship between constraints and innovation growth, as well as 
the case studies findings suggest that innovators in developing economies such as South Africa 
may encounter critical limitations to scale up their innovation. While constraints drive the 
innovation downward, it has been shown that competition, especially among the new entrants 
themselves, appears to have some positive effect on driving the innovation upward.   
 
From an innovator perspective, the innovating firm’s ability to acquire and develop generic and 
firm-specific strategic resources for scaling-up its innovation, capturing and sustaining value is 
critical. However, because of the open source nature of information technology innovations, and 
because of open principles and designs of market-driven business model innovations, pioneering 
firms find it difficult to utilize the use of patents or intellectual property to protect and capture 
the growth of their innovations. This appears to compel firms to focus on continuous innovation 
as the only source of survival. The case studies investigation reveals three fairly common key firm-
specific strategic capabilities that differentiate successful innovators from others; a well-defined 
innovation process, focus on human resources (HR) development and motivation, and nurturing 
eco-system from the beginning.  
 
This chapter discusses the incumbent’s model in two parts. The first part emphasizes that 
understanding the causes and processes of disruptive innovation is fundamental for developing 
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strategic approaches to enable disruptive innovation. The second part conceptualizes major 
hypothetical strategic processes for enabling disruptive innovation.  
 
In the first part, it was hypothesized that disruptive innovation was a function of three factors; 
disparity, conflict and dilemma. A potentially disruptive innovation may evolve in a disparate 
trajectory in the form of radical product, new competencies, new customers and/or new revenue 
model long before it directly invades an established market. But this disparity does not seem to 
have significant effect on causing disruptive innovation. The statistical result reveals that conflict 
between the two disparate models, in a causal play with the dilemma factor, has a significant 
effect on disruptive innovation. The managerial implication of this finding is that incumbent 
senior management’s competency and readiness in absorbing the dilemma and finding creative 
ways to prevent conflict can considerably mitigate a dire consequence of disruptive innovation.  
 
In the second part, it was hypothesized that incumbent’s performance in enabling disruptive 
innovation depends on creating a separate business model, creating a new organization, 
significant senior management involvement and hiring outside CEO. At a system level, the 
finding of this study shows that creating a separate business model and hiring outside CEO have 
positive effects on the incumbent’s performance in enabling disruptive innovation. However, this 
will be more appropriately investigated at the second order analysis by disaggregating the data 
into dichotomous innovation categories in the next chapter. 
 
The finding of this study suggests that there are two shared strategic approaches that most 
incumbents across industries seem to follow in dealing with disruptive innovation. First, when 
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established organizations decide to respond to a disruptive innovation, they are likely to create a 
separate business unit. A closer look of this strategy shows significant separation at the lower 
stream of the value chain in terms of brand, marketing and sales, and organizational elements 
such us identity, culture and management, there appears to be some weak structural linkages 
specifically at the upstream supply chains. This may suggest that there is some sort of sharing or 
integration at a system level, if the integration makes sense without compromising the 
effectiveness of the disruptive company. The second common factor observed in most companies 
is a significant level of senior management involvement in disruptive units or companies at 
higher strategic levels.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: TECHNOLOGICAL VS. MARKET-DRIVEN 
INNOVATIONS 
7.1  Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the differences or similarities between technological 
and market-driven business model innovations utilizing the same entrant’s and incumbent’s 
conceptual models. The total number of observation is 114, divided equally into 57 technology 
and 57 business model observations. A moderated regression analysis tests whether the 
hypothesized relationships between the independent and dependent variables vary depending 
whether the innovation is technological or non-technological. In general, moderation effects can 
be examined in two ways:  either as moderating the ‘form’ or ‘strength’ of the hypothesized 
relationships (Venkatraman, 1989: 426). This study examines the ‘strength’ of the hypothesized 
relationships using subgroup analysis.  The assumptions underlying subgroup analysis in the 
second-order study of the current dissertation is that, using the moderation method, the predictive 
ability of independent variables differs across the two categories of innovation.  
 
To get a standardized solution, the business model innovation category is set as a dummy 
variable (-1) representing a reference category, while the technology innovation category 
represents an effect coding variable (1). In the moderated regression analysis, we reject the null 
hypothesis that the two categories are the same (no direct effect of moderator variables) when the 
p-value of the interaction’s slop coefficients () is 0.01, 0.05 and marginally 0.10. In addition, 
the interaction slopes are presented graphically to visualize the effects of the moderator variables 
(Lee, 2008: 242; Kline, 2005: 146; Oczkowski, 2003). In the following section, first H1 and H3 
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are analyzed by conducting a single moderated regression to test the basic disruptive innovation 
theory assumption, not as main predictors of (potential disruptive) niche market innovation 
growth (IG).  Next, H2, H4, H5 and H6 are run in a collectively in multiple regression analysis 
as principal predictors of the response variable, niche market innovation growth (IG).  
 
7.2  Entrant’s Model: Disruptive Business Model Evolution  
H1: The relationship between Relative Advantage (RA) and Asymmetric Motivation (AM) will 
vary across the two types of innovation. 
Table 7.1 shows that the standardized interaction coefficient slop has marginally significant 
negative effect on the hypothesized relationships H1 (CATEGORYxRA B = -0.11, p<0.1). In 
addition, the t-test result shows a marginally significant difference between the means of the 
dependent variables (AM) of the sample groups (p<.01).  
 
Table 7.1: PROC REG Tech vs. BM H1: RA - AM  
 Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2= 0.41, Pr > ChiSq 0.0015, 
Dependent Variable AM 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable B SE  VIF 
Intercept 2.68*** 0.07 0 0 
H1: C_CATEGORY -0.60*** 0.07 -0.63 1.0 
H1: C_RA -0.31*** 0.07 -0.33 1.1 
H1: CATEGORYxRA -0.11* 0.07 -0.11 1.0 
                            *** p<0001, *p<0.1 
 
Figure 7.1 displays the graphical representation of the coefficient slops of the interaction and 
moderator for the relationship between independent variable (IV) Relative Advantage (RA) and 
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dependent variable (DV) Asymmetric Motivation (AM). It shows the negative effect of RA is 
significant on AM for the technology, but somewhat insignificant for the business model.  
 
Figure 7.1: Difference between Technology & Business Model in RA & AM46 
 
 
Corroborating the statistical results, we have seen in the case studies that technological 
innovations are typically pure low-cost innovations that emerge in markets that may not attract 
large incumbent’s attention at least in the innovation’s introduction life-cycle stages. But perhaps 
due to the country’s specific market dynamics in the airlines and insurance industries, the 
experiences of Innovation 5 and Innovation 4 demonstrated that disruptors that began with a low-
cost business models moved upward instantly into hybrid models.  
                                                 
46
 The interaction effect graph is plotted by entering the slope coefficients of (a) the intercept, (b) IV, (c) moderator 
and (d) interaction in a given excel worksheet. First, the categorical innovation (moderators) are assigned values  as 
Technology = 1 and business model = -1. Second, the worksheet has a given formula that calculates the values of 
these variables, and that plots the moderator and interaction slopes on a graph. For example, the Business Model 
(low level of moderator -1) is calculated by the following formula: (Intercept = IV slope) x (IV low score + 
Moderator slope) x (Moderator low score + Interaction slope) x (IV low score x Moderator low score). For instance, 
for Figure 7.1 (Difference between Technology and Business Model in RA & AM) the calculation for the BM slope 
is made as follows: (2.68 + 0.31) x (-2 + 0.60) x (-1 + 0.11) x (-2 x -1).  
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H2: The effect of Asymmetric Motivation (AM) on Innovation Growth (IG) will vary across 
the two types of innovation. 
Differing with the second-order hypothesis, there is no statistically significant different between 
the two groups of innovation on the hypothesized relationship (see Table 7.12 below). 
 
H3: The relationship between Value Chain Configuration (VC) and Continuous Innovation 
(CI) will vary across the types of innovation. 
Contrary to the second-order hypothesis (H3), the interaction coefficient slop does not show a 
significant statistical difference between the two types of innovations (see Table 7.12 below)  
 
H4: The effect of Continuous Innovation (CI) on Innovation Growth (IG) will vary across the 
two types of innovation.  
This hypothesis is rejected failing to show a significant statistical difference between the two 
groups of innovation (see Table 7.12). However, although the statistical results show no 
statistically significant difference on the effect of continuous innovation on firm’s innovation 
growth, in the previous case study chapter we observe that technological and non-technological 
innovators differ in the way they configure innovative value chains and, accordingly how they 
pursue value innovation. Most market-driven innovators capitalize on direct models. A direct 
firm performs most of the value creation activities inside and controls its own distribution 
channels. In non-technological environments such as the insurance and airlines industries, this 
permits the innovator to interact directly with consumers and control the downstream process of 
getting its innovation to market.  
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In contrast, technology innovators configure a distributed value chain. A firm with a distributed 
model focuses on performing one or few core activities in the value chain, and partners with 
other firms that perform the rest of the activities in the value chain. In technological 
environments, this model has the best advantage in getting the innovation to market faster 
compared to fully integrated traditional corporations that control all the chain linkages of 
innovation processes from the research and development (R&D) center to distribution channels 
(Chesbrough, 2006). 
 
H5: The effect of Constraint on Innovation Growth (IG) will vary across the two types of 
innovation.  
Rejecting the second-order hypothesis, there is no significant difference between technology and 
business model innovations with respect to this hypothesis. Yet again, although the statistics 
show no significant difference between technology and business model innovations, a closer 
qualitative investigation of the case studies demonstrate that the two types of innovating firms 
face considerably different nature of problems. Typically, emerging disruptive technological 
innovations such as the V-mobile are significantly confined in terms of compatibility with 
existing complementary technologies, and inherent technical and functional limitations. Dewar 
and Dutton (1986: 1422) observed that radial or disruptive technological innovations evolve 
through a period of technological ferment until a dominant standard emerged.  
 
Moreover, the finding of the present study suggests that start-up technological disruptors that 
launch a potentially disruptive innovation are less likely to be backed by major investors 
probably due to uncertain markets during the early disruptive innovation life-cycle. Particularly, 
this is more evident in South Africa where there seems to be no robust innovation policies and 
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capital venture market to support start-up innovators. Interestingly, we find that technological 
innovators seem to partner with established companies that own major brands and distributions 
channels to take their innovation to market. Therefore, they adopt a distributed model as a means 
to overcome resource constraints. The disadvantage of this model is that the innovators 
compromise the opportunity to learn first-hand from final users.  
 
Conversely, we observe that most market-driven innovations appear to encounter developing 
economies’ specific market related problems, for instance, lack of customer affordability and 
accessibility to modern innovations. However, due to massive investment requirements to create 
and develop new companies in non-technological industries such as insurance and airlines, and 
subsequently the major backing needed for uninterrupted investment in human resources, 
branding and marketing, we find that disruptive market-driven companies are launched by major 
established companies.  
 
H6: The effect of Competition on Innovation Growth (IG) will vary across the two types of 
innovation.  
Confirming this hypothesis, Table 7.2 indicates that competition has a positive effect on 
innovation growth (IG) for the business model, but not for technology (H6: C_COMP  = 0.24, 
p<0.01). The t-test result of the difference between the means of dependent variables (IG) of the 
two sample groups supports the regression outcome at 5% significance level. As can be seen in 
Figure 7.2, there are remarkably strong positive effect of competition on innovation growth for 
the business model, but not at all for the technology group.   
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Table 7.2: PROC REG Tech vs. BM H6: COMP - IG  
Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2= 0.48, Pr > ChiSq 0.3408, Dependent Variable AM 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable  B SE     VIF 
Intercept  3.85***        0.11     
 
0 0 
H6: C_CATEGORY  0.09       0.14        
 
0.07       2.27 
H2: C_AM                0.13     0.13        
 
0.10        1.83 
H4: C_CI                0.33 ***       0.09       
 
0.30        1.27 
H5: C_CONST             -0.68***        0.11       
 
-0.46        1.19 
H6: C_COMP              0.22**        0.09       
 
0.22        1.67 
H6: CATEGORYxCOMP  -0.24***        0.09    
 
-0.2        1.22 
    ***p<0.01, **p<..05 
 
Figure 7.2: Difference between Technology & Business Model in Competition & GI 
 
 
The case studies insights support the survey result depicted in Figure 7.2. It has been observed 
that start-up disruptive technological innovators are relatively more driven by technology-push 
factors rather than by competitive forces, for instance, relying on community of experts through 
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open sources or via user interaction in exclusive web channels. The founder and executive 
director of  MXit, a technology start-up company said this: 
 
You know one of our slogans is that “WE DO NOT COMPETE, WE CREATE47.” So we 
look at the landscape quite differently to many other companies. I think in the history of 
MXit, its very young; its only three years old, we've really only once looked at what our 
competitors need and made a small adjustment to our software – only once. The rest of the 
time we have got our vision and that is to get 200 million users as soon as possible and to 
build a lifestyle company around that. So what our competitors do is almost like we don’t 
care. We have got enough creativity I think, and coming from our user base to create 
something that will be very desirable. 
 
Although competition may surface at a later stage of the technology life-cycle, at present the core 
purpose is to address technical and functional challenges. Supporting our finding, some scholars 
earlier observed that intense competition is less likely to emerge in uncertain markets until a 
dominant technological design emerges that provides stable platform for competition (Gatignon, 
Tushman, Smith & Anderson, 2004: 1107; Roberson, 1967: 15).  
 
In the non-technological environments, innovating firms face a varying degree of competition 
intensity that is contingent to the nature of innovation, innovation life-cycle and a firm’s context. 
Some disruptors in industries such as the insurance and airlines are characterized by intense 
competition possibly due to the small size of the domestic middle-market. The historical wide 
                                                 
47
 This slogan appears in the company’s website as “Our philosophy: We don’t compete, we create” 
http://www.mxitlifestyle.com/about-us.  

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disparities in fiscal capacity among the population in South Africa seem to delimit the 
competition among disruptors in the rather thinner middle market, compared to developed 
economies that are characterized relatively by narrower gap in economic structure.  
 
Even though competition is certainly important to drive the growth of an emerging disruptive 
niche market, the qualitative study outcomes suggest that due to lack of clear and strong 
government’s competition policies, coupled with the globalization and deregulation, the existing 
fierce competition will probably have strong erosion effect on the disruptors business model in 
later growth or mature stages of disruption innovations.  
 
The case studies provide evidences to corroborate the above argument. Despite its huge potential for 
extending banking to the previously un-banked market segments, the cell-phone banking has been 
increasingly moved to the middle market due to problems of low-end consumer affordability, 
accessibility and lack of education in terms self-service technology and customer value concept. 
Similarly, the LCCs have struggled to extend travel services to the previously un-flown customers 
due to customer accessibility problems such as credit card and Internet.  
 
Expressing the concern around the lack of well-informed regulations and dynamic competition 
policies in the airlines industry, another manager commented as follows:  
 
What we would like to challenge the industry bodies in general is that you have got two 
problems; there is no barrier of entry into the airline industry. I could start-up an airline 
tomorrow without buying an airplane. I can sell tickets for six months and get the cash in 
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the bank and then start operating. There is no protection for the consumer, and that is one 
of the problems we have. So barrier to entry in terms of regulations should be resolved. And 
that, in itself, will protect those carriers that are currently operating and help them grow. 
We have seen airlines that start and fail in this country, purely because they haven’t been 
managed properly. And who usually loses? The consumer. 
 
The second part of it is that there is most certainly unfair bias (of competition) towards 
large corporations and government owned bodies. The large companies or state owned 
monopolies were required by the competition law to separate legally their spinoffs 
companies, but (we) don’t for one minute believe they are. In our minds they are still been 
driven largely by their parent companies (taking unfair advantage).  
 
H7: The relationship between strategy and innovation growth (IG) will vary across the two 
types of innovation. 
The above analysis convincingly suggest that in highly competitive and relatively small size 
markets such as South Africa, the need to strategize is not only vital to maximize revenues but 
also to overcome innovation challenges and constraints. In order to explore the uniqueness of 
individual firm strategy, the seventh hypothesis (H7) with respect to the relationship between 
strategy and a disruptor’s firm growth, is investigated using the case studies approach.   
 
In the previous chapter we saw that successful innovators have three strategic components in 
common at a system-level; (a) a well-defined innovation process (b) focus on human resources 
(HR) (development and motivation), and (c) nurturing eco-system from the beginning. Having 
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these qualities in common among all successful innovating firms, there are three key 
dissimilarities between technological and business model innovators with regard to strategy, as 
summarized in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3: Differences between Technological and Business Model Innovations in Strategy 
Bases of distinctions  Technological innovation  Business model innovations 
1. Locus of innovation  Product innovations  Process and market innovations  
2. Firm-specific 
strategic capabilities  
- First mover advantage 
- Network economies of 
scale 
- Hybrid models: building strong brand and building 
strategic positioning  
- Low-cost models: developing competencies aimed at 
cost minimization and increasing volume  
3. Competitive strategy  - Emergent strategy  
- Technology-push 
- A forward-looking strategy  
- Competitive drive 
 
1) Locus of innovation. Firms with technological innovations focus on product improvement, for 
instance, continuous innovation of successive versions of software or information technology 
products. In contrast, firms with market-driven business model innovations primarily concentrate 
on process and market innovations.   
 
2) Firm-specific strategic capabilities: In both types of innovations, the prevalent open access to 
Internet-based information technologies and the generic nature of designs and principles of direct 
business models make it difficult for innovating firms to protect their innovation using codified 
knowledge and Intellectual Property (IP). Two components that seem to be critical for value 
capture and sustainability in technological innovations are first mover advantage and network 
economies of scale. Information technology (IT) innovations, such as instant mobile messenger 
and V-mobile, seem to possess the characteristics of high velocity globalization and network 
economies of scale that can be achieved through remote terminals, breaking down time and 
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space barriers, although these innovations have still to resolve some technical and resources 
problems (Evans and Wurster, 1997: 14).  
 
With market-driven business models, such as airlines, banking and insurance, it may require 
massive investments to achieve world-scale mass production, global reach and economies of 
scale, probably because offering these services require physical presence where production and 
consumption takes simultaneously. For capturing value, hybrid firms emphasize heavily on 
building a brand and building a strategic position around their brands. Low-cost firms with 
market-driven business models focus on either minimizing cost and/or increasing volume 
through innovative distribution channels.  
 
c) Competitive strategy: Pioneering technological companies did not seem to have a clear idea 
about strategy when developing their innovations. A technological firm seems to be driven more 
by technology-push (internal motives) rather than by competitive pressures. An innovator start-
up begins by developing a technology and proceeds to develop a business model, with less 
regard to strategy in the initial stage. In due course, strategy emerges as the innovator begins to 
face competition (Magretta, 2002: 92; Mintzberg, 1994: 111). 
 
On the other hand, firms with market-driven business model innovations seem to have clearly 
thought about their strategy when they develop their innovations. It is a forward-looking 
(planned) strategy development process, although in reality the original strategy changes 
tremendously. Perhaps this is because most of disruptive market-driven business model 
innovations emerge when a once radical or disruptive technology matures, and competition 
 246 
through business model reinvention becomes a new avenue of growth. Thus, because firms with 
non -technological market-driven business model innovations introduce their innovations in 
mature industry structure, they may have the opportunity to analyze the existing industry forces 
and formulate a strategic position from the beginning (Shafer et. al., 2005: 203; Moore, 2004: 88; 
Porter, 1985: 32). 
 
7.3  Incumbent’s Model: Enabling Disruptive Business Model Innovation  
Stressing the present study principle that the emergence of a potentially disruptive niche market 
does not, by its very nature, lead to disruptive innovation, this section examines, from the 
incumbent’s perspective, the moderating effects of the dichotomous innovation categories on all 
hypothetical factors that are assumed to cause disruptive innovation, and on hypothetical 
enabling determinants for disruptive innovation in the varying contexts of technology and non-
technological environments. The incumbent’s conceptual model hypothesizes that disruptive 
innovation is the function of (H8) disparity, (H9) conflict and (H10) incumbent’s entrepreneurial 
dilemma.  
 
H8: The effect of Disparity on Disruptive Innovation (DI) will vary across the two types of 
innovation. 
Consistent with the firm-level findings in Chapter six, the moderated regression shows no 
significant relationship between the disparity and DI on both types of innovation. Thus rejecting 
the second-order hypothesis, there is no significant difference between the dichotomous 
innovations on this particular relationship, holding other factors constant (see Table 7.4 
CATEGORY B = -0.03263). 
 247 
Table 7.4: PROC REG Tech vs. BM H8: DISP - DI 
Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2= 0.6061, Pr > ChiSq 0.2167 , Dependent Variable DI 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable B SE  VIF 
Intercept 3.66*** 0.07 0 0 
C_CATEGORY 0.14* 0.08 0.13 1.35 
C_DISPARITY -0.02 0.07 -0.02 1.08 
C_CONFLICT 0.14** 0.07 0.14 1.28 
C_DILLEMA 0.75*** 0.07 0.76 1.68 
CATEGORYxDISPARITY -0.033 0.07 -0.03 1.14 
              ***p<.01, **p<.05, * p<.10 
H9: The effect of Conflict on Disruptive Innovation will vary across the two types of 
innovation. 
Similarly, the results of aggregated first-order will be maintained. There is no statistically 
relevant difference between the two types of innovation with respect to the effect of conflict on 
disruptive innovation (see Table 7.5. CATEGORYxCONFLICT B = -0.06). 
 
Table 7.5: PROC REG Tech vs. BM H9: CONF - DI 
Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2 = 0.6081, Pr > ChiSq 0.3301, Dependent Variable DI 
Parameter Estimates  
Variable B SE  VIF 
Intercept 3.64*** 0.072 0 0 
C_CATEGORY 0.13 0.083 0.11 1.38 
C_DISPARITY -0.03 0.07 -0.03 1.14 
C_CONFLICT 0.16* 0.06 0.16 1.24 
C_DILLEMA 0.72*** 0.08 0.74 1.96 
CATEGORYxCONFLICT -0.06 0.068 -0.06 1.32 
  ***p<.01, **p<.05, * p<.10 
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H10: The effect of Dilemma on Disruptive Innovation (DI) will vary across the two types of 
innovation.  
Consistent with the results at firm level in Chapter six, the results indicate a strong positive 
correlation between the dilemma factor and disruptive innovation in both types of innovation. 
Rejecting the second-order hypothesis, the moderated regression result shows no significant 
statistical difference on the direction of the hypothesized relationships between the dichotomous 
innovations (see Table 7.6 CATEGORY x DILLEMA B = 0.11).  
 
Table 7.6: PROC REG Tech vs. BM H9: DILLEMA - DI 
Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2 = 0.6086, Pr > ChiSq 0.1303, Dependent Variable DI 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable Parameter 
Estimate 
SE  VIF 
Intercept 3.73*** 0.09 0 0 
C_CATEGORY 0.20** 0.09 0.17 1.94 
C_DISPARITY -0.01 0.07 -0.01 1.09 
C_CONFLICT 0.16** 0.06 0.16 1.27 
C_DILLEMA 0.83*** 0.11 0.85 3.94 
CATEGORYxDILLEMA 0.11 0.13 0.09 3.16 
 
***p<.01, **p<.05, * p<.10 
 
With respect to the causes of disruptive innovation, we see that predictor variable disparity 
seems to have no significant effect on disruptive innovation on both types of innovation. In 
contrast, the predictor variables conflict and dilemma have significant impact on DI on both 
types of innovation. But the interaction effect coefficient slops do not reveal any statistically 
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significant differences on the effects of these three factors on disruptive innovation between the 
two groups of innovation. Across the two types of innovation, the statistical results suggest that 
the higher the dilemma the higher the impact of disruptive innovation on incumbent’s business 
model. Alternatively the lower the dilemma incumbents managers face, the lower the disruptive 
impact.  
 
However, although the moderation regression analysis could not capture the differences, the case 
studies findings reveal interesting differences between high-tech and low-tech incumbents in the 
way they were affected by disruptive innovation.  
 
Table 7.7: Time Lags in Organizational Responses to Potentially Disruptive Innovations 
Innovation  Year of 
introduction  
Respondent 
incumbents  
Year of 
response  
Time lags 
in response 
(years) 
Type of organizational 
response   
HD insurance 
model  
1998 The largest short-
term insurance 
corporation in SA 
2008 10 Second business model via 
new company 
HD airlines 
model 
2001 The largest airlines 
corporation in SA  
2006 5 Second business model via 
new company 
IMS – MXit 2005 Two largest MNOs 
in SA 
2007 2 Integration   
Mobile VoIP  2006 The largest MNO 
in SA 
2008 2 Second business model in 
existing organizational 
structure 
M- banking 2005 1. One major bank 
2. All the “Big 
Four” banks 
2005 0 1. Second business model 
via new company 
2. Integration   
 
Table 7.7 reveals different time lags in response to potentially disruptive innovations in the four 
industries. From this table it can be seen that the time lags to respond to disruptive innovation 
taken by low-tech incumbents affected by disruptive market-driven hybrid models (10 and 5 
years) are much longer compared to incumbents facing potentially disruptive technologies (only 
2 years). (We exclude the mobile banking since it has not affected banks which have easily 
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integrated it). This may suggest that low-tech incumbents faced relatively higher degree of 
dilemma, and therefore the disruptive effect was relatively higher.  On the other hand, high-tech 
firms appear to mitigate the dilemma and resolve the conflict by taking appropriate strategic 
response to deal with disruptive innovation. Therefore, the disruptive effect was relatively lower. 
This study finds suggest that technological firms tend to have the skills to anticipate and to be 
entrepreneurial to disruptive technological innovation compared to firms facing non-
technological disruptive innovation. Next, we conduct the investigation to explore the strategic 
approaches incumbents used to respond to disruptive innovation. The next hypotheses test the 
interaction effect on the variables that predict an incumbent’s performance in enabling disruptive 
innovation. It is hypothesized that incumbent’s performance (IP) is a function of business model 
separation, organization isolation, senior management involvement and the outside CEO factor.  
 
H11: The effect of Business Model Separation on Incumbent’s Performance (IP) will vary 
across the two types of innovation.  
Table 7.8: PROC REG Tech vs. BM H8: BM SEP - IP  
Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2= 0.57, Pr > ChiSq 0.0.0424, Dependent Variable IP 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable B SE  VIF 
Intercept 4.23*** 0.11 0 0 
C_CATEGORY 0.26** 0.13 0.19 2.44 
C_BM_SEPARATION1 0.02 0.10 0.03 5.13 
C_ORG_SEPARATION 0.87*** 0.10 0.73 1.88 
C_INVOLVEMENT 0.23*** 0.09 0.22 1.39 
C_CEO_FACTOR1 0.00 0.07 0.01 2.52 
CATEGORYxBM_SEPARATION1 0.17*** 0.06 0.18 1.12 
             ***p<.01, **p<.05 
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Proving the second-level hypothesis, Table 7.8 indicates that the interaction statistic difference 
test between the two innovations with regard to the relationship between business model (BM) 
separation and IP shows significant statistical difference (Table 7.8: 
CATEGORYxBM_SEPARATION1 B = 0.17, p<0.01). 
 
Figure 7.3 shows quite opposite relationships between the BM separation and IP across the two 
categories of innovation. While there seems to be a slightly positive correlation between BM 
separation and IP in Technology, there is an opposite down word negative slop in market-driven 
Business Model.  
 
Figure 7.3: Difference between Technology & Business Model in BM. SEP. & IP 
 
 
Figure 7.3 suggests that high-tech incumbents firms are likely to create a separate business 
model to manage a disruptive innovation. But this cannot be generalized across the three low-
tech industries (banking, insurance and airlines). For instance, most incumbents in airlines and 
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insurance industries appear to introduce a separate business model due to the high conflict 
between disruptive and their broker-based traditional business models. On the contrary, most 
South African banks have easily integrated the mobile banking as additional channel within 
their full-service business models. This strategy appears to be in line with their previous 
experience on online banking, which they had easily integrated that otherwise, has been 
disruptive to airlines and insurance companies.  
 
H12: The effect of Organizational Separation on Incumbent’s Performance (IP) in enabling 
disruptive innovation will vary across the two types of innovation.  
In the survey, leaving out respondents that indicated their firms had integrated the innovation 
(namely the banking industry), sample respondents that replied their companies had created a 
separate business model to deal with disruptive innovation were further asked whether the 
corporations isolated the disruptive business unit is a separate company to manage disruptive 
innovation. The moderated regression result shows that consistent with the first-order result, both 
types of incumbents (high-tech and low-tech) are likely to isolate the disruptive unit in a separate 
organization. There is no significant statistic difference between the two, thus rejecting our 
hypothesis that the two types of incumbents vary on this aspect (see Table 7.9 
CATEGORYxORG_SEPARATION B = 0.04, p= 0.6178).  
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Table 7.9: PROC REG Tech vs. BM H8: ORG_SEP - IP  
Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2= 0.55, Pr > ChiSq 0.0299, Dependent Variable IP 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable B SE   VIF 
Intercept 4.1*** 0.09 0 0 
C_CATEGORY 0.27** 0.13 0.19 2.44 
C_BM_SEPARATION1 -0.01 0.10 -0.01 5.08 
C_ORG_SEPARATION 0.92*** 0.10 0.77 1.85 
C_INVOLVEMENT 0.23*** 0.09 0.22 1.42 
C_CEO_FACTOR1 0.04** 0.07 0.05 2.62 
CATEGORYxORG_SEPARATION 0.04 0.09 0.03 1.22 
 
Consistent with the case study finding, Table 7.9 shows that strategic organizational responses to 
potentially disruptive innovation vary depending on the firm’s context and specific innovation 
characteristics, rather than on the dichotomous innovation category (technology vs. non-
technology). While the mobile incumbents integrate the new business model in an existing 
organization, airlines and insurance industries create a separate company. South African banks 
and MNOS have integrated mobile banking and instant mobile messaging technology without 
changing their traditional business models. 
  
13: The effect of Senior Management Involvement (SMI) on Incumbent’s Performance (IP) in 
enabling disruptive innovation will vary across the two types of innovation.  
Confirming the second-level hypothesis, Table 7.10 of the moderated regression analysis result 
shows that the effect of Senior Management Involvement (SMI)  on IP is positive for the 
technology group, but not for the business model group (Table 7.10: 
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CATEGORYxINVOLVMENT B = 0.32, p<.01). The Student t distribution (t-test) test also 
supports this result at 1% significant level (p<.01). 
 
 
Table 7.10: PROC REG Tech vs. BM H8: INV - IP  
Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2= 0.59, Pr > ChiSq 0.2335, Dependent Variable IP 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable B SE   VIF 
Intercept 3.94*** 0.09 0 0 
C_CATEGORY 0.34*** 0.13 0.25 2.51 
C_BM_SEPARATION1 0.11 0.11 0.16 5.82 
C_ORG_SEPARATION 0.82*** 0.10 0.69 1.98 
C_INVOLVEMENT 0.23*** 0.09 0.18 1.45 
C_CEO_FACTOR1 -0.05 0.07 -0.07 2.84 
CATEGORYxINVOLVEMENT 0.32*** 0.09 0.23 1.27 
                ***p<.01 
 
Figure 7.4 demonstrates an opposite direction of the moderators’ effect on this relationship. 
Supporting H13, there is a strong positive relationship between senior management involvement 
and IP in technological firms. On the contrary, there seems to be no significant relationship in 
firms dealing with market-driven business model innovations.  
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Figure 7.4: Difference between Technology & Business Model in Involvement & IP 
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H14: The effect of the outside hired CEO on IP will vary across the two types of innovation.  
Accepting the second-order hypothesis, Table 7.11 indicates that the effect of outside hired CEO 
on incumbent’s performance in enabling disruptive innovation is significant for the technology, 
but not for the business model category (Table 7.11 CATEGORYxCEO_FACTOR1 B = 0.15, 
p<.01). Figure 7.5 demonstrates a strong positive relationship between the outside hired CEO 
and IP in high-tech industries, whereas this relationship is almost non-existent in low-tech 
industries environment.  
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Table 7.11: PROC REG Tech vs. BM H8: CEO_FACTOR – IP 
Pr > F <.0001, Adjusted r2= 0.5774, Pr > ChiSq 0.0234, Dependent Variable IP 
Parameter Estimates 
Variable B SE   VIF 
Intercept 4.16*** 0.09 0 0 
C_CATEGORY -0.51* 0.30 -0.37 12.82 
C_BM_SEPARATION1 -0.08 0.10 -0.11 5.36 
C_ORG_SEPARATION 0.84*** 0.10 0.71 1.95 
C_INVOLVEMENT 0.24** 0.09 0.18 1.45 
C_CEO_FACTOR1 0.11 0.07 0.16 2.58 
CATEGORYxCEO_FACTOR1 0.15*** 0.05 0.56 10.00 
 
Figure 7.5: Difference between Technology & Business Model in CEO Factor & IP 














	

 $+. - " $+. - "





	




	








	



 
 !
 
 
Furthermore, Figure 7.6 indicates some significant association between the source of recruitment 
of a CEO and the dichotomous categorization of innovations. The majority of incumbent firms 
(90.48%) in technological environment hired external CEO compared to non-technological 
incumbent firms (57.58%) that hired outside CEO to manage disruptive innovation (χ2 p<.05).  
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Figure 7.6: The CEO factor: Technological vs. Business Model Innovations 
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Our qualitative investigations reveal that hiring outside CEO is seen as the most critical source of 
innovation. Most incumbents hire outside CEOs who were previously the founders or managers 
of pioneering disruptors in order to appropriate the disruptive technology. However, there seem 
to be no common patterns among all incumbent firms dealing with market-driven business model 
innovations.  
 
7.4  Emergent Typologies for Categorizing Disruptive Innovations  
Table 7.12 below presents a summary of the 14 second-order hypotheses results and conclusions. 
The conclusions are reached through triangulation of the statistical results with case studies and 
further referring to established theories. When the statistic difference tests show no significant 
differences, we reject the hypothesis that the two groups of innovation are the same and the 
outcome can be replicated across the two types of innovations. On the other hand, when there are 
statistically different outcomes, we reject the null hypothesis that the two groups of innovation 
are the same and the outcome cannot be replicated across the two types of innovations. 
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Table 7.12: Second -Order Hypothesis Testing, Findings and Conclusions 
Interaction 
effect slope 
coefficient  
 Second-order hypothesis  Support/reject 
second-order 
hypothesis  
B 
Replication  
H1 The relationship between Relative Advantage (RA) and 
Asymmetric Motivation (AM) will vary across the two 
types of innovation. 
Marginally 
supported  
-0.11* No 
H2 The effect of Asymmetric Motivation (AM) on Innovation 
Growth (IG) will vary across the two types of innovation. 
Rejected 0.12      Yes  
H3  The relationship between Value Chain Configuration (VC) 
and Continuous Innovation (CI) will vary across the types 
of innovation. 
Rejected  0.03 Yes 
H4 The effect of Continuous Innovation (CI) on Innovation 
Growth (IG) will vary across the two types of innovation. 
Rejected -0.05 Yes 
H5 The effect of Constraint on Innovation Growth (IG) will 
vary across the two types of innovation 
Rejected -0.16684        Yes 
H6 The effect of Competition on Innovation Growth (IG) will 
vary across the two types of innovation. 
Strongly 
supported 
0.24*** No 
H7 The relationship between strategy and innovation growth 
(IG) will vary across the two types of innovation. 
Supported  A firm-specific 
application. 
Yes 
H8 The effect of Disparity on Disruptive Innovation (DI) will 
vary across the two types of innovation. 
Rejected -0.03 Yes 
H9 The effect of Conflict on Disruptive Innovation will vary 
across the two types of innovation. 
Rejected -0.06 Yes 
H10 The effect of Dilemma on Disruptive Innovation (DI) will 
vary across the two types of innovation. 
Rejected 0.11 Yes 
H11 The effect of Business Model Separation on Incumbent’s 
Performance (IP) will vary across the two types of 
innovation. 
Supported 0.17*** No 
H12 The effect of Organizational Separation on Incumbent’s 
Performance (IP) in enabling disruptive innovation will 
vary across the two types of innovation. 
Rejected 0.04 Yes 
H13 The effect of Senior Management Involvement (SMI) on 
Incumbent’s Performance (IP) in enabling disruptive 
innovation will vary across the two types of innovation. 
Strongly 
supported 
0.32*** No 
H14 The effect of the outside hired CEO on IP will vary across 
the two types of innovation. 
Strongly 
supported 
0.15*** No 
***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 
 
As stated in the research methodology chapter (Chapter 4), although the statistical outcomes are 
relevant for interpretation, a caution needs to be made that the moderated regression statistic 
different test is sensitive to sample size. The case studies qualitative findings will be 
considerably applied to draw the final conclusions of this thesis.  
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7.4.1 The Emergent Model for the Entrant  
Based on the conceptual models, statistical analysis presented in Table 7.7 and insights generated 
from the case studies, this study proposes typologies for categorizing business model evolutions 
for technological and non-technological disruptive business model innovations. From an entrant 
perspective, Table 7.13 suggests ten modes of business model innovation based on (i) the 
relationships between relative advantage (RA) and asymmetric motivation (ii) value chain 
configuration (VC) and continuous innovation (CI) and CI (ii) the constraint factor (iii) the 
competition factor and (iii) strategy. 
 
 Table 7.13:  Entrant’s Model: Emerging Patterns of Business Models Evolutions 
RA & AM VC & CI The Constraint 
Factor 
The Competition 
Factor 
Strategy  
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I. RA and AM: Table 7.12 indicates a marginally significant negative correlation between RA 
and AM for technology, but not for market-driven business model group (B = -0.11, p<.1). 
Consistent with the hypothesized negative relationship between relative advantage (RA) and 
asymmetric motivation (AM), disruptive technological innovations emerge as low-end 
innovations that do not primarily appeal to the mainstream customer or incumbents’ revenue 
model, thus creating sufficient condition for AM. On the other hand, market-driven business 
model innovations do not seem to create adequate condition for AM. Two contextual reasons 
explain why non-technological innovations evolve into hybrid models.  
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Firstly, from a developing economy context perspective, the country’s wide gap in fiscal 
capacities and economic structure, market-driven innovating firms seem to target the middle 
markets (FSM 6 & 7) who own the means and knowledge to access innovations. In absence of 
intermediaries and lack of physical presence in markets, direct players invest considerably on 
branding and marketing thus in an effort to acquire and retain customers from the highly 
competitive middle market, eventually adding up some costs to their value chain.  
 
Secondly, there are industry specific cost characteristics that moderate lower cost advantage of 
the innovator. For example, in the airlines industry there are three factors that may moderate the 
low-cost business models’ lower cost advantage. First, compared to developed countries, the 
South African LCCs do not have the benefit of low cost advantage emanating from using a 
secondary airport. Second, when a variable input cost amount to a significant portion of cost 
structure and this cost is highly unstable, it affects the innovator’s lower-cost advantage. For 
example, the biggest cost of LCC which makes about 50% - 60% is fuel. Worldwide, the sharp 
increase of oil price during 2008 had put considerable pressure on airlines cost structure 
requiring them to find ways to cover costs.  
 
Third, when an industry is naturally characterized by high fluctuation in demand and supply it 
affects the innovator’s lower cost advantage. The airlines industry is characterized by high 
CAPEX and OPEX cost structure, perishable nature of service (cost always incur whether or not 
people fly) and wide fluctuation of demand and capacity. These cost drivers put pressure on 
incumbent airlines to use the revenue management model to lower prices to adjust demand in 
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low demand seasons. These three factors in some ways affect both the innovating firm’s and the 
incumbent’s lower cost advantage.  The network carriers have been cutting some of the value 
added options to save costs. Whilst the LCCs that started out as pure low-cost models, have been 
adding up other services in order to cover costs. 
 
Because of the above reasons, market-driven business model innovations appear to evolve 
quickly into hybrid business models. A hybrid model refers to a business model that combines 
elements from both of the two worlds; the low-cost and premium models (Francies et. al., 2005: 
2). The above analysis suggests that, from entrant’s perspective, there are two basic variations 
with regards to how innovators construct their value innovations (1) a pure low-cost or (2) a 
hybrid model. This classification appears to correlate with the dichotomous categorization of 
technology vs. non-technology and business model classification of low-cost vs. hybrid models.  
 
Despite being not strictly low-cost business models, how hybrid business model innovations 
create a dilemma (despite the non-existence of a strong economical asymmetric motivation) and 
eventually cause disruptive innovation seems to be not fully understood. Our findings suggest 
two possible explanatory factors why non-technological market-driven hybrid business models 
may cause dilemma and disruption. First, incumbent managers tend to ignore emerging market-
driven models possibly due to the size of the domestic market. In the airlines industry, for 
example, the main source of revenue for traditional network carriers is international travel 
market. Although, they serve the domestic market with full capacity, they do not consider it as 
the main driver of their full-service business models. Commenting on the size of the domestic 
market, one manager said as follows: 
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South Africa is still largely a restricted travel market. If you take for example how many 
people in South Africa travel versus how many people in India travel, I mean its just mind 
blowing. We don’t have the volume to support more and more players in the market. 
 
Similarly, the major insurance incumbents’ revenue models are driven by the commercial market 
(B2B), while serving the middle personal market (B2C) as a second priority.  Probably for this 
reason, some leading incumbents did not take seriously the emergence of market-driven hybrid 
direct models in the middle business-to-consumer domestic market, as explained by a senior 
manager: 
 
If you look at how profitable personal business is versus commercial and corporate both in 
terms of volume and value, you would understand the prioritization within the business. 
Even if I loose a large part of my personal business it won't be as significant as risking my 
commercial and corporate relationships because of it. 
 
The insight emerging from this analysis is that, despite the existence of strong asymmetric 
motivation in emerging disruptive technological innovations, technological incumbents appear to 
mitigate dilemma and respond to latent disruptive innovation quite early. On the contrary, 
despite the non-existence of a strong economical asymmetric motivation, non-technological 
firms seem to a face relatively higher the dilemma and disruptive impact. This may suggest that 
the concept of asymmetric motivation alone cannot help us to understand the process of 
disruptive innovation.  
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II. VC and CI: Table 7.12 shows no statistically significant difference on the relationship 
between VC and CI across the two types of innovation. This means that both types of innovators 
configured fundamentally different value chain and created capabilities for continuous 
innovation. However, the case study investigation explains some relevant typology to associate 
the categorization of innovation into dichotomous technological vs. market-driven with the 
classification of value chains into direct vs. distributed. The very disintermediation and “going 
direct” is the core source of innovation in market-driven hybrid models. A firm with a direct 
model performs most of the downstream value creation activities inside and controls its own 
distribution channels. While direct hybrid models go to market directly by cutting intermediaries, 
major backing from established large corporations allows them to source (outsource) assets and 
capabilities, coordinate and process activities on the upstream value chains.  
 
Technological innovators are likely to adopt a distributed model. A firm with a distributed model 
focuses on performing one or few core activities in the value chain, mostly on the upstream 
position, and partners with other firms that perform the remaining activities in the value chain, 
usually in the downstream activities such as distribution and marketing. While this model is 
arguably an efficient innovation model with a better speed-to-market capabilities (Chesbrough, 
2003), we find that innovating firms also adopt this model to circumvent critical resource and 
capabilities shortages. Therefore, when a technological innovator is located on the upstream 
value chain, which is the case with most innovators, it will likely compromise the prospect to 
interact with customers directly and get first-hand consumer insights. 
 
III. The constraint factor: While both types of innovating firms face significant constraints 
with no statistically significant differences among them,  the qualitative investigation reveals the 
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two types of innovations face different nature and degree of constraints. Technological start-up 
innovators can be referred to as un-supported innovators. In their early product life-cycle 
disruptive technological innovations evolve through a period of technological ferment until a 
dominant standard emerges (Dewar and Dutton, 1986: 1422). As a result, they are less likely to 
find capital ventures or major investors to back their innovations, especially during their early 
un-certain market periods. Particularly, this is more evident in South Africa where there seems to 
be no robust innovation policies and capital venture markets to support start-up innovators. As a 
result, they seem to overcome some constraints by partnering with established firms that possess 
required resources such as distribution channels and brands, in effect creating a distributed 
model. 
 
Due to massive investment requirements to create and develop new companies in non-
technological industries such as insurance and airlines, and subsequently the need for 
uninterrupted investment in human resources, branding and marketing, we find that disruptive 
market-driven companies are launched by major established companies that allow them to 
configure direct and hybrid models. 
 
Therefore, there seems to be some associations between the types of constraints, choice of a 
business model and categorization of innovation into the dichotomous technology and market-
driven business model innovations. Because of significant constraints in terms of compatibility 
with existing complementary technologies, inherent technical, functional and capital limitations, 
emerging disruptive technological innovations are pure low-cost, distributed and un-supported 
business models. Generally, market-driven innovations are hybrid, direct and supported models.  
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IV. The Competition factor: Table 7.12 shows that a strong effect of competition for market-
driven low-tech firms, while the hypothesized relationship is almost non-existent in high-tech 
innovators (B = 0.24, p = 0.0068). In latent disruptive technological innovation phenomenon, 
intense competition is less likely to emerge in uncertain markets until a dominant technological 
design emerges that provides a stable platform for competition. The innovation tend to be 
technology-push rather than driven by competition (Gatignon et. al., 2004: 1107; Roberson, 
1967: 15).  
 
We find that firms with hybrid market-driven business models tend to have higher competitive 
pressures compared to firms with technological innovations. In non-technological market-driven 
business model innovations, even though competition is certainly a key driver for growth of an 
emerging disruptive niche market, our qualitative study outcomes suggest that the existing fierce 
competition, lack of clear and strong government’s competition policies, coupled with the 
globalization and deregulation, will probably have some erosion effect on the disruptors 
revenues in later growth or mature stages of disruptive innovations.   
 
V. Strategy and innovation: In developing economies setting, in both types of innovations, the 
prevalent open access to procedures, designs and principles in creating innovation would seem to 
make the use of codified knowledge and Intellectual Property (IP) less useful as strategic assets 
to protect innovations. For example, the ideas and basic principles of information technology 
innovations such as VoIP mobile and instant mobile messaging are open source in nature. In 
similar manner, the basic ideas and principles of developing market-driven low-cost business 
models can be openly studied from developed economies experiences. 
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A technological start-up firm seems to begin by developing a technology and proceeds to 
develop a business model, with less regard about developing a sustainable competitive strategic 
advantage in the initial stage. In the evolutionary process, technological innovators 
characteristically capture rent if they are successful to achieve the first mover advantage, which 
in turn creates network economies of scale (Evans and Wurster, 1997: 14). However, in rapidly 
changing technological landscape, they maintain these advantages through continuous product 
innovation in a form of releasing successive versions of the original innovation. This strategy can 
be referred to as emergent strategy (Magretta, 2002: 92; Mintzberg, 1994: 111). 
 
Firms with market-driven business model innovations seem to have a forward-looking (planned) 
strategy development process, although in reality the original strategy changes tremendously. 
The fact that most market-driven disruptive business model innovations emerge in a mature 
industry, when once a radical or disruptive innovation matures and competition through business 
model innovation becomes a key means of circumventing industry barriers, innovators are likely 
to have the opportunity to analyze industry forces. In sustaining competition advantage, the locus 
of innovation is often on continuous process and business model innovation (Moore, 2004: 88; 
Porter, 1985: 32; Shafer et. al. 2005: 203). 
 
7.4.2 The Emergent Model for the Incumbent  
From the incumbent’s perspective, the conceptual model emphasizes that first understanding the 
causes and processes of disruptive innovation is fundamental for developing strategic approaches 
to enable disruptive innovation. It was hypothesized that disruptive innovation was a function of 
three factors; disparity, conflict and dilemma. A potentially disruptive innovation may evolve in 
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a disparate trajectory in the form of radical product, new competencies, new customers and/or 
new revenue model long before it makes inroads into an established market (Gilbert, 2003: 32). 
This disparate trajectory in terms of radical product design, core competencies, market focus or 
business models, per se, does not seem to have significant effect on causing disruptive 
innovation across the two types of innovation. Table 7.14 summarizes key emerging insights for 
the differences between technological and non-technological incumbents with regards to 
disruptive innovation enabling approaches.  
 
Table 7.14:  Incumbent’s Model: Emerging Patterns of Disruptive Innovation  
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Table 7.14 explains that technological firms are likely to have higher anticipation ability to 
emerging disruptive innovation relative to non-technological market-driven firms. As a result, 
the time lags taken by firms in responding to potentially disruptive innovation is shorter in 
technological firms compared to non-technological firms. One of key decision criteria for both 
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business model and organization separation or integration is whether the firm’s value chain is 
horizontally or vertically structured. In technological environment, firms are likely to separate 
both the business model and the organization in a separate company regardless whether their 
value chain is horizontally distributed or vertically integrated. In non-technological environment, 
firms with horizontally distributed value chain are likely to separate both the business model and 
the organization. In contrast, firms with vertically integrated value chain are more likely to 
integrated the business model within the existing organizational structure. However, despite the 
different approaches, the t-test paired difference statistic test of the two groups shows no 
significant differences in the mean scores of the two manifest variables (a. achieving synergy and 
b. disruptive market performance) that constitute the construct variable “incumbent performance 
in enabling disruptive innovation”. Table 7.14 indicates that the mean scores for the variable 
“synergy” for technology and business model are equally about 4 with t-test p-value 0.85. 
Similarly, the mean values for the variable “disruptive market performance” for technology and 
business model are again about 4 with no significant t-test difference 0.84. 
 
I. Dilemma and disruptive innovation: The most important cause of disruptive innovation 
seems to be the dilemma factor across both types of innovation, with no statistical difference 
between them (see Table 7.12). The higher the dilemma incumbents managers face, the higher 
the negative impact of disruptive innovation on incumbents business model. Proving this 
relationship statistically, the qualitative examination reveals that high-tech incumbent firms seem 
to possess the capability to anticipate latent disruptive innovation and respond relatively quickly 
long before the technology becomes disruptive. On the other hand, low-tech incumbents appear 
to face higher dilemma and, as a result, higher disruption. The difference between these two 
types of firms is management’s ability to anticipate, willingness to take risk initiative and to 
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cannibalize existing source of revenue. Thus, the lower the dilemma, the lower the disruptive 
impact of an innovation to an incumbent’s business model (Christensen, 2006: 46; Henderson 
and Clark, 1990: 27). 
 
II. Business model separation or integration strategy: Statistically the difference between the 
two types of firms on the issue of separation or integration is significant (see Table 7.12). The 
study outcome shows common patterns among high-tech incumbents with regards to creating a 
new SBU (within existing organizational structure) to manage a disruptive innovation relative to 
low-tech industries. Still, organizational strategies on this aspect may depend on the nature of 
specific innovation and idiosyncrasies peculiar to specific industry, rather than purely depending 
whether an innovation is technological or non-technological. In technological environments, for 
instance, MXit users use massive data at very low tariff, which creates a bottleneck on the 
MNO’s network capacity, blocking and interfering with cellular voice and SMS traffic. This led 
many managers to believe that instant mobile messaging (MXit) would be disruptive to MNOs 
SMS technology.  
 
Over time, as the market of MXit becomes clearer, the MNOs found that IMS was not disruptive 
to their traditional source of revenue. Instead, it created a new source of revenue for them. As 
MXit users use the MNO’s network to send more messages more efficiently, the bigger the data, 
the more the revenue for incumbents. The mobile industry is characterized by massive network 
economies of scale; when the network works to the maximum capacity it becomes more 
efficient. If the traffic becomes heavy on the network, MNOs can expand the capacity by adding 
more towers and other required infrastructure. Having said that, the specialist start-up MXit has 
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grown remarkably adding many related product lines to its original technology in a rather short 
time since its introduction. It can only be seen in future whether the incumbents’ integration 
strategy will be considered as the best possible option in retrospect.   
 
Again in technological environments, the case study of VoIP mobile points out that when 
managers predict that a certain technology will be disruptive to their main established source of 
revenue, technological incumbents are likely to adopt a separation strategy. The Internet based 
VoIP-mobile has the potential to displace the GPRS/3G GSM cellular voice calls technology. In 
addition to the nature of technology, as we have seen in our case studies chapter Innovation 2 
uses a fundamentally different business model compared to the traditional mobile industry. 
MNOs charge their subscribers per minute for cellular voice calls. The start-up company 
distributes its V-mobile voice call services through voice over IT terminators (intermediaries) for 
a flat license fee for about ZAR10 (USD$1.3) per subscriber per month. In addition, customers 
have to pay for the Internet data tariff to the network provider.  
 
Therefore, recognizing this disruptive technology, the major incumbent responded quickly by 
introducing a separate SBU. Yet, “disruption is a process, not an event” that may take months or 
years or decades before an innovation becomes disruptive (Christensen, 2006: 46). Whether the 
specialist start-up or the MNO incumbent is poised to surf on the next disruptive growth of V-
mobile market can only be seen in future.  
 
In non-technological industries, the question of separation or integration strategy seems to be 
correlated with the vertical or horizontal types of industry’s value chain structure. The insurance 
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and airlines’ value chains are horizontally distributed in which they rely profoundly on 
intermediation for their major source of income. On the contrary, the bank industry’ value chain 
is vertically integrated. Hence, banks are likely to integrate the same innovation model within 
their full-service traditional business model that otherwise, has been disruptive to airlines and 
insurance companies. This study suggests that in vertically integrated low-tech industries, 
integration strategy seems tot be the best possible action. But as our case studies show 
incumbents such as banks could still create a separate company for political and national 
economic reasons. 
 
III. Organizational separation: In both types of innovation, there is a strong statistical 
correlation between the organizational separation strategy and incumbent’s performance for 
enabling disruptive innovation. There is no statistically significant difference between the 
technological and non-technological firms. When an innovation is identified as disruptive, 
incumbents in the mobile industries are more likely to create a separate business unit within an 
existing organization to manage the disruptive innovation. The insurance and airlines incumbents 
are likely to create a separate company to manage the disruptive business model. Banks, 
however, are likely to integrate a potentially disruptive innovation within existing business unit 
and organizational structure. Note that this finding must be read in conjunction with the first-
order conclusion that states organizational separation does not, in the literal sense, mean an 
obsolete disconnection of the new spinoff company from the parent company. There is a 
common pattern of some sort of weak linkages at the upstream value chains among all firms that 
launch a separate disruptive organization.  
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IV. Senior management involvement:  Table 7.12 shows that, supporting the second-order 
hypothesis (H13), there is a strong positive relationship between senior management 
involvement and IP in high-tech firms, but not in low-tech industries ( = 0.32, p = 0.0013). In 
technological firms, senior corporate managers tend to be significantly involved in supporting 
the disruptive unit. Stressing the importance of senior management involvement in addressing 
internal political infighting and conflicts between the managers of disruptive unit and the 
traditional units, one director for the new disruptive unit commented as follows: 
 
We can see it straight away (conflict between managers), because the existing business 
sees us as a threat to their business. And obviously there’s personal ego’s involved and 
so yes… absolutely… its… its not easy. So the new venture is very much in the limelight 
with the senior management of the company, but it is (also) very much seen as a threat to 
middle management in the other side of the business. 
 
For non-technological environments, despite the statistical insignificant difference result, the  
personal face-to-face interviews with some top level managers reveal that the senior corporate 
mangers involvement is critical. One manager for a spinoff expressed his frustration in regard to 
the lack of attention and support from the top level management for the new venture: 
 
It (the conflict of interest) is one of the problems.  You must just remember that you 
are actually not central. If you are not central you are not on their list of priorities.  
If you are not on the list of priorities, you have to just fight. I am going to write a 
book one day on innovation, okay. And it is going to be written in a font this big, 
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and say, "If you are not at the core of the business that you are innovating for, do 
not do it". 
 
V. The CEO Factor: Statistically, second-order H14 is strongly supported in technological 
firms with regards to the relationship between hiring an outside CEO and incumbent’s 
performance in enabling disruptive innovation (see Table 7.12,  = 0.15, p = 0.0049). 
Technological firms are likely to hired outside CEO to manage the disruptive innovation. But 
there is no shared pattern in low-tech industries. In technological firms, the externally hired CEO 
is seen as the vital source of enabling disruptive innovation.  Technological firms are found to 
hire CEOs who were previously the founders and directors of pioneering disruptive companies 
that inflicted or predicted to affect the incumbent. In non-technological firms, while insurance 
and banks follow the same strategy of hiring an outside CEO, airlines incumbents believe hiring 
internal CEO is the best strategy to enable disruptive innovation. As one manager commented, 
what was most important for the airlines incumbent was the quick learning curve and leveraging 
the expertise of the parent company: 
 
I don’t think that is the determining criteria (hiring an outsider). What is important is 
that an entrepreneurial mindset. So, that’s the more important one than rather an 
outsider CEO. I don‘t think that makes a difference. Especially if you want to put 
something up quickly, and it must work quickly. You cannot really afford to have a too 
long learning curve. You just have to make sure the two are separate to make a healthy 
competition between the two companies (traditional and disruptive models). 
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VI. Incumbents performance in enabling disruptive innovation: This study hypothesized that 
incumbent’s performance in enabling disruptive innovation is the function of business model and 
organizational separation, senior management involvement and hiring outside CEO. The above 
analysis shows that the two types of incumbent firms significantly differ in their approaches to 
disruptive innovation. In future studies, there is a need to investigate whether these different 
approaches lead to different incumbents’ performance in enabling disruptive innovation across 
the two types of innovation.  
 
In chapter four, it was stated that incumbent’s performance in enabling disruptive innovation 
should have been ideally measured by assessing objective monetary measures including market 
share gained from the disruptive market. In this study, it has been difficult to obtain and correlate 
the exact financial data with incumbent’s performance in the disruptive market due to issues of 
confidentiality and other complex market dynamics. By consulting published researches, this 
item is measured by quantifying managers’ opinion on the performance of the incumbent in 
dealing disruptive innovation The quantified opinions of the surveyed managers suggest that, 
despite the different approaches, the t-test paired difference statistic test shows no significant 
differences in the mean scores of the two manifest variables that constitute the construct variable 
“incumbent performance in enabling disruptive innovation”. Table 7.14 indicates that the mean 
scores for the variable “synergy” for technology and business model are equally about 4 with t-
test p-value 0.85. Similarly, the mean values for the variable “disruptive market performance” 
for technology and business model are again about 4 with no significant t-test difference 0.84. 
(Markides and Charuitou, 2004; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; Dess and Robinson, 
1984).  
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7.5  Conclusions 
The premise for the study’s second research question is that technological and non-technological 
market-driven disruptive innovations vary in business model evolutions, competitive and 
disruptive effects and the associated managerial implications. This study concludes that 
technological and non-technological market-driven disruptive innovations have both similarities 
and differences.  
 
The two types of innovation follow similar business model evolution patterns and exhibit similar 
disruptive effects on incumbents established business models. This thesis also reveals a number 
of differences. Consistent with the hypothesis and established literature, during the introduction 
stage of the innovation life-cycle, disruptive technological innovation’s value propositions are 
inferior enough to cause asymmetric motivation (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). Transaction 
cost theory that defines the cost of production and delivery of goods and services seems to 
explain the cause of asymmetric motivation in technological environments (Adner, 2002; 
Reinganum, 1983). A disruptive technology and traditional business models have fundamentally 
different cost-structure and pursue different margin models.  
 
In contrast, transaction economic theory alone does not seem to explain fully the evolution of 
hybrid market-driven non-technological disruptive innovations. The disruptive and traditional 
models are not strictly dissimilar when we compare them merely in terms of economic models. 
Our findings suggest two important reasons for causing possible disruption on the part of 
incumbents; (a) the size of the domestic market, and (b) the distinction of personal versus 
 276 
commercial, and international versus national markets as in the insurance and airlines industries 
case studies in South Africa demonstrate.   
 
Paradoxically, although technological innovations appear to have created economic asymmetric 
motivation, incumbent firms seem to have learned how to identify the early pointers of latent 
disruptive technology and take appropriate strategic measures to respond long before the 
technology becomes disruptive. Non-technological hybrid market-driven disruptive innovations 
do not seem to create sufficient condition for economical asymmetric motivation. Yet they seem 
to cause relatively higher degree of dilemma and, as a result higher disruptiveness impact. 
 
On the question of enabling strategies, while all firms seem to follow the organizational isolation 
strategy to manage disruptive innovation, there seems to be significant senior management 
involvement in high-tech firms compared to low-tech firms. But, the decision on hiring inside or 
outside CEO seems to be contingent on industry circumstances rather than on the nature of the 
two types of innovation. By triangulating the statistical results with case studies, this chapter has 
identified key patterns and suggested frameworks of typologies for recognizing evolutions of 
disruptive technology from non-technological market-driven innovations.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1  Introduction   
Chapter one identified two research questions and presented the objective of this study from the 
perspectives of both theory and practice. The first question is: How should established 
companies reinvent their business models to enable internally or externally induced disruptive 
innovations? The secondary question is: What are the differences between disruptive technology 
and disruptive market-driven (non-technological) business model innovations. The overall 
objective of this thesis is to contribute, both theoretically and empirically, to the advancement of 
knowledge through the systematic comprehension of disruptive innovation phenomena in South 
Africa.  
 
This thesis reiterates that the notions of disruptive innovation and a business model are multi-
dimensional, complex and dynamic in nature. This study has tried to simplify these complexities 
by following a rigorous and systematic research methodology to address its research questions. 
First, in chapter two an extensive theoretical examination of the literature was carried out on the 
topics of disruptive innovation and a business model. Following the literature investigation and 
establishing the two research gaps, chapter three presented two conceptual models. The first 
conceptual model proposes seven hypotheses that determine a proactive evolution of a 
potentially disruptive business model innovation from an entrant’s perspective. The second 
conceptual model puts forward another seven hypotheses for enabling disruptive innovation from 
an incumbent’s perspective.  
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Chapter four outlined the research methodology. Disruptive innovation is un-common 
phenomena. The rarity and dynamic nature of this innovation arguably makes a firm-level case 
study method the preferred approach to study disruptive innovation phenomena. While a multi-
case studies method has been used to study disruptors at a firm-level, a survey-based quantitative 
method has been utilized to identify common patterns at a system-level and innovation 
dichotomy level (technology vs. non-technological market-driven innovations) (Adner, 2002; 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Macher and Richman, 2004). 
 
Following the structure of the conceptual models, chapter five discussed five case studies 
consisting of two technological and three market-driven business model innovations in four 
South African industries. Chapter six examined the two conceptual models at a system-level by 
testing the fourteen hypotheses empirically. The purpose of chapter six is to indentify common 
patterns that can be replicated or generalized across the population of the study. Chapter seven 
investigated the same two models by dividing the innovations into two groups; technology vs. 
market-driven business model innovations, and then by subjecting each innovation to the same 
hypothesis and statistical frame. The objective of chapter seven is to discover differences 
between the two types of innovations. This chapter draws together the outcomes of preceding 
chapters and proceeds with conclusions, implications and recommendations.  
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8.2  Conclusions  
8.2.1  First-Order: The Proactive Process of Disruptive Business Model Innovation  
From an entrant’s perspective, the first conceptual model hypothesizes that disruptive innovation 
creates and grows a niche market in a disparate trajectory to the established main market long 
before it becomes disruptive. To examine this hypothesis, two theoretical assumptions of 
disruptive innovation must be met.  
 
First, RA is negatively related to AM. Somewhat consistent with the first hypothesis, mainstream 
customers’ negative perception of relative advantage (RA) of emerging innovation is likely to 
cause asymmetric motivation (AM) during the introduction of a potentially disruptive 
innovation. This may be inferred from the paradoxical nature of a potentially disruptive 
innovation. Initially, a potentially disruptive innovator may begin by discovering low-end 
customer value propositions that are perceived significantly as negative in overall RA compared 
to similar traditional product, when measured by the mainstream customers. This creates AM 
where entrants target a low-end or previously un-served market that is good enough to generate 
low-margin for them, but that may not be encouraging incumbents to counter-attack.  
 
Second, VC is positively related to CI. As hypothesized, continuous innovation is found to be a 
function of new value chain that creates capabilities for consumer-insights, speed-to-market and 
lower cost advantage. Initially, a business model innovation may begin by gaining new consumer 
insight. Alternatively, a dramatic redesign of the end-to-end value chain or value network that 
allows the innovator to take its innovation to market faster than existing traditional value chains 
may create a disruptive value.  
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Conversely, a fundamental deconstruction of traditional value chains that brings about 
fundamental difference in transaction costs of producing and distributing goods or services can 
create a potentially disruptive business model. But one of these changes must propel dramatic 
changes in the other two factors eventually. When these three factors reinforce each other around 
a sustainable strategy, in successive and evolutionary adaptation to endogenous and exogenous 
innovation enabling or disabling forces, a model can function as a dynamic system for 
continuous innovation (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001). 
 
Having met these two basic tests, the conceptual model hypothesizes that a potentially disruptive 
innovation’s growth is a function of asymmetric motivation, continuous innovation, constraints, 
competition and strategy. Rejecting one of the hypotheses, the absence of incumbent’s reaction 
(or presence of asymmetric motivation) during the introductory life-cycle of disruptive 
innovation does not play a significant role in stimulating a latent disruptive niche market. From 
an insurgent perspective, the most critical factor for creating and growing a potentially disruptive 
niche market is the innovator’s intrinsic ability to create and sustain continuous innovation, 
rather than the lack of retaliation from established incumbents. 
 
Moreover, a caveat must follow that not all low-end innovations that emerge in a low-end or 
previous market, and that do not motivate established large incumbents’ revenue models, will 
ultimately become disruptive. As the case of the mobile banking suggests, some innovations are 
typical Bottom of the Pyramid (Bo) innovations that have a long way to go even to address the 
massive challenges of the low-end market itself (Prahalad, 2006).  
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Excluding the AM factor, the empirically emerging insights suggest that a potentially disruptive 
business model innovation is a process that evolves in a complex interplay between constant 
innovation, constraints, competition and innovator’s strategy. 
 
Constraints negatively impact on the evolution of disruptive business model. The constraints 
comprise capital and skilled labor shortages, technical hurdles, poverty and education. On the 
other hand, competition, especially among the new entrants themselves, appears to have some 
positive effect on innovation. From an innovator perspective, in resource scarce, challenging and 
highly competitive domestic market such as South Africa, the innovating firm’s managerial 
ability to acquire, integrate, coordinate and develop generic and firm-specific strategic resources 
is critical for creating and scaling-up a niche market, and capturing and sustaining value for long-
term survival.  
 
This study finds that because of the open source nature of information technology innovations, 
and because of open principles and designs of market-driven business model innovations, 
enterprise firms are less likely to benefit from the use of patents or intellectual property to protect 
and capture the growth of their innovations. The finding of this research suggests that, in such 
open environments, promising disruptors are more likely to rely on continuous innovation as the 
only source of survival. The case study investigation reveals three fairly common key firm-specific 
strategic capabilities that differentiate successful innovators from others; a well-defined innovation 
process, focus on human resources (HR), and nurturing eco-system from the beginning.  
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Summarizing the entrant’s model, the imperative for creating and growing a potentially 
disruptive niche market are configuring a fundamentally different value chain, pursuing 
continuous innovation through deliberate internal strategic processes, and developing generic 
and firm-specific strategic capabilities to overcome disabling forces and sustain a long-term 
differential advantage. Still, the growth of a potentially disruptive niche market does not, by its 
very nature, lead to disruptive innovation. A mainstream market disruption occurs only when the 
innovator’s business model makes it inroad into the incumbent’s mainstream market and 
displaces the incumbent fully or partially (Gilbert, 2003; Rafi and Kamps, 2003). 
 
8.2.2  First-Order: The Enabling Process of Disruptive Innovation   
From an incumbent perspective, the conceptual model for enabling disruptive innovation is built 
from two parts. The first part emphasizes that understanding the causes of disruptive innovation 
is fundamental for developing strategic approaches to enable disruptive innovation. It was 
hypothesized that disruptive innovation was a function of three factors; disparity, conflict and 
dilemma. 
 
A potentially disruptive innovation may evolve in a disparate trajectory in the form of radical 
product, new competencies, new customers and/or new revenue model long before it attacks an 
established market. But the result of this study shows that managers’ perception or misperception 
of this disparity does not seem to have significant effect on causing disruptive innovation. The 
real-time conflict between the two disparate models, and the dilemma it causes, are found to 
cause disruptive innovation. The implication of this finding is that the incumbent senior 
management’s competency in absorbing the dilemma and finding creative ways to prevent the 
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conflict plays considerable role in enabling disruptive innovation, and thus eliminating a dire 
consequence of disruptive innovation on an incumbent’s established business model.  
 
The second part hypothesized that incumbent’s performance in enabling disruptive innovation 
depends on creating a separate business model, creating a new organization, significant senior 
management involvement and hiring outside CEO. As hypothesized, the empirical findings show 
that, first, when established organizations identify the signs of latent disruptive innovation, or 
they are affected by disruptive innovation and decide to respond, they are likely to create a 
separate business unit (either under the existing organization structure or in a separate company), 
with somewhat loose linkages at the upstream supply chains. The second common pattern is a 
significant level of senior management involvement in disruptive spinoff companies at higher 
strategic levels. The third general pattern is that most incumbents are likely to hire outside CEO 
to manage the disruptive business unit. Nevertheless, the aggregate outcome for the questions of 
integration or separation of a business unit and the hiring inside or outside CEO to manage a 
disruptive unit does not give the accurate picture of the relative differences across firms. These 
two questions are more accurately investigated at the second-order study by disaggregating the 
data into dichotomous innovation categories.  
 
8.2.3 Second-Order: The Proactive Process of Disruptive Business Model Innovation 
The purpose of the second-order examination was to investigate the differences or similarities 
between technological and market-driven business model innovations using the same conceptual 
models and hypotheses. 
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From the entrant perspective, consistent with the hypothesis and established literature, this study 
finds that disruptive technological innovation’s value propositions are low enough to cause 
asymmetric motivation during the introduction stage of the innovation life-cycle. This causal 
relationship is underpinned by transaction cost theory. A start-up disruptor and large established 
incumbent have fundamentally different cost-structure and, thus pursue very different margin 
levels.  
 
In hybrid market-driven innovations, differences in transaction costs and revenue models alone 
do not seem to explain fully the evolution of disruptive business model innovation. Incumbents 
do not appear to be paralyzed merely by economically disparate models. In fact hybrid market-
driven models begin life in middle markets that are not entirely perceived unattractive by 
incumbents’ measure. Theoretically, this would lead us to believe that established incumbents 
are likely to react aggressively when a start-up disruptor sets foothold in a mainstream market. 
Empirically, this was not the case. 
 
Our findings suggest two important reasons for causing possible disruption on the part of 
incumbents; (a) the size of the domestic market, and (b) the distinction of personal versus 
commercial, and international versus national markets as in the insurance and airlines industries 
case studies in South Africa demonstrate.  
 
An intriguing finding of this study which needs a very careful reading is the following 
conclusion: 
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• Technological innovations seem to have created economic asymmetric motivation, which 
is theoretically a necessary condition for disruptive innovation (Adner, 2002; Christensen 
and Raynor, 2003; Reinganum, 1983). Contrary to the hypothesized expectation, 
technological incumbents appear to react promptly and aggressively to prevent future 
disruption on their very core-existence.  Incumbent firms seem to have the capability to 
identify the early signals of latent disruptive technology and take appropriate strategic 
measures to respond long before the technology becomes disruptive.  
• Non-technological hybrid market-driven disruptive innovations do not seem to create 
sufficient condition for economical asymmetric motivation, theoretically which is not a 
necessary condition for disruptive innovation. Contrary to the hypothesized expectation, 
non-technological incumbents are found to be paralyzed and disrupted considerably by 
this type of innovation.  
 
From the incumbent’s perspective, statistically speaking, technological firms are likely to create 
a new business model to manage a disruptive innovation. However, incumbents’ response to 
potentially disruptive innovation depends on the nature of innovation and idiosyncrasies peculiar 
to specific industry. In the technological domain, as the case study of MXIt demonstrates, some 
innovations may appear disruptive at a glance, while later they turn out to create a new avenue of 
revenue for incumbents. In the non-technological sector, the question of integration or separation 
of a disruptive innovation seems to be correlated with the value chain structure of a certain 
industry, i.e. whether it is a horizontal or a vertical value chain.  
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Nevertheless, in both sectors, when managers sense the signs of real disruptive innovation or 
their companies are hit by disruptive innovation, most firms are likely to adopt a separation 
strategy. Technological firms seem to have the ability to anticipate and respond long before a 
technology becomes disruptive.  Yet,  “disruption is a process, not an event” that may take 
months or years or decades before an innovation becomes disruptive (Christensen, 2006: 46). 
Whether a specialist start-up like Innovator 2 or an agile MNO incumbent that responded to this 
technology, is poised to surf on the next disruptive growth of VoIP-mobile market can only be 
seen in future.  
 
The statistical outcome shows that consistent with the hypothesis, in technological firms, senior 
corporate managers tend to be significantly involved in supporting a disruptive innovation. In 
non-technological environments, there is no significant association between senior 
management’s involvement and incumbent spinoff’s performance to enable disruptive 
innovation. A caution here follows that according to our personal face-to-face interviews with 
some top level managers, senior mangers involvement is critical to champion and support the 
disruptive unit even in non-technological environments. However, a further study seems 
necessary to find out whether non-technological market-driven disruptive spinoff companies 
launched by major corporations need a relatively higher degree of autonomy compared to 
disruptive technological spinoffs.  
 
Technological firms are found to hire CEOs who were previously the founders and directors of 
pioneering disruptive companies that inflicted or predicted to affect the incumbent. In non-
technological firms, while insurance and banks follow the same strategy of hiring an outside 
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CEO, airlines incumbents believe hiring internal CEO is the best strategy to enable disruptive 
innovation.  
 
In conclusion, generally speaking disruptive technology and market-driven business model 
innovations are distinct phenomena and have different managerial implications. Having said this, 
a careful scrutiny within the five types of innovations suggest that disruptive innovation is a 
relative phenomenon. It affects firms in different ways and firms respond to it differently 
depending on the nature of innovation and firm specific contexts (Christensen, 2006: 48). 
 
8.3  Theoretical and Managerial Implications 
8.3.1 Theoretical Implications 
With the academic shift of research focus from a technology to a business model, many scholars 
developed different useful theories and frameworks to address the problem of managing 
disruptive business model innovation. However, few studies have attempted to address the 
question of how industry incumbents strategic processes in reinventing a second business model 
to enable disruptive innovation (Markides and Charitou, 2004; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004; 
Christensen and Overdorf, 2000). In particular, with the emerging understanding that disruptive 
innovation is a function of conflict between traditional and disruptive business models, a careful 
scrutiny of the literature seems to suggest that systematic studies that examine disruptive 
innovation from both sides, i.e, from a disruptor pioneering firm and an incumbent firm 
perspectives seems to be rare.  
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The first contribution of this study is that, by linking the emerging field of study of business 
model innovation (Govindarajan and Gupta, 2001; Holmstrom et. al., 2001; Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1999) with disruptive innovation theory (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; 
Christensen, 1997), it is felt that this thesis has developed an integrated two phased namely, 
proactive and reactive models, for guiding business model innovation from an entrant 
perspective, and strategic reinvention processes to enable disruptive innovation from an 
incumbent perspective.  
 
From a pioneering disruptor perspective, the evolutionary (proactive) model describes that a 
business model innovation is a continuous innovation process that evolves through dynamic 
interaction of market ideas, internal capabilities and processes that convert this idea into 
customer value, value chains that take this customer value to market with speed-to-market 
abilities and lower cost factors. A business model evolves over time in successive adaptations to 
both constraints and competitive forces that shape the evolution and direction of the business 
model’s trajectory. Therefore, it is not a priori concept that can be implemented right away with 
a well-thought out business plans. From the entrant perspective, this study discovers ten modes 
of business models that emerge in response to constraints and competitive forces, and depending 
on the nature of innovation. 
 
 
Extant literature maintains that a distributed model is arguably an efficient innovation model 
compared to an integrated model (Chesbrough, 2003). This study adds value to this argument by 
empirically establishing that innovating firms also adopt this model to circumvent critical 
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resource and capabilities shortages. In effect, they may compromise the possibility to interact 
directly with the final user and gain consumer insights.    
 
From an incumbent firm perspective, the current academic understanding is that disruptive 
innovation is primarily a function of conflict between disparate business models (Christensen, 
2006: Markides, 2006). This study extends this view by empirically establishing the link between 
incumbent’s entrepreneurial dilemma and disruptiveness. We emphasize that senior 
management’s willingness or unwillingness, competence or incompetence to embrace disruptive 
innovation is one of the key factors that cause disruptive innovation. The findings of this study 
strongly suggest that incumbent firms are able to anticipate and prevent disruption of their 
established business models and markets by taking entrepreneurial risk early before an 
innovation becomes disruptive.  
 
When established organizations identify early signs of disruptive innovation, or when they are 
already affected by it, they take different strategic approaches to deal with disruptive innovation 
depending on the nature of innovation, industry structure and firm’s context. Technological as 
well as non-technological incumbents that have horizontally distributed value chains are likely to 
create a separate organization to manage distribution innovation.  
 
Many academic observers have witnessed the disruption of many vertically integrated large 
corporations and, as a result a transition from vertical to horizontal structure in many 
technological and manufacturing industries (Tapscott et. al., 2001; Clark and Clegg, 2000; 
Hamel, 2000; 1998; Evans and Wurster, 1997; Grove, 1996). On the contrary, vertically 
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integrated non-technological industries, such as the bank industry, seem to be less affected by 
market-driven disruptive innovations that otherwise have been disruptive to the insurance and 
airlines industries. This seems to be an interesting finding that needs further investigation. 
 
In disruptive innovation studies, the question underpinning the notions of senior management 
involvement and autonomy is the source and background of a CEO. Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom’s (2002) argue that incumbent’s senior management often applies their preexisting 
values and mindsets in the form of appointing internal managers when they pursue disruptive 
innovation, but end up creating a similar business model, rather than a disruptive one. Beyond 
supporting this argument, a unique finding of this study is that an external CEO is viewed as a 
major strategic source of innovation. Using deep pockets, established firms hire external CEOs 
who were founding members or managing directors of pioneering start-ups and who had a good 
knowledge of the disruptive market and the way a business model works in that market.  
 
The second contribution of this study is that it expands the understanding of the concept of 
relativity in disruptive innovation theory. To the researcher’s knowledge, this study is probably 
the first study that attempts to re-examines the questions surrounding disruptive innovation 
theory in relation to its theoretical generalizations and literal replication by studying the 
problems at the second level of analysis, i.e., by questioning whether the same conceptual 
models can apply across technology and non-technological innovations.  
 
The third contribution of this study is that it has created frameworks of typologies by using 
descriptive categorization schemes. The categorization of innovations into technological and 
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market-driven business model innovations seems to be associated with the classification of 
innovations into “low-cost” vs. “hybrid” and into “direct” vs. “distributed” models.  
 
Firms that introduce low-cost innovations appear to be technological firms that face constraints 
including capital, technical and uncertain markets. The disintermediation or “going direct” 
appears to be a key source of innovation for hybrid market-driven innovations. Major backing 
from established corporations allows them to invest in branding and marketing that could 
function in place of intermediaries. 
 
A caveat must follow here that not all market-driven business model innovations are supported 
by major corporations and evolve into “hybrid” models. Nevertheless, the finding of this study 
suggests that disruptive market-driven business models may need to be hybrid in order to target 
the middle markets in economies such as South Africa where wide gap in financial capacities 
determine the path and destiny of innovation.   
 
The literature review of this study reveals that disruptive innovation research is predominantly 
focused on developed economies, although this study evidently shows that disruptive innovation 
phenomena are not always restricted to developed economies. Contextually, this is the first 
comprehensive multi-industries based disruptive innovation study in South Africa as far as the 
researcher knows.  
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8.3.2 Managerial Implications 
From managerial implications point of view, this study may provide a platform for developing 
models taking into consideration the nature of innovation and firm’s special circumstances. From 
an insurgent’s perspective, the proactive model developed by this study may be applied to guide 
entrepreneurial undertaking for introducing a potentially disruptive innovation. For the entrant, 
the second incumbent’s model of this study may help to predict incumbent’s dilemma and 
probable retaliatory moves and select the best proactive strategic course of action to attack the 
incumbent’s established market.  
 
However, although success depends on the innovator’s ability to strategize, change constraints 
and competitive pressures into innovation opportunities, there are major constraints beyond the 
control of entrepreneur firms. The findings of this study suggest that the lack of capital venture 
markets, national innovation clusters, R&D centers and government policies and regulations with 
regards to innovation need an urgent government attention. 
 
From an incumbent’s perspective, by looking at the entrant’s proactive framework, managers 
will be able to sense, detect and monitor latent and emerging disruptive innovations. From the 
incumbent’s model, managers can understand the processes and causes of disruptive innovation. 
Understanding this will assist them to take the best possible strategic approaches to enable 
disruptive innovation. Therefore, the two frameworks developed in this thesis can provide basis 
for developing managerial models for introducing a potentially disruptive innovation and for 
developing intervention strategies to respond to disruptive innovation. 
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8.4  Recommendations for Further Research  
The notions of business model and disruptive innovation are multi-dimensional, complex, 
dynamic, evolutionary and revolutionary in nature that certainly demand multi-method 
researches and longitudinal studies. A cross-sectional research, such as the one contained here, 
has a number of limitations. Chapter 4 highlighted the methodological and study limitations. The 
following are recommendations to address some of the limitations and research gaps uncovered 
by this study: 
 
1. The empirical conclusions of this study can be reproduced from the sample to the study’s 
target population, i.e., the four South African services industries. This thesis does not 
claim that its findings can be, as is, universally replicated, i.e., the results are contingent.  
Further research in other continents and regions can raise the literal and theoretical 
replications of this study, particularly with respect to anomalies between technology and 
market driven business model innovations.  
 
2. The South African situation revealed in this study subtly implies that in developing 
economies the trajectory of disruptive innovation is likely to be affected by a relatively 
high level of constraints and intensity of competition in small domestic markets, among 
others. Developing economies such as South Africa are characterized by lack of capital 
venture markets, migration of skilled labor, high un-employment rate and low level of 
education. In the future, a comparative study between developed and developing 
economies on the topic of disruptive innovation will add value to the strategic 
management literature.  
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3. This thesis finds that the issue of creating synergy between disparate models appears far 
too complex and ever challenging for managers. On average, incumbents that launched a 
second business model via a new business unit or company have retained some sorts of 
integration through the parent company’s top management involvement at strategic level 
and/or by linking the disparate models at upstream value chains. This issue has not been 
fully addressed here. A dedicated research on the problem of creating synergy between 
disparate models could be an interesting contribution to theory and practice of strategic 
management.  
 
4.  “Disruptive innovation is process, not an event” that may take a number of years 
(Christensen, 2006: 46). In a cross-sectional survey based study, it was unavoidable to 
investigate the past and present events and to rely on surveyed managers’ opinions on 
predictions about the possible future. This probably causes some errors and biases in this 
thesis. A longitudinal study will be necessary to continue this research and follow the 
paths and evolution of the innovations studied in this study.   
 
5. This study is primarily industry research. The topics of relative advantage and 
asymmetric motivations are exclusively studied from a firm perspective. The multi-
dimensional nature of disruptive business model innovation requires a study of user 
adoption determinant factors with respect to a potentially disruptive innovation. Due to 
time and resource limitation this dimension of research is missing from this research. 
This thesis recommends future research to complement this study from a market 
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perspective that examines determinants of a potentially disruptive innovation adoption in 
low-end markets and factors that determine mainstream customer switching behaviors 
from traditional to disruptive innovation. 
 
6. Finally, an interesting trend observed in this study is the potential of disruptive 
innovation to affect other substitute industries beyond the home industries. For instance, 
it is believed that the LCC disruptive innovation has disrupted about 15% market share of 
the long-haul bus industry in South Africa. Although not disruptive innovation, the 
mobile banking has displayed an imminent disruption to the informal financial services in 
the informal economy. This would be an interesting topic for future study.   
 
8.5 Limitations of the Study and the Research Design    
As discussed, any systematic study that attempts to construct an innovation model must meet the 
reliability and validity tests. Govindarajan and Koppalle (2006: 196) argue that extant research 
has yet to establish an appropriate construct validity scale or a psychometrically valid assessment 
for the construct of disruptiveness of an innovation. Realizing this, it is important to highlight the 
potential limitations of this study’s empirical methodology.  
 
First, because of the dynamic, evolutionary and multi-dimensional natures of the concepts of 
disruptive innovation and business model, quantitative methods may not be adequate to study 
disruptive phenomena, if used alone. Because of the rarity of disruptive innovation phenomena 
in South Africa, and hence geographical limitation (empirical study is limited only to South 
Africa), the survey data may not be large enough for a strong generalization of the results, 
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especially at the second level (technology vs. business model) (Kline, 2005; Hoyle and Kenny, 
1999). In an effort to minimize the above two shortcomings, this study used both case study and 
quantitative methods (Voelpel et. al., 2005; Macher and Richman, 2004; Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Hamel, 2000; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). 
 
Second, one of the well-known drawbacks of convenience sampling is self-selection.  There is a 
possibility that the sample includes only respondents with a strong interest or familiarity with the 
concept of disruptive innovation. In addition, although the multi-dimensional nature of disruptive 
innovation would have required multi-dimensional views, particularly of final users, due to time 
and research method limitations, the study is based predominantly on managers’ views. Thus, it 
does not include customers’ views, particularly in investigating the causal relationships of 
relative advantage (RA) of new value propositions and asymmetric motivation (AM) variables 
(Cooper and Schindler, 2001). 
 
Third, the construct of “disruptive innovation” could have been ideally measured by assessing a 
particular disruptive firm’s growth and its disruptive impact on the incumbent’s traditional 
business model and market by objective monetary measures including market share gained by a 
disruptor and, as a consequence, market share lost by disrupted company. In this thesis, it has 
been problematic obtaining the financial measures from the two opposite sides and correlating 
them due to a number of powerful forces including the global financial crises and oil price that 
affected considerably many industries market shares during the period of writing this thesis. By 
consulting published studies, the growth or disruption are measured by relying on reported 
sources on the growth of firms in terms of market share and customers, and quantifying 
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managers’ opinion as a measures of growth (or effectiveness) or disruption (Markides and 
Charuitou, 2004; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; Dess and Robinson, 1984). In this regard, 
a possible bias may arise where managers self-report a growth or disruption based on subjective 
estimation, or without having full information, or provide possibly incorrect information.  
 
Fourth, as common to all strategic management research, in the broader context of the actual 
empirical data analysis and case studies undertaken, and the subsequent systematic process for 
theoretical model development, this study attempts to investigate disruptive innovation 
phenomena ex post for developing a theoretical framework ex ante supposedly to inform future 
strategic management practices. While this may be useful in an environment where competitive 
and technological dynamics remain relatively unchanged, in rapidly and unpredictably changing 
business environments, the usefulness of retrospective analysis for developing a predictive 
framework will probably entail some potential limitations (Danneels, 2004: 248; Sanchez, 1997: 
942).  
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Questionnaire 
PhD Thesis on Disruptive Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXAMPLE OF DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION 
 
 
Disruptive innovation is a technology or a business model innovation which over time displaces 
previously established comparable product or business model in traditional markets. The 
introduction of mobile phones relative to landlines is an example of disruptive technological 
innovation. 
 
A good example of disruptive business model innovation is the introduction of Southwest’s low-
cost carrier (LCC) business model relative to network carriers’ full-service business model in the 
early 1970s in the USA. At the time of its introduction, the mainstream passengers did not see 
value in Southwest’s low-cost, no-frills flying services relative to conventional premium 
services. However, over time many mainstream passengers switched to LCCs. By May 2003, 
Southwest had the largest market share in the US airlines industry. World wide, the LCC 
business model has been rapidly accepted by leisure and price sensitive business travelers who 
value the cheaper, simpler, and more convenient value propositions. Because of conflicts in 
markets and business models, many industry incumbents responded by introducing their own 
LCC models.   
 
This research attempts to investigate how business organizations adapt to technological or 
business model disruptive innovation.  
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire No. 
 
Position of interviewee 
 
Name of the company 
 
Date of interview 
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 Have you witnessed any company that has introduced an innovation into your industry in terms 
of a business model or technology that appeared to you different compared to what was ordinary 
in your industry? If more than one, please mention the innovation that had the biggest impact on 
the industry or your company. 
     Yes/No If yes, how long 
ago? 
If yes, please describe the nature of innovation  
 
1 Business model innovation  Yes/No       
2 Technology innovation Yes/No      
3 Other       
   
  Section 1 
1. Please rate the relative advantages of the innovation’s value propositions compared to existing 
established product/service's value propositions    
.      
  Value proposition 
attributes 
Very least 
advantage   
Lesser 
advanta
ge   
Somewhat 
lesser  
Equal 
advantage  
Somewhat  
better  
Better 
advantage  
Very 
great 
1 Price advantage  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
2 Ease of use  1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
3 New technology 
advantage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
4 Quality advantage  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
5 Brand recognition 
advantage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
6 Other 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
  
       
  
Section  2 
  
 
   
2. Indicate the most appropriate situation when the innovation was introduced into the South African 
market.  
         
    Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree  
Some
what 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 The innovation was 
introduced initially into a 
low-end market which was 
not financially attractive to 
established competitors 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
2 It was not initially attractive 
to mainstream customers in 
the main market  
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
3 It was introduced into 
previously un-served market  
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
4 It was introduced into a 
small niche market that we 
did not believe it was big 
enough to accommodate 
another new competitor 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
5 Other 1 2 3 4 5 6   
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Section 3   
  
     
3. How different do you think is the innovation's value chain (new business model) compared to the industry's 
traditional value chain in terms of the following? 
        
  Components  Very 
similar  
Similar Somewhat 
similar  
The same  Somewhat 
different  
Different Very 
different 
1 Production processes 
(activities in production)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 Supply channels  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 Distribution channels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 Marketing and sales  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 Other  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. In your opinion, how effective do you think is the innovation's value chain in terms of the 
following?   
         
Somewhat 
ineffective 
    Very 
ineffective 
Ineffective 
  
Neither 
effective 
nor 
ineffective 
Somewhat 
effective 
Effective Very 
effective 
1 Cost advantage 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
2 Other                
 
5. In your opinion, how effective do you think is the innovation's value chain in terms of the 
following? 
  
  
      
 
Somewhat  
ineffective 
    Very 
ineffective 
Ineffective 
  
Neither 
effective 
nor 
ineffective 
Somewhat 
effective 
Effective Very 
effective 
1 Gaining consumer 
insight 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
2 Speed to market for 
new products or 
services  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
3 Other  1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
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Section 4 
6. Please assess how difficulty would you think the following constraints could affect the innovating company in its 
effort to develop and scale up its innovation in South Africa. 
.       
    Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree  
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 Lack of access to capital or 
resources (finance, skilled 
labor, technology, 
equipment) 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
2 Customer lack of 
accessibility (shortage of 
business infrastructure) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
3 Customers lack of 
affordability (large 
population with  low income 
and/or low education) 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
4 Lack of clear government or 
industry regulations 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
5 Incompatibility of the 
innovation with existing 
complementary devices 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
6  Other                
 
  
Section 5 
      
7. How big do you think is the number of competitors that have already introduced this innovation in South 
Africa?  
         
Small      Very 
small  
  
Somewhat 
small  
Same as 
expected 
Somewhat 
big 
Big  Very 
big 
1 The number of new competitors 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
2 Other 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
 
8. Please rate how important were the following factors in stimulating the growth of this innovation's market in South 
Africa?  
         
  Factors  Not 
important 
at all   
Unimportant  Somewhat 
unimportant  
Neither 
important 
nor 
unimportant  
Somewhat 
important  
Important  Very 
important  
1 Competition 
among new 
competitors with 
new business 
models  
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
2 Competition from 
traditional 
competitors 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
 Other  1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
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9. Please answer the following questions relative to what you had expected when the innovation/new business model was 
introduced.  
 
    Very 
small  
Small  Somewhat 
small   
Same as 
expected 
Somewhat 
big 
Big  Very big 
1 How big is the market 
share the innovation/new 
business model has 
achieved to date? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
2 
How big do you think the 
market share of all new 
competitors (with the new 
business model) is at this 
point? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
3 
How big do you think the 
growth potential of this 
innovation in future? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
4 Other  1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
 
  Section 6      
 
10. Relative to established comparable product, please evaluate how different is the innovation.   
         
    Very 
similar 
Similar Somewhat 
similar 
Same  Somewhat 
different 
Different  Very 
different 
1 How different was the 
innovation compared to 
your company's previously 
existing core product or 
service design? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
2 How different was the 
innovation compared to 
your previously existing 
core competencies 
(knowledge, technology, 
processes)?   
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
3 How different was the 
innovation to your 
mainstream customers in 
the industry?  
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
4 How different was the 
innovation compared to 
your previously 
established main revenue 
model in the industry? 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
5 Other……………………
…………………………. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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11. Please indicate your agreement/disagreement regarding what your company's stand was at the time  
when the innovation emerged in the market.        
         
    Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree  
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 We did not respond at that time 
because it was difficult to anticipate 
the impact of the innovation on our 
main market 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2 We did not respond at that time 
because we did not believe the 
innovation was the right way to do 
business in the industry 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 We did not respond at that time 
because there was a risk of 
cannibalizing existing 
product/service 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 We did not respond at that time 
because our management was not 
willing to embrace the innovation  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 We did not respond at that time 
because the innovation was not 
appealing to our main customers  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6 We did not respond at that time 
because we would risk losing our 
main partners (distributors)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 We did not respond at that time 
because our company did not have 
the required capabilities  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 Other.……………………………….             7 
 
 
12. Did your company respond to this innovation in any way?      
        
Yes   No    
No 
response    
If your answer is yes, please answer all the rest questions.     
        
13. Please indicate the month and year the innovation was introduced.  
 Month________________ Year____________  
No 
response    
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14. How did your company introduce the innovation? Please tick the appropriate answer. 
      
1 By introducing a separate business unit via a new company 
  
2 By introducing a separate business unit in an existing  company 
  
3 By integrating the innovation in an existing business model  
  
4 Other/ No response/ Not applicable 
  
 
 
15. If your company introduced the innovation in a separate business unit, please rate how important you think  
 the following factors were in creating a separate business model.        
         
    Not 
important  
at all 
Unimportant Somewhat 
unimporta
nt 
Neither 
important 
nor 
unimportant  
Somewhat 
important 
Important Very 
important  
1 Risk of cannibalizing 
(destroying) 
previously established 
products/services 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
2 Risk of lowering your 
profit from high-
margin to low-margin 
activities 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
3 Risk of degrading 
existing quality of 
products or services  
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
4 Risk of damaging the 
company’s image  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
5 Risk of damaging  
relationships with 
existing distribution 
channels  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
6 Risk of defocusing 
from our strategic 
positioning in our 
main market  
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
7 Other………………
…………… 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
16.  If your company introduced the innovation in a separate business unit, 
please tick the most appropriate answer applicable.     
       
1 The CEO of the new company was a member of the parent company’s management    
  2 
The CEO was hired from outside (was not a member of the established parent 
company)    
3 Other/ Not applicable/ No response    
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17. If your company introduced the innovation in a separate business unit/company, to what degree is the 
management of the parent company involved in supporting the new unit/company in the following aspects?  
   
         
    Not at all Very 
little 
Little Same as 
expected  
A fair 
amount 
Much Very 
much 
1 Taking risk initiatives to embrace 
disruptive innovation  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
2 Championing the disruptive 
venture 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
3 Resolving managerial conflicts 
between the new unit and 
existing units 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
4 Screening and approving projects 
for the new unit 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
5 Setting strategic direction 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
6 Setting annual budget for the new 
unit 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
7 Exercising overall financial 
control 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
8 Other…………………………… 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
 
18. If your company introduced the innovation in a separate business unit, how different are the following components 
 of the new unit from the parent company's organization      
         
  Components  Very 
similar   
Similar Somewhat 
similar  
Same  Somewhat 
different  
Different Very 
different 
1 Brand   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
2 Marketing and sales  1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
3 Distribution  1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
4 Production 
processes/activities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
5 Supply 
processes/activities 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
6 Firm identity   1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
7 Organizational culture  1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
8 Management 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 Other 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
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19. If your company introduced the innovation in a separate business unit while maintaining   
the traditional business unit, please indicate your agreement/disagreement with the following statements    
regarding the sharing of activities or resources between the new business unit and the corporate company’s traditional business 
unit(s).  
         
    Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Agree Strongly 
agree 
1 The sharing has enhanced the 
competitive advantage of both new 
business unit (new company and the 
traditional business  or corporate 
company) 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
2 Other.………………………………. 1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
 
  
Section 7 
      
20. If your company responding by introducing a disruptive unit/company, please indicate 
how effective has your organization been in the following:     
         
    Very 
ineffective 
Ineffective Somewhat 
ineffective 
Neither 
effective 
nor 
ineffective  
Somewhat 
effective 
Effective Very 
effective 
1 By introducing the 
innovation in a new 
business unit/company, 
we have become part of 
the disruptive market 
1 2 3 4 5 6  7 
2 Other……………………
…………….. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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21. Please answer the following questions relative to what you had expected when the innovation/new business model  
was introduced.        
         
Small      Very 
small  
  
Somewhat 
small  
Same as 
expected 
Somewhat 
big 
Big  Very 
big 
1 How big do you think the market share 
of all new competitors (with the new 
business model) is at this point?  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
2 How big do you think the market share 
your company or other incumbent(s) 
from the industry lost as the 
consequence of this innovation's 
growth? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3 How big do you think the market share 
other incumbent(s) from other industry 
lost as the consequence of this 
innovation's growth? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 How big is the threat this innovation 
poses to existing traditional business 
models in the industry in future? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5 Other……………………… 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for taking time to give this valuable information. This information is 
used only for academic purposes.  
 
FULL CONFIDENTIALITY IS GUARANTEED 
 
If you would like to receive a copy of a summary of this research findings, please contact 
Mr Solomon Habtay via Solomon.Habtay@wits.ac.za or call 011 717 8085. 
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Open Questionnaire 
PhD Thesis on Disruptive Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. How did your company discover the idea for the innovation? 
 
2. What were the most important market drivers/opportunities that gave you an insight into this 
innovation? 
 
3. What are the key differences of your new customer value propositions compared to 
traditionally existing product or offerings in the industry?  
 
4. Please describe the general profile of your target market and your strategic position compared 
to a major industry incumbent’s target market and its position?  
 
5. Have you attracted or targeted customers who were not historically part of the traditional 
market? 
 
6. Was the market your company targeted financially attractive to traditional large competitors?  
 
7. How do you describe the key differences of your value-chain compared to the industry’s 
traditional value chain? 
 
8. What distribution approach or channels do you use to reach the final user? 
 
9. How different is your new business model from the traditional existing industry’s business 
models? 
 
Questionnaire No. 
 
Position of interviewee 
 
Name of the company 
 
Place of interview 
 
Date of interview 
 
Time started 
 
Time finished 
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10. What were the major constraints for your innovations? And how did you overcome them? 
 
11. What are your company’s three most important strategic capabilities for capturing the value 
your company created and sustaining competition in the long-run?  
 
12. When you first developed your innovation, did you think about a strategy? 
 
13. What was your strategy for the innovation? And how has this changed over time? 
 
14. Relative to what you had expected when the innovation was introduced, how fast do you 
think the innovation's market share has grown? 
 
15. How big is your market share at present in this new market? 
 
16. How long did it take your company to achieve this market share? 
 
17. Do you describe your innovation as disruptive? How? (If yes, go to the next questions) 
 
18. How big do you think the market share lost my major incumbents from the established 
market as a result of your innovation? 
 
19. How did the industry incumbents respond to your innovation? 
 
20. Do you foresee that in future the major incumbents will abandon the market being attacked 
by the innovation? 
 
 
Thank you very much for taking your time to give us this valuable information. This 
information is used only for academic purposes.  
 
FULL CONFIDENTIALITY IS GUARANTEED 
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APPENDIX C:  LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 
AIRLINES INDSUTRY 
No. Interviewee position Date Duration/Hours 
1 Senior Executive Manager 05-06-08 1:00 
2 Head of Corporate Strategy & Planning 03-07-08 2:30 
3 Manager: Operations 07-07-08 1:00 
4 Senior Manager 08-07-08 2:00 
5 Manager: Strategy & planning  20-07-08 2:00 
6 Senior Manager 02-0808 1:00 
7 Manager: Sales and marketing 22-08-08 2:00 
8 HR Manager 18-08-08 1:30 
9 General Manager: Operations 21-08-08 2:00 
10 Training Manager  23-09-08 1:00 
11 Executive Manager: Sales & Marketing 24-09-08 2:00 
12 Manager: Group Budget & Forecasting 25-08-08 2:00 
13 Executive Manager 28-09-08 1:30 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
14 Marketing director 02-09-08 2:00 
15 CEO 01-09-08 1:00 
16 CEO 04-09-08 1:00 
17 Vice President: Client markets  18-09-08 1:30 
18 Executive Manager 29-09-08 1:30 
19 Manager: Innovation hub 30-09-08 2;30 
20 Senior Manager 02-10-08 1:30 
21 Strategy & Innovation Manager 02-10-08 1:30 
22 Head of Marketing  08-10-08 2:00 
23 Managing Director 04-11-08 1:30 
MOBILE & IT INDUSTRY 
24 Chief Corporate Officer  06-08-08 1:00 
25 Senior Manager: Leadership & Talent Management  14-08-08 1:00 
26 Executive Head: Networks  20-08-08 2:00 
27 Senior Manager: Strategic Investments 18-09-08 1:30 
28 Managing Director 29-05-08 2:00 
29 Executive Head: Networks Services 02-10-08 1:00 
30 CEO 02-10-08 2:00 
31 Senior Manager: Marketing & Support Services 06-10-08 2:00 
32 Managing Executive: Product & Development  10-09-08 2:00 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: RA 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 16.7719298 Sum Observations 1912 
Std Deviation 5.03269855 Variance 25.3280546 
Skewness -0.0465252 Kurtosis -0.5831916 
Uncorrected SS 34930 Corrected SS 2862.07018 
Coeff Variation 30.0066754 Std Error Mean 0.47135541 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 16.77193 Std Deviation 5.03270 
Median 17.00000 Variance 25.32805 
Mode 17.00000 Range 23.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 7.00000 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 35.58234 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.988436 Pr < W 0.4435 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.065752 Pr > D >0.1500 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.065388 Pr > W-Sq >0.2500 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 0.394245 Pr > A-Sq >0.2500 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 28 
99% 27 
95% 25 
90% 23 
75% Q3 20 
50% Median 17 
25% Q1 13 
10% 10 
5% 9 
1% 6 
0% Min 5 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
5 41 25 71 
6 37 26 1 
7 81 26 101 
7 80 27 17 
9 113 28 14 
 
                         Stem Leaf                     #             Boxplot                      
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                           21 0000                     4                |                         
                           20 0000000000              10             +-----+                      
                           19 000000000                9             |     |                      
                           18 0000                     4             |     |                      
                           17 0000000000000           13             *-----*                      
                           16 000000                   6             |  +  |                      
                           15 0000000                  7             |     |                      
                           14 00000000                 8             |     |                      
                           13 00000                    5             +-----+                     
                           12 00000000                 8                |                         
                           11 00000                    5                |                         
                           10 000                      3                |                         
                            9 000000                   6                |                         
                            8                                           |                         
                            7 00                       2                |                         
                            6 0                        1                |                         
                            5 0                        1                |                         
                              ----+----+----+----+                                                
                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 327 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: RA 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
                       28.5+                                                ++*                   
                           |                                              +*                      
                           |                                            **                         
                           |                                         **+                          
                           |                                      ***+                            
                           |                                    ***+                              
                           |                                  **++                                
                           |                                 *++                                  
                           |                              ***+                                    
                           |                            ***+                                      
                           |                           **+                                        
                           |                        ****                                          
                           |                       **+                                            
                           |                     **+                                              
                           |                   ***                                                
                           |                  **                                                   
                           |               ***                                                    
                           |             ***                                                      
                           |            **                                                         
                           |        ****                                                          
                           |        ++                                                            
                           |     **+                                                              
                           |   *++                                                                
                        5.5+* ++                                                                  
                            +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+                   
                                -2        -1         0        +1        +2                        
                                                                                                   
                                                                                                   
 
 328 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: AM 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 10.7807018 Sum Observations 1229 
Std Deviation 3.85295834 Variance 14.845288 
Skewness 0.57068115 Kurtosis -0.2962887 
Uncorrected SS 14927 Corrected SS 1677.51754 
Coeff Variation 35.739402 Std Error Mean 0.36086261 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 10.78070 Std Deviation 3.85296 
Median 10.00000 Variance 14.84529 
Mode 9.00000 Range 16.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 5.00000 
 
Note: The mode displayed is the smallest of 2 modes with a count of 15. 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 29.87481 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.954978 Pr < W 0.0007 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.132917 Pr > D <0.0100 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.229421 Pr > W-Sq <0.0050 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 1.42114 Pr > A-Sq <0.0050 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 21 
99% 20 
95% 18 
90% 17 
75% Q3 13 
50% Median 10 
25% Q1 8 
10% 6 
5% 5 
1% 5 
0% Min 5 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
5 104 18 41 
5 89 19 35 
5 82 20 20 
5 68 20 26 
5 60 21 30 
 
                         Stem Leaf                     #             Boxplot                      
                           21 0                        1                0                         
                           20 00                       2                |                         
                           19 0                        1                |                         
                           18 000                      3                |                         
                           17 000000                   6                |                         
                           16 0                        1                |                         
                           15 0000000                  7                |                         
                           14 00000                    5                |                         
                           13 000000000                9             +-----+                      
                           12 00000000                 8             |     |                      
                           11 00000000                 8             |     |                      
                           10 000000000000000         15             *--+--*                      
                            9 000000000000000         15             |     |                      
                            8 00000000                 8             +-----+                      
                            7 000000000                9                |                         
                            6 000000000                9                |                         
                            5 0000000                  7                |                         
                              ----+----+----+----+                                                
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: AM 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: VC 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 20.5964912 Sum Observations 2348 
Std Deviation 4.38565501 Variance 19.2339699 
Skewness -1.2300955 Kurtosis 2.67381909 
Uncorrected SS 50534 Corrected SS 2173.4386 
Coeff Variation 21.2932143 Std Error Mean 0.41075423 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 20.59649 Std Deviation 4.38566 
Median 21.00000 Variance 19.23397 
Mode 24.00000 Range 24.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 6.00000 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 50.1431 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.91895 Pr < W <0.0001 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.098057 Pr > D <0.0100 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.233058 Pr > W-Sq <0.0050 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 1.710718 Pr > A-Sq <0.0050 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 28 
99% 28 
95% 26 
90% 26 
75% Q3 24 
50% Median 21 
25% Q1 18 
10% 16 
5% 13 
1% 4 
0% Min 4 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
4 44 26 101 
4 41 26 113 
8 37 27 1 
10 26 28 92 
12 39 28 104 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: VC 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: VC 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: CI 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 15.0526316 Sum Observations 1716 
Std Deviation 3.63571786 Variance 13.2184443 
Skewness -0.7470679 Kurtosis 0.56958749 
Uncorrected SS 27324 Corrected SS 1493.68421 
Coeff Variation 24.1533704 Std Error Mean 0.34051618 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 15.05263 Std Deviation 3.63572 
Median 15.50000 Variance 13.21844 
Mode 18.00000 Range 18.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 5.00000 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 44.20533 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.942536 Pr < W <0.0001 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.133328 Pr > D <0.0100 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.240439 Pr > W-Sq <0.0050 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 1.612153 Pr > A-Sq <0.0050 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 21.0 
99% 20.0 
95% 20.0 
90% 19.0 
75% Q3 18.0 
50% Median 15.5 
25% Q1 13.0 
10% 10.0 
5% 9.0 
1% 3.0 
0% Min 3.0 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
3 41 20 25 
3 37 20 27 
8 44 20 40 
8 38 20 101 
9 95 21 92 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: CI 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Const 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 23.0701754 Sum Observations 2630 
Std Deviation 4.51491001 Variance 20.3844124 
Skewness -0.399024 Kurtosis -0.2025435 
Uncorrected SS 62978 Corrected SS 2303.4386 
Coeff Variation 19.5703323 Std Error Mean 0.42286007 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 23.07018 Std Deviation 4.51491 
Median 24.00000 Variance 20.38441 
Mode 24.00000 Range 22.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 6.00000 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 54.55747 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.977975 Pr < W 0.0569 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.116671 Pr > D <0.0100 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.169597 Pr > W-Sq 0.0138 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 0.91965 Pr > A-Sq 0.0201 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 33 
99% 31 
95% 30 
90% 29 
75% Q3 26 
50% Median 24 
25% Q1 20 
10% 17 
5% 15 
1% 12 
0% Min 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 343 
Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
11 70 30 57 
12 44 30 73 
13 16 31 28 
14 37 31 42 
14 14 33 64 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Const 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Comp 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 12.1491228 Sum Observations 1385 
Std Deviation 4.07068618 Variance 16.5704859 
Skewness -0.3644337 Kurtosis -0.1444053 
Uncorrected SS 18699 Corrected SS 1872.46491 
Coeff Variation 33.506009 Std Error Mean 0.38125469 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 12.14912 Std Deviation 4.07069 
Median 13.00000 Variance 16.57049 
Mode 13.00000 Range 18.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 6.00000 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 31.86616 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.972442 Pr < W 0.0187 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.10033 Pr > D <0.0100 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.125696 Pr > W-Sq 0.0497 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 0.851037 Pr > A-Sq 0.0284 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 21 
99% 20 
95% 18 
90% 17 
75% Q3 15 
50% Median 13 
25% Q1 9 
10% 7 
5% 3 
1% 3 
0% Min 3 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
3 101 19 4 
3 93 19 40 
3 88 20 15 
3 83 20 17 
3 80 21 14 
 
                         Stem Leaf                     #             Boxplot                      
                           21 0                        1                |                         
                           20 00                       2                |                         
                           19 00                       2                |                         
                           18 0000                     4                |                         
                           17 00000                    5                |                         
                           16 0000000000              10                |          
                           15 0000000000              10             +-----+                      
                           14 000000000000            12             |     |                      
                           13 0000000000000           13             *-----*                      
                           12 000000000                9             |  +  |                      
                           11 000000000                9             |     |                      
                           10 0000000                  7             |     |                      
                            9 0000000                  7             +-----+                      
                            8 0000000000              10                |                         
                            7 00000                    5                |                         
                            6 0                        1                |                         
                            5                                           |                         
                            4                                           |                         
                            3 0000000                  7                |                         
                              ----+----+----+----+                                                
                                                                                                  
                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 348 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Comp 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: IG 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 12.1491228 Sum Observations 1385 
Std Deviation 3.99830153 Variance 15.9864152 
Skewness 0.1175955 Kurtosis -0.8596209 
Uncorrected SS 18633 Corrected SS 1806.46491 
Coeff Variation 32.9102076 Std Error Mean 0.37447525 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 12.14912 Std Deviation 3.99830 
Median 12.00000 Variance 15.98642 
Mode 11.00000 Range 16.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 6.00000 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 32.44306 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.971661 Pr < W 0.0160 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.086782 Pr > D 0.0343 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.119327 Pr > W-Sq 0.0640 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 0.835199 Pr > A-Sq 0.0316 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 20 
99% 20 
95% 19 
90% 18 
75% Q3 15 
50% Median 12 
25% Q1 9 
10% 7 
5% 6 
1% 5 
0% Min 4 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
4 64 19 14 
5 82 19 101 
5 38 19 107 
6 76 20 28 
6 75 20 92 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: IG 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
Note that the statistics on variables from Disparity through to IP (Incumbent Performance) 
covers data only from 88 respondents. But the SAS 9.2 software assigns the missing value as 
“1”. Therefore, the number of observations “N” is indicated as 114. 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Disparity 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 19.1754386 Sum Observations 2186 
Std Deviation 4.23689153 Variance 17.9512498 
Skewness 0.00020814 Kurtosis -0.314744 
Uncorrected SS 43946 Corrected SS 2028.49123 
Coeff Variation 22.0954087 Std Error Mean 0.39682125 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 19.17544 Std Deviation 4.23689 
Median 19.00000 Variance 17.95125 
Mode 18.00000 Range 19.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 6.00000 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 48.32261 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.98417 Pr < W 0.1994 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.077918 Pr > D 0.0879 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.09092 Pr > W-Sq 0.1488 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 0.548427 Pr > A-Sq 0.1597 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 28 
99% 28 
95% 26 
90% 25 
75% Q3 22 
50% Median 19 
25% Q1 16 
10% 14 
5% 12 
1% 9 
0% Min 9 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
9 91 27 57 
9 37 27 95 
11 62 27 110 
11 39 28 14 
11 26 28 19 
 
                         Stem Leaf                     #             Boxplot                      
                           28 00                       2                |                         
                           27 000                      3                |                         
                           26 000000                   6                |                         
                           25 0000                     4                |                         
                           24 00000                    5                |                         
                           23 000000                   6                |                         
                           22 0000                     4             +-----+                      
                           21 000000000000            12             |     |                      
                           20 00000000                 8             |     |                      
                           19 00000000000             11             *--+--*                      
                           18 00000000000000          14             |     |                      
                           17 0000000000              10             |     |      
                           16 00000000                 8             +-----+                      
                           15 00000000                 8                |                         
                           14 000                      3                |                         
                           13 000                      3                |                         
                           12 00                       2                |                         
                           11 000                      3                |                         
                           10                                           |                         
                            9 00                       2                |                         
                              ----+----+----+----+                                                
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Disparity 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                           
                       28.5+                                              +*+ *                   
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                           |                            ****                                      
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                           |             ****+                                                    
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                           |          **+                                                         
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                           |     **+*                                                             
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Dillema 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 27.1754386 Sum Observations 3098 
Std Deviation 8.65795007 Variance 74.9600994 
Skewness 0.88048318 Kurtosis -0.2117238 
Uncorrected SS 92660 Corrected SS 8470.49123 
Coeff Variation 31.8594676 Std Error Mean 0.81089132 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 27.17544 Std Deviation 8.65795 
Median 25.00000 Variance 74.96010 
Mode 21.00000 Range 35.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 10.00000 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 33.51305 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.902722 Pr < W <0.0001 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.134331 Pr > D <0.0100 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.673265 Pr > W-Sq <0.0050 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 4.08598 Pr > A-Sq <0.0050 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 49 
99% 47 
95% 45 
90% 42 
75% Q3 31 
50% Median 25 
25% Q1 21 
10% 18 
5% 17 
1% 14 
0% Min 14 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
14 39 45 15 
14 37 46 5 
16 87 46 23 
16 47 47 29 
16 38 49 14 
 
                       Stem Leaf                        #             Boxplot                     
                         48 0                           1                0                         
                         46 000                         3                0                         
                         44 0000                        4                |                         
                         42 0000000                     7                |                        
                         40 000                         3                |                         
                         38 0                           1                |                         
                         36 000                         3                |                         
                         34 0                           1                |                         
                         32 0000                        4                |                         
                         30 000000                      6             +-----+                     
                         28 0000000000                 10             |     |                     
                         26 000000000000               12             |  +  |                     
                         24 000000000                   9             *-----*                     
                         22 000000000000               12             |     |                     
                         20 00000000000000000000000    23             +-----+                     
                         18 0000000                     7                |                        
                         16 000000                      6                |                         
                         14 00                          2                |                         
                            ----+----+----+----+---                                                
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Dillema 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
                         49+                                                  *                   
                           |                                            ** *++                    
                           |                                        ***  ++                       
                           |                                    ****   ++                         
                           |                                   **   +++                           
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                           |                                  * ++                                
                           |                                 *++                                  
                           |                               +**                                    
                           |                             ++**                                     
                           |                          ++***                                       
                           |                        ++***                                         
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                           |                    +***                                              
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                           |           ****++                                                     
                           |     ** ***  ++                                                       
                         15+*  *      +++                                                         
                            +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+                   
                                -2        -1         0        +1        +2                        
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: DI 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 14.6666667 Sum Observations 1672 
Std Deviation 4.84387519 Variance 23.4631268 
Skewness 0.27831018 Kurtosis -0.9393634 
Uncorrected SS 27174 Corrected SS 2651.33333 
Coeff Variation 33.0264217 Std Error Mean 0.45367048 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 14.66667 Std Deviation 4.84388 
Median 14.00000 Variance 23.46313 
Mode 12.00000 Range 19.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 7.00000 
 
Note: The mode displayed is the smallest of 2 modes with a count of 10. 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 32.3289 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.959815 Pr < W 0.0017 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.103757 Pr > D <0.0100 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.195519 Pr > W-Sq 0.0060 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 1.291641 Pr > A-Sq <0.0050 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 26 
99% 24 
95% 23 
90% 21 
75% Q3 18 
50% Median 14 
25% Q1 11 
10% 8 
5% 8 
1% 7 
0% Min 7 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
7 57 23 22 
7 41 24 19 
7 38 24 23 
7 37 24 28 
8 101 26 29 
 
                         Stem Leaf                     #             Boxplot              
                           26 0                        1                |                         
                           25                                           |                         
                           24 000                      3                |                         
                           23 000                      3                |                         
                           22 0000                     4                |                         
                           21 000000                   6                |                         
                           20 00000000                 8                |                         
                           19 0                        1                |                         
                           18 0000000000              10             +-----+                      
                           17 0000                     4             |     |                      
                           16 000000000                9             |     |                      
                           15 00000                    5             |     |                      
                           14 00000000                 8             *--+--*       
                           13 0000000                  7             |     |                      
                           12 0000000000              10             |     |                      
                           11 00000000                 8             +-----+                      
                           10 0000000                  7                |                         
                            9 00000000                 8                |                         
                            8 00000000                 8                |                         
                            7 0000                     4                |                         
                              ----+----+----+----+                                                
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: DI 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Conflict 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 26.0877193 Sum Observations 2974 
Std Deviation 7.27532063 Variance 52.9302903 
Skewness 0.35610587 Kurtosis -1.3601141 
Uncorrected SS 83566 Corrected SS 5981.12281 
Coeff Variation 27.8879137 Std Error Mean 0.68139621 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 26.08772 Std Deviation 7.27532 
Median 24.00000 Variance 52.93029 
Mode 18.00000 Range 25.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 13.00000 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 38.28568 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.893232 Pr < W <0.0001 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.186579 Pr > D <0.0100 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.767642 Pr > W-Sq <0.0050 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 4.587946 Pr > A-Sq <0.0050 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 40 
99% 39 
95% 38 
90% 37 
75% Q3 33 
50% Median 24 
25% Q1 20 
10% 18 
5% 18 
1% 16 
0% Min 15 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
15 81 38 84 
16 50 39 15 
18 108 39 18 
18 106 39 24 
18 104 40 22 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Conflict 
                         Stem Leaf                     #             Boxplot                      
                           40 0                        1                |                         
                           39 000                      3                |                         
                           38 0000                     4                |                         
                           37 00000                    5                |                         
                           36 00000                    5                |                         
                           35 0                        1                |                         
                           34 000000                   6                |                        
                           33 00000                    5             +-----+                      
                           32 000                      3             |     |                      
                           31 000000                   6             |     |                      
                           30 0000                     4             |     |                      
                           29 00                       2             |     |                      
                           28 00000                    5             |     |                      
                           27 00                       2             |     |                      
                           26 00                       2             |  +  |                      
                           25 0                        1             |     |                      
                           24 000                      3             *-----*                      
                           23 00                       2             |     |                      
                           22 00000000                 8             |     |                      
                           21 000                      3             |     |                      
                           20 0000000000000000        16             +-----+                      
                           19 0000000                  7                |                         
                           18 000000000000000000      18                |                         
                           17                                           |                         
                           16 0                        1                |                         
                           15 0                        1                |                         
                              ----+----+----+----+                                                
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Conflict 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
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                       30.5+                            ** +                                      
                           |                            * +                                       
                           |                           **+                                        
                           |                          *+                                          
                           |                         +*                                           
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Involvement 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 29.3859649 Sum Observations 3350 
Std Deviation 7.56155714 Variance 57.1771464 
Skewness 0.17305357 Kurtosis -1.3317067 
Uncorrected SS 104904 Corrected SS 6461.01754 
Coeff Variation 25.7318661 Std Error Mean 0.70820471 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 29.38596 Std Deviation 7.56156 
Median 28.00000 Variance 57.17715 
Mode 35.00000 Range 28.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 13.00000 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 41.4936 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.922 Pr < W <0.0001 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.1746 Pr > D <0.0100 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.594201 Pr > W-Sq <0.0050 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 3.485413 Pr > A-Sq <0.0050 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 44 
99% 43 
95% 41 
90% 40 
75% Q3 35 
50% Median 28 
25% Q1 22 
10% 21 
5% 19 
1% 18 
0% Min 16 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
16 33 42 26 
18 35 42 27 
19 44 43 20 
19 36 43 73 
19 28 44 74 
 
                       Stem Leaf                        #             Boxplot                     
                         44 0                           1                |                         
                         42 0000                        4                |                         
                         40 00000000                    8                |                        
                         38 000000                      6                |                         
                         36 0000                        4                |                         
                         34 00000000000000000000000    23             +-----+                     
                         32 000                         3             |     |                      
                         30 00000                       5             |     |                      
                         28 00000000                    8             *--+--*                     
                         26 00000                       5             |     |                      
                         24 00000000                    8             |     |                     
                         22 0000000000000              13             +-----+                     
                         20 00000000000000000000       20                |                        
                         18 00000                       5                |                         
                         16 0                           1                |                         
                            ----+----+----+----+---                                                
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Involvement 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Org_separation 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 35.1315789 Sum Observations 4005 
Std Deviation 9.40392797 Variance 88.4338612 
Skewness 0.24416047 Kurtosis -1.3120971 
Uncorrected SS 150695 Corrected SS 9993.02632 
Coeff Variation 26.767735 Std Error Mean 0.88075855 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 35.13158 Std Deviation 9.40393 
Median 34.00000 Variance 88.43386 
Mode 24.00000 Range 30.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 20.00000 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 39.88787 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.89795 Pr < W <0.0001 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.162439 Pr > D <0.0100 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.473559 Pr > W-Sq <0.0050 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 3.652084 Pr > A-Sq <0.0050 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 53 
99% 52 
95% 50 
90% 49 
75% Q3 44 
50% Median 34 
25% Q1 24 
10% 24 
5% 24 
1% 24 
0% Min 23 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
23 54 50 23 
24 114 51 18 
24 113 51 28 
24 112 52 17 
24 111 53 19 
 
                   Stem Leaf                                #             Boxplot                  
                     52 00                                  2                |                     
                     50 0000                                4                |                     
                     48 0000000000                         10                |                     
                     46 00000000                            8                |                     
                     44 000000                              6             +-----+                  
                     42 000000                              6             |     |                  
                     40 0000                                4             |     |                  
                     38 0000                                4             |     |                  
                     36 00000                               5             |     |                  
                     34 000000000000                       12             *--+--*                  
                     32 000000000                           9             |     |                  
                     30 0000000                             7             |     |                  
                     28 00                                  2             |     |                  
                     26 000                                 3             |     |                  
                     24 0000000000000000000000000000000    31             +-----+                 
                     22 0                                   1                |                     
                        ----+----+----+----+----+----+-                                            
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: Org_separation 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: IP 
Moments 
N 114 Sum Weights 114 
Mean 8.18421053 Sum Observations 933 
Std Deviation 2.77971728 Variance 7.72682813 
Skewness 0.364762 Kurtosis -0.8514009 
Uncorrected SS 8509 Corrected SS 873.131579 
Coeff Variation 33.9643911 Std Error Mean 0.26034438 
 
Basic Statistical Measures 
Location Variability 
Mean 8.184211 Std Deviation 2.77972 
Median 7.000000 Variance 7.72683 
Mode 6.000000 Range 12.00000 
  
  Interquartile Range 5.00000 
 
Tests for Location: Mu0=0 
Test Statistic p Value 
Student's t t 31.43609 Pr > |t| <.0001 
Sign M 57 Pr >= |M| <.0001 
Signed Rank S 3277.5 Pr >= |S| <.0001 
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Tests for Normality 
Test Statistic p Value 
Shapiro-Wilk W 0.900854 Pr < W <0.0001 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov D 0.231366 Pr > D <0.0100 
Cramer-von Mises W-Sq 0.948879 Pr > W-Sq <0.0050 
Anderson-Darling A-Sq 5.312473 Pr > A-Sq <0.0050 
 
Quantiles (Definition 5) 
Quantile Estimate 
100% Max 14 
99% 14 
95% 13 
90% 12 
75% Q3 11 
50% Median 7 
25% Q1 6 
10% 6 
5% 5 
1% 2 
0% Min 2 
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Extreme Observations 
Lowest Highest 
Value Obs Value Obs 
2 81 13 73 
2 63 13 84 
4 46 13 88 
4 9 14 74 
5 52 14 91 
 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: IP 
             Stem Leaf                                            #             Boxplot            
               14 00                                              2                |               
               13                                                                  |               
               13 000000000                                       9                |               
               12                                                                  |               
               12 000000                                          6                |               
               11                                                                  |               
               11 0000000000000                                  13             +-----+            
               10                                                               |     |            
               10 000000000                                       9             |     |            
                9                                                               |     |            
                9 0000000000                                     10             |     |            
                8                                                               |     |            
                8 00000                                           5             |  +  |            
                7                                                               |     |            
                7 000000000                                       9             *-----*            
                6                                                               |     |            
                6 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000    43             +-----+           
                5                                                                  |               
                5 0000                                            4                |               
                4                                                                  |               
                4 00                                              2                |               
                3                                                                  |               
                3                                                                  |               
                2                                                                  |               
                2 00                                              2                |               
                  ----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+---                                      
                                                                                                   
                                                                                                   
 381 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The UNIVARIATE Procedure 
Variable: IP 
                                          Normal Probability Plot                                 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 5 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 2.93874763 1.92959674 0.5877 0.5877 
2 1.00915088 0.48937664 0.2018 0.7896 
3 0.51977425 0.21498116 0.1040 0.8935 
4 0.30479308 0.07725893 0.0610 0.9545 
5 0.22753416   0.0455 1.0000 
 
2 factors will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 Factor2 
RA1 RA1 0.77257 0.37041 
RA2 RA2 0.86733 0.14683 
RA3 RA3 0.62171 0.58147 
RA4 RA4 0.80516 -0.44124 
RA5 RA5 0.74486 -0.56354 
 
Variance Explained by Each 
Factor 
Factor1 Factor2 
2.9387476 1.0091509 
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Final Communality Estimates: Total = 3.947899 
RA1 RA2 RA3 RA4 RA5 
0.73407507 0.77382569 0.72463586 0.84297055 0.87239134 
 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 4 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 2.33930454 1.62640747 0.5848 0.5848 
2 0.71289707 0.13318056 0.1782 0.7631 
3 0.57971651 0.21163462 0.1449 0.9080 
4 0.36808188   0.0920 1.0000 
 
1 factor will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 
AM1 AM1 0.74563 
AM2 AM2 0.81671 
AM3 AM3 0.82413 
AM4 AM4 0.66117 
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Variance Explained 
by Each Factor 
Factor1 
2.3393045 
 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.339305 
AM1 AM2 AM3 AM4 
0.55595794 0.66701973 0.67918390 0.43714298 
 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 4 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 2.40127949 1.51832676 0.6003 0.6003 
2 0.88295274 0.46889319 0.2207 0.8211 
3 0.41405955 0.11235133 0.1035 0.9246 
4 0.30170822   0.0754 1.0000 
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1 factor will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 
VC1 VC1 0.88843 
VC2 VC2 0.59628 
VC3 VC3 0.75091 
VC4 VC4 0.83220 
 
Variance Explained 
by Each Factor 
Factor1 
2.4012795 
 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.401279 
VC1 VC2 VC3 VC4 
0.78930878 0.35555120 0.56386883 0.69255068 
 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 3 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 2.07823555 1.44416437 0.6927 0.6927 
2 0.63407117 0.34637790 0.2114 0.9041 
3 0.28769328   0.0959 1.0000 
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1 factor will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 
CI1 CI1 0.74130 
CI2 CI2 0.90111 
CI3 CI3 0.84659 
 
Variance Explained 
by Each Factor 
Factor1 
2.0782355 
 
Final Communality Estimates: Total 
= 2.078236 
CI1 CI2 CI3 
0.54952600 0.81199496 0.71671459 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 5 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 2.02247072 1.03408025 0.4045 0.4045 
2 0.98839046 0.13442291 0.1977 0.6022 
3 0.85396755 0.14636592 0.1708 0.7730 
4 0.70760163 0.28003198 0.1415 0.9145 
5 0.42756964   0.0855 1.0000 
 
1 factor will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 
Const1 Const1 0.69586 
Const2 Const2 0.80732 
Const3 Const3 0.43925 
Const4 Const4 0.66614 
Const5 Const5 0.49980 
 
Variance Explained 
by Each Factor 
Factor1 
2.0224707 
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Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.022471 
Const1 Const2 Const3 Const4 Const5 
0.48422109 0.65176985 0.19294287 0.44373785 0.24979905 
 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 3 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 1.84005400 0.98212013 0.6134 0.6134 
2 0.85793387 0.55592175 0.2860 0.8993 
3 0.30201213   0.1007 1.0000 
 
1 factor will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 
Comp1 Comp1 0.54469 
Comp2 Comp2 0.90455 
Comp3 Comp3 0.85156 
 
Variance Explained 
by Each Factor 
Factor1 
1.8400540 
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Final Communality Estimates: Total 
= 1.840054 
Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 
0.29668774 0.81821072 0.72515554 
 
 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 3 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 1.52973380 0.46993706 0.5099 0.5099 
2 1.05979673 0.64932726 0.3533 0.8632 
3 0.41046947   0.1368 1.0000 
 
2 factors will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 Factor2 
IG1 IG1 0.85914 -0.28414 
IG2 IG2 0.88433 0.16819 
IG3 IG3 0.09782 0.97508 
 
Variance Explained by Each 
Factor 
Factor1 Factor2 
1.5297338 1.0597967 
 390 
 
Final Communality Estimates: Total 
= 2.589531 
IG1 IG2 IG3 
0.81885898 0.81033001 0.96034155 
 
 
 
 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 4 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 2.29738286 1.45808883 0.5743 0.5743 
2 0.83929403 0.34475565 0.2098 0.7842 
3 0.49453838 0.12575364 0.1236 0.9078 
4 0.36878473   0.0922 1.0000 
 
1 factor will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 
Disparity1 Disparity1 0.70099 
Disparity2 Disparity2 0.77802 
Disparity3 Disparity3 0.84808 
Disparity4 Disparity4 0.69387 
 
 391 
Variance Explained 
by Each Factor 
Factor1 
2.2973829 
 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.297383 
Disparity1 Disparity2 Disparity3 Disparity4 
0.49138510 0.60531353 0.71923541 0.48144883 
 
 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 6 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 3.87890959 3.24527928 0.6465 0.6465 
2 0.63363031 0.16239493 0.1056 0.7521 
3 0.47123538 0.06032763 0.0785 0.8306 
4 0.41090776 0.06792757 0.0685 0.8991 
5 0.34298019 0.08064342 0.0572 0.9563 
6 0.26233677   0.0437 1.0000 
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1 factor will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 
Conflict1 Conflict1 0.84603 
Conflict2 Conflict2 0.74144 
Conflict3 Conflict3 0.84688 
Conflict4 Conflict4 0.77766 
Conflict5 Conflict5 0.79553 
Conflict6 Conflict6 0.81154 
 
Variance Explained 
by Each Factor 
Factor1 
3.8789096 
 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 3.878910 
Conflict1 Conflict2 Conflict3 Conflict4 Conflict5 Conflict6 
0.71576152 0.54972824 0.71720977 0.60475627 0.63286418 0.65858961 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 7 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 4.40847251 3.53125854 0.6298 0.6298 
2 0.87721397 0.25274166 0.1253 0.7551 
3 0.62447231 0.26209014 0.0892 0.8443 
4 0.36238217 0.06573894 0.0518 0.8961 
5 0.29664323 0.05647745 0.0424 0.9385 
6 0.24016578 0.04951574 0.0343 0.9728 
7 0.19065004   0.0272 1.0000 
 
1 factor will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 
Dillema1 Dillema1 0.82985 
Dillema2 Dillema2 0.79610 
Dillema3 Dillema3 0.86987 
Dillema4 Dillema4 0.71735 
Dillema5 Dillema5 0.75353 
Dillema6 Dillema6 0.88495 
Dillema7 Dillema7 0.68105 
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Variance Explained 
by Each Factor 
Factor1 
4.4084725 
 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 4.408473 
Dillema1 Dillema2 Dillema3 Dillema4 Dillema5 Dillema6 Dillema7 
0.6886539
7 
0.6337810
0 
0.7566724
6 
0.5145913
1 
0.5678137
9 
0.7831294
3 
0.4638305
4 
 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 4 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 2.51321940 1.89284495 0.6283 0.6283 
2 0.62037446 0.03665910 0.1551 0.7834 
3 0.58371535 0.30102456 0.1459 0.9293 
4 0.28269079   0.0707 1.0000 
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1 factor will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 
DI1 DI1 0.83695 
DI2 DI2 0.87042 
DI3 DI3 0.71445 
DI4 DI4 0.73801 
 
Variance Explained 
by Each Factor 
Factor1 
2.5132194 
 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 2.513219 
DI1 DI2 DI3 DI4 
0.70049202 0.75762881 0.51043576 0.54466281 
 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 7 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 3.69647118 2.53101188 0.5281 0.5281 
2 1.16545929 0.47835815 0.1665 0.6946 
 396 
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 7 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
3 0.68710115 0.08721649 0.0982 0.7927 
4 0.59988466 0.04372606 0.0857 0.8784 
5 0.55615860 0.39633457 0.0795 0.9579 
6 0.15982402 0.02472292 0.0228 0.9807 
7 0.13510111   0.0193 1.0000 
 
2 factors will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 Factor2 
Involvement1 Involvement1 0.70952 0.08929 
Involvement2 Involvement2 0.86055 0.06287 
Involvement3 Involvement3 0.84676 0.07471 
Involvement4 Involvement4 0.76255 -0.51501 
Involvement5 Involvement5 0.71991 -0.52548 
Involvement6 Involvement6 0.64757 0.46012 
Involvement7 Involvement7 0.46520 0.62839 
 
Variance Explained by Each 
Factor 
Factor1 Factor2 
3.6964712 1.1654593 
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Final Communality Estimates: Total = 4.861930 
Involveme
nt1 
Involveme
nt2 
Involveme
nt3 
Involveme
nt4 
Involveme
nt5 
Involveme
nt6 
Involveme
nt7 
0.5113899
4 
0.7444969
9 
0.7225787
2 
0.8467079
5 
0.7943995
7 
0.6310641
7 
0.6112931
2 
 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 8 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 4.60643393 3.22664140 0.5758 0.5758 
2 1.37979253 0.81730322 0.1725 0.7483 
3 0.56248931 0.04864960 0.0703 0.8186 
4 0.51383972 0.19352965 0.0642 0.8828 
5 0.32031006 0.04879574 0.0400 0.9229 
6 0.27151432 0.07372716 0.0339 0.9568 
7 0.19778716 0.04995421 0.0247 0.9815 
8 0.14783296   0.0185 1.0000 
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2 factors will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 Factor2 
Org_separation1 Org_separation1 0.69578 -0.57800 
Org_separation2 Org_separation2 0.87543 0.03750 
Org_separation3 Org_separation3 0.89593 0.14003 
Org_separation4 Org_separation4 0.74839 0.49110 
Org_separation5 Org_separation5 0.54896 0.58055 
Org_separation6 Org_separation6 0.71469 -0.40851 
Org_separation7 Org_separation7 0.75086 -0.46455 
Org_separation8 Org_separation8 0.78564 0.25256 
 
Variance Explained by Each 
Factor 
Factor1 Factor2 
4.6064339 1.3797925 
 
Final Communality Estimates: Total = 5.986226 
Org_sep
aration1 
Org_sep
aration2 
Org_sep
aration3 
Org_sep
aration4 
Org_sep
aration5 
Org_sep
aration6 
Org_sep
aration7 
Org_sep
aration8 
0.818198
17 
0.767788
40 
0.822297
00 
0.801261
61 
0.638397
25 
0.677663
41 
0.779602
51 
0.681018
11 
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DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION MODEL 
 
The FACTOR Procedure 
Initial Factor Method: Principal Components 
Prior Communality Estimates: ONE  
Eigenvalues of the Correlation Matrix: Total 
= 2 Average = 1 
  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
1 1.71342326 1.42684653 0.8567 0.8567 
2 0.28657674   0.1433 1.0000 
1 factor will be retained by the MINEIGEN criterion. 
Factor Pattern 
  Factor1 
IP1 IP1 0.92559 
IP2 IP2 0.92559 
 
Variance Explained 
by Each Factor 
Factor1 
1.7134233 
 
Final Communality Estimates: 
Total = 1.713423 
IP1 IP2 
0.85671163 0.85671163 
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APPENDIX E 
